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Japan

Kaifu Praises CPSU for Ending Power Monopoly

OW0802075190 Tokyo KYODO in English 0724 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 8 KYODO—Japan praised the Soviet Communist Party leadership on Thursday for scrapping its monopoly on political power and for paving the way for a multi-party system.

Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu welcomed the decisions, made at a three-day plenary meeting of the Central Committee which ended Wednesday, during a campaign tour of Tottori in western Japan in preparation for the general election on February 18. Kaifu said the decisions by the party's Central Committee would accelerate dialogue and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States. Perestroika, engineered by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, will have a favorable impact on relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in Asia and the Pacific, Kaifu said. He said Japan would make every effort to resolve the dispute over the four Soviet-held islands off eastern Hokkaido to pave the way for the signing of a peace treaty between the two countries.

Meanwhile, the opposition parties hailed the Soviet Communist Party's new platform, and said the Soviet reforms would make a firm contribution to the promotion of political stability in the world.

Tsuruo Yamaguchi, secretary general of Japan's largest opposition party, the Japan Socialist Party, said Gorbachev's five-year campaign for reforms was meant to push the Soviet Union toward Western-style democracy.

Tetsuzo Fuwa, chairman of the Japan Communist Party Presidium, said it was natural for the Soviet Communist leadership to introduce a multi-party system, but noted that this did not imply the abolition of the communist movement in the Soviet Union.

Defense Vice Minister on U.S. Troop Cuts

OW0702162090 Tokyo KYODO in English 1502 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 7 KYODO—U.S. defense officials have no plans to pull frontline combat troops out of Japan but will take some steps to streamline its forces here, Vice Minister of Defense Seiki Nishihiro said Wednesday. Nishihiro had returned earlier from a series of consultations with defense officials in the United States and Europe.

Slight cutbacks in U.S. forces in Japan to improve efficiency and reduce excess personnel were being considered, Nishihiro said.

In meetings with U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Nishihiro discussed several elements in Asian security which

impeded larger cuts. U.S. officials said the modernization of Soviet defenses in the Far East and possible instability in China and the Korean peninsula made the Asian situation fundamentally different from that of East Europe. Large troop reductions in Europe have produced pressure for similar moves in Asia. There are some 50,000 U.S. troops in Japan. Reports of limited cutbacks in U.S. forces posted in Okinawa and Iwakuni, Yamaguchi Prefecture, surfaced before the announcement of selected troop withdrawals in Asia by Cheney last week.

Nishihiro said that Soviet Asian troops have replaced old, obsolete weapons with the latest armaments and are also stockpiling weaponry from forces pulled out of Europe. But the Defense Agency's second-in-command noted a marked reduction in the number of large-scale military exercises by the Soviets, adding the development of newer weaponry was unlikely.

Agency sources said late last month Japan's defense buildup plans are to be reviewed to reflect the findings of Nishihiro's visit, advancing Soviet reforms, and changes in East Europe.

U.S. Communications Site Being Built on Okinawa

OW0802104490 Naha NHK Television Network in Japanese 0315 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] It has been learned that a new communications facility is being built at the U.S. Forces' [USF] Northern training ground located in Kunigami-son. According to a source, the facility consists of one steel tower about 50 meters high, which will be used for receiving and sending ultra high frequency communications waves, and one building. The facility is located almost at the top of Mount Iyu in the Northern training ground near the border between Kunigami-son and Higashi-son. Construction reportedly started around August last summer.

The construction of the facility is part of the USF communications system modernization, according to a source concerned with the USF. The facility will be a relay station that connects a satellite ground station on Camp Zukeran in Ginowan City, a communication station on Mount Yae in Motobu-cho, and a communications facilities in mainland Japan. The satellite ground station at Camp Zukeran is one of the important ground stations for the U.S. Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), which connects the facilities of the USF in Japan and the United States. It is thought that the communications facility, disclosed at this time, will reinforce communications systems such as DSCS.

Many people in Kunigami-son are not aware of the construction because the facility is located on the top of the mountain and is away from the residential area. Thus, there is no opposition to the construction. A Kinugami-son official explained that he did not want the new facility to be built even if it did not have a direct effect on the village people when used for military exercises.

Election Monitoring Team To Go to Nicaragua

OW0602115990 Tokyo KYODO in English 1107 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 6 KYODO—Japan will dispatch six individuals to Nicaragua on February 15 to help monitor the country's general elections on February 25, the Foreign Ministry announced in a release issued Tuesday. The release, meanwhile, called attention to reported "intimidation to and harassment of candidates" by the Sandinista Government and called on Nicaragua to make "utmost efforts for the holding of fair and free elections."

Joining the 200-member international observer force will be six Spanish-speaking Japanese, including one Foreign Ministry official, three former members of Japan's Peace Corps, a professor, and a gardener, officials said. Four support staff will accompany the group, they said.

Japanese participation in the UN project will be its second such endeavor following the dispatch of 31 personnel to monitor the elections in Namibia last November.

The ministry statement called attention to reports of "obstructive practices (in Nicaragua) such as the intimidation to and harassment of candidates." Officials said the reference was to improper activities being carried out by the Sandinista Government. "The Government of Japan earnestly hopes that the Supreme Electoral Council of Nicaragua will make the utmost efforts for the holding of fair and free elections," the statement urged. It said Japan will provide reconstruction assistance to the war-tattered country "once a genuine peace is achieved in the region."

"That means the simple holding of elections is not enough," said ministry spokesman Taizo Watanabe. "There should be a national reconciliation," he said. Watanabe also pointed to alleged aid by the Sandinista Government to insurgents in El Salvador and other countries and said "those acts should be stopped."

ROK Urges Japan To Settle Residents Issue

OW0702155290 Tokyo KYODO in English 1510 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] Seoul, Feb. 7 KYODO—The South Korean Government Wednesday called for Japan to cooperate in promoting settlement of bilateral issues such as the legal status of third generation Korean residents in Japan, the Japanese ambassador to South Korea said Wednesday.

Ambassador Shinichi Yanai denied reports in Seoul that South Korean President No Tae-u will postpone his visit to Japan, expected in the first half of 1990, until both nations agree on the pending issues.

South Korean Vice Foreign Minister Yu Chong-ha summoned Yanai to the ministry on Wednesday and told

him that No urged Japan to resolve the issues pending between the two nations as soon as possible, Yanai said.

The issues include the return to their homeland of Koreans in Sakhalin and the question of Korean atom-bomb sufferers, the ambassador said.

Third generation Korean residents of Japan, who are the children of those Koreans born in Japan on January 17, 1971 or later, have no legal protection by Japanese authorities.

During Japan's 1910-1945 colonial rule of Korea, many Koreans were taken to Japan as forced labor, and some to Sakhalin which was then Japanese territory.

NHK Televises Election Debate—Part Two

OW0602050990 Tokyo NHK General Television Network in Japanese 0502 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Part Two of two-part televised "Open Debate Among Party Heads," sponsored by the Japan National Press Club (JNPC), at the press center in Uchisaiwai-cho, Tokyo; participants are Toshiki Kaifu, president of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Takako Doi, chairwoman of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), Koshiro Ishida, chairman of Komeito, Tetsuzo Fuwa, Presidium chairman of the Communist Party of Japan (JCP), and Eiichi Nagasue, chairman of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP); Kenya Mizukami, chairman of the JNPC Board of Directors, acts as overall moderator; MAINICHI SHIMBUN chief commentator Akira Saito, YOMIURI SHIMBUN chief commentator Osamu Shima, and ASAHI SHIMBUN editorial writer Toyozo Tanaka, representing three groups of four journalists each, collate and ask questions—live. For Part One of the debate, see the East Asia DAILY REPORT of 6 February]

[Text] [Mizukami] In part two, questions from the floor collated and organized into three groups will be asked by a representative of each group. The three representatives will act as moderators. Each will have 20 minutes. Therefore, we request that the party leaders limit their remarks to around a minute [laughter] or even shorter. Please bear with us. The first group of questions will center on international issues. The first group consists of Akira Saito, chief commentator of MAINICHI SHIMBUN; Mitsuo Murase, deputy chief editor of NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN; Sotaro Ishikawa, SANKEI SHIMBUN commentator; and Hiroshi Eguchi, KYODO news service International Reporting Department. Mr. Saito will represent the group. Mr. Saito, please take over. The moderator is also asked to make his remarks brief. [laughter] Please.

[Saito] I will make my remarks as short as possible. While listening to your discussions earlier, I somehow felt a gap in your understanding of international issues. In the opening statements of the party leaders, none of you mentioned the isolation of Japan. In particular, there has been no serious statement on the crisis in

Japan-U.S. relations. We are very concerned that in the past year or two, Japan-U.S. relations have indeed fallen into a critical stage. As a very real problem, we have already received reports that the theory of Japan's threat will emerge during the U.S. mid-term elections. In such a case, how will your parties explain to the voters straightforwardly about this most serious problem for Japan, the crisis in Japan-U.S. relations, and how do you hope to achieve a breakthrough in this crisis? I would like to ask Mr Kaifu first how he will explain this crisis.

[Kaifu] I fully understand that there are problems in Japan-U.S. relations, for instance those involving economic issues, and I think that we should overcome such problems. However, I do not think they amount to a crisis. If we let them develop to such a stage, it will be the end of everything. Therefore, for instance, in the structural impediments initiative [SII] talks, we are working very hard to prepare a document to be completed in March. I, myself, am working very hard based on the outcome of the Japan-U.S. summit talks and the commitment made with President Bush to overcome this situation through efforts on both sides. We are continuing efforts to resolve the crisis. That is how I look at it.

[Saito] However, it is a very real problem that Japan-U.S. relations have indeed become very hazardous in the past five or six years. That happened under the LDP administration, which regards Japan-U.S. friendly relations as the core of its policy. On that point, please tell us what went wrong in LDP policy? Is the LDP not responsible?

[Kaifu] There is absolutely no crisis in the overall basic relationship of trust between Japan and the United States. As I said earlier, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty covers not only the security aspect but, also cooperation in the more wide-ranging aspect of economic security. I firmly believe that the foundation of Japan-U.S. relations is very sturdy. However, as you said, in the past few years, problems have arisen, as symbolized by the fact that the favorable trade balance on the Japanese side—or the U.S. trade deficit—exceeded \$50 billion in the past year or two. I think the U.S. side's argument is that we should exert greater effort to expand domestic demand. If we take the arrogant attitude of doing nothing and thinking that it would be good to make as much profit as possible or just to produce cheap and durable goods, it would indeed become a crisis. However, as I said, if we make efforts to become a major importing country, correct the price gap between Japan and foreign countries, and take other steps in domestic politics, I believe we will surely be able to overcome the crisis. I will persist in such efforts.

[Saito] Are you saying that there is nothing wrong in past LDP policy and that things just turned out the way they did?

[Kaifu] I believe that overall, there is nothing wrong in our past policy.

[Saito] Are you saying that it would have been the same even if the LDP was not in power?

[Kaifu] We can say that it was the LDP that brought about the vitality of Japanese companies, which in turn resulted in the trade friction. I cannot say what would have happened if another party was in power. I do not know. However, the LDP feels that, by treasuring the economic cooperation between the two countries, as stated in the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, we can overcome this.

[Saito] One more question. I think the problem is public opinion in both countries regarding the economic issues. As you know, there has been a marked change in U.S. public opinion concerning Japan in the past year or two. That has been seen in various polls. The United States is a democratic country, and when public opinion is mobilized, there is a possibility it might get out of control. Such a problem might arise. Therefore, even if we in Japan think that things are all right, problems might still arise on the U.S. side. What do you think of that?

[Kaifu] A cultural difference has indeed been pointed out. When I went to Boston, I listened to the views of 16 U.S. intellectuals and discussed various issues with them without setting any prior time limit. As we are basically different historically and culturally, it will be difficult to achieve total agreement. Even so, if we work really hard and exert efforts to develop our relationship of trust and consciousness on the greater issue of the common responsibility to treasure the values of freedom and democracy and to coordinate policies, I think we will overcome that through policy coordination. I have received a message from the U.S. President about holding talks without setting any prior agenda. I myself would also like to do that as soon as possible if I have the time. I think Japan should exert every effort to strengthen the relationship of trust, not only on economic issues but also on all issues.

[Saito] Now to Mrs. Doi. As I said earlier, we believe that Japan is in a very bad position internationally. You said that Japan-U.S. relations are important. However, the JSP does not stress the fact that Japan-U.S. relations are in a crisis situation as a focal issue. What is the reason for this?

[Doi] Well, that is because there is the question of whether issues considered vital here in Japan are directly reflected in the various negotiations and in the substance of cooperative relations so far. Things that are indeed considered of crisis proportions from the standpoint of the consumers may not necessarily look that way to the business operators. Do you not agree? I believe that we should act from the standpoint of the consumers.

[Saito] Let me ask you another question. In the United States, there is a strong feeling of hostility against Japan. Some people are starting to talk about repealing the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. For now, they are a minority, but there is the possibility that such opinion

might spread. In your opinion, Mrs. Doi, is this a welcome or undesirable trend for the JSP?

[Doi] Looking at the overall trend in the world, the United States itself has maintained that the present Security Treaty is meaningful only under Cold War conditions. Because conditions are becoming ripe to reexamine the strategy of power politics, under which armaments were relentlessly expanded, I think that moves to disarm and to work for relaxation of tensions will simultaneously become a major outcome of the trend. I believe that is a desirable trend in considering what roles we can play to promote global coexistence and mutual benefit on issues such as environmental conservation, economic cooperation, technical cooperation, manpower cooperation, and other areas.

[Saito] Do you think such a trend is desirable?

[Doi] Yes.

[Saito] I see. There is a question from Nihon Television's Mr. Sakurai, who is present here. He would like to ask Mrs. Doi this question. On your remark that you would respect the Maekawa report on international economic order, what are your intentions concerning market liberalization in which Japan is being forced to open its agriculture? Please give us your reply.

[Doi] Ah, the agricultural issue. I have wanted to talk about that. Among the existing issues being discussed, I think the agricultural issue for Japan is a matter of life and death. On the agricultural issue, I believe that Japan's task is to create a basis for agriculture survival and to establish a secure system of self-sufficiency. As for rice, it will not be viable under liberalized conditions. It is out of the question. The Diet has adopted a resolution on it. It seems the LDP is not quite sure of itself as evidenced by the recent statement by Minister of International Trade and Industry Matsunaga. I think we should make it utterly clear that we cannot do it.

[Saito] On that point, I would like to ask one more question. For instance, there is the Uruguay round slated for December. As you all know, during the meeting of agricultural ministers of the United States, Japan, and the European countries in January, Japan was very isolated. That was reported in the papers. If that trend continues, Japan will be isolated at the Uruguay round. What should Japan do? For example, should it overturn the Uruguay round conference table?

[Doi interrupts] Of course not.

[Saito] Should it think about withdrawing from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT]?

[Doi] Of course not. Reciprocity should apply both to the Uruguay round and GATT. That is basic. In the case of Japan... [changes thought] Come to think of it, the European countries and the United States give much weight to self-sufficiency when it concerns agriculture or agricultural products. As you know, Japan's degree of self-sufficiency in grain is about 30 percent, the lowest in

the advanced countries. Japan should exert efforts in the Uruguay round toward formulating a general rule for dealing with countries with a low rate of self-sufficiency based on actual conditions in those countries.

[Saito] The problem is whether it is possible.

[Doi] Of course, but we must exert utmost efforts in that respect—reciprocity is the rule.

[Saito] The problem is whether it is possible.

[Doi] We would like to try and do it.

[Saito] Mr. Fuwa, may I? Mr. Fuwa, you said and pointed out a while ago that it is not good to take a subservient attitude in Japan-U.S. relations. Although I fully understand that the stand of Mr. Shintaro Ishihara and that of the JCP are different, Mr. Ishihara recently wrote a book entitled "A Japan That Can Say No," and it became very controversial. On this point, with regard to the attitude toward the United States, I have a feeling that the JCP, or Mr. Fuwa's remarks are similar to what Mr. Ishihara said. [laughter] Would you care to comment?

[Fuwa] I have not read the book. [laughter]

[Saito] Is that so?

[Fuwa] However, a Japan that cannot say no is certainly an anomaly even in the world. Earlier, I cited a Reagan adviser talking about our abnormal submissiveness. Not only the United States but also Europe sees us as abnormal. I think it is quite clear that such abnormal submissiveness, to the contrary, hinders the solution of problems between Japan and the United States. With regard to Japan-U.S. relations, I maintain that during the prewar period, relations were one of enmity and in the postwar period became one of subordination. I think it is high time we established truly equal, friendly relations. Because the relationship of subordination is founded on the security setup and because it is assumed that if Japan withdraws from the military power setup or if Japan refuses to form a military alliance or provide bases, then it is being unfriendly. This is not necessarily so. Truly equal relations should be established. I think they should be the starting point in reexamining present Japan-U.S. negotiations.

[Saito] U.S. public opinion, as shown in many polls, considers Japan the greatest economic power, and superior even to the United States. In such a situation, would the American people be convinced by talk of subordination? That is very different from what the American people believe.

[Fuwa] I do not know whether the American people will be convinced, but I am talking about a fact.

[Saito] The fact as seen on the other side is different. We should also respect it. Do you not think so? Just as we respect Japanese public opinion.

[Fuwa] On this question of Japan-U.S. friction, it is a well-known fact—even on the U.S. side—that it will not be resolved unless something is done on the U.S. side about its twin deficits. On the Japanese side, as I said a while ago, we even have cases of death from overwork. Take the system of low cost through overwork. Japan should stand for the interests of its own workers and people in solving that problem. The result will contribute to a basic solution. Efforts on both sides are necessary. It will not do for both sides not to exert sufficient efforts on the vital issues and waste time negotiating on other areas instead. In dealing with the substance of these other areas, Japan is diplomatically submissive. Although the big companies do whatever they please, when it comes to foreign relations, Japan shows an abnormal submissiveness astonishing even to the United States. I think that is also a fact.

[Saito] Let me ask one more question. A while ago, you said that you would absolutely oppose the liberalization of rice. I asked Mrs. Doi the same question and would like to ask you. I believe that opposing liberalization will most likely be impossible at the Uruguay round. If such is the case, then what will you do?

[Fuwa] We propose that the issue be excluded from the negotiations at the Uruguay round. There is no rule saying that a country like Japan, where rice is the staple food and where a staple food control system is in place, should be subject unconditionally to GATT restrictions. We compromised and got into such a situation. We should withdraw without any second thoughts. If we look at the self-sufficiency rate, the British self-sufficiency rate in calories of 48 percent 20 years ago is now more than 80 percent. The self-sufficiency rate of 66 percent for Germany 20 years ago has now been increased to 90 percent. When a country's self-sufficiency rate in food declines, it is only proper for that country's government to take all possible measures to rehabilitate agriculture and produce food. There should be a radical change in the long-running LDP regime, which has not considered that the government's responsibility. I think it should effect that change even though it is a conservative party.

[Saito] I see. Mr. Ishida.

[Ishida] Yes.

[Saito] I would like to ask you. The implementation of Super 301 is now an immediate problem. Sanctions might be imposed on Japanese products. In such a case, in your opinion, how should Japan react? What should it do?

[Ishida] In my opinion, as I said earlier, the basic problem in Japan-U.S. trade friction lies in the problems of the U.S. industrial structure. Take the automobile industry or the high-technology sector; the structure is such that they must depend on 80-percent imports in order to make any U.S. product. I think they should fundamentally correct that structure. As I said a while ago, it will not do to force them to do it alone. Japan should also take administrative measures to enable U.S.

companies to enter the Japanese market. For instance, the land issue should be solved. While demonstrating that Japan is trying hard in domestic politics, there is no other way but to conduct on-the-spot negotiations.

[Saito] I see. Then I would like to ask Mr. Nagasue. As I said earlier, I feel the Japan-U.S. relationship is coming to a crossroad this year, and I am uneasy about that situation. Now Mr. Nagasue, do you feel the same way as I do?

[Nagasue] What we are concerned about most are the advances of the Japanese into the United States in various forms. It is all right if they are there only to visit the country, but they are there buying land and buildings. Such things stand out conspicuously. Where trade balance is concerned, even though exports to the country have decreased somewhat, Japan's exports still remain a major problem to the United States. Americans are wondering why the Japanese, despite the problem, want to minimize their defense burdens, and claim their position is justified. The United States is fully aware that the basic reason for the country's financial deficit is the overextended military costs. That is why they have such laws as the Gramm-Rudman Law. That is why the U.S. Congress has passed a number of resolutions calling on Japan to double its military defense spending. The United States has also called on Japan to increase its international cooperation, including the so-called Official Development Aid [ODA]. They have been saying that Japan should expand its overall cooperation, and they are charging that Japan is only interested in selling its products to the United States, thinking only about its own self-interests. They are demanding that Japan play a fair game.

[Saito] With regard to international cooperation, I would like to ask once again. Japan's ODA burden is about half of what other industrialized nations aim to bear—0.7 percent of their GNP. Of course, there have arisen various questions as to how the funds have been used. But aside from that question, do you think that if Japan gives 0.7 percent, that is good enough?

[Nagasue] No, that is not good enough. Japan, following the spirit of its Constitution, does not allow military spending in amounts at a level of the United States. Therefore, when Japan draws up ODA plans, I think it should view the matter more systematically and on a larger scale. Japan itself has been a poor country. Right now, all ministries and offices concerned are acting individually, and when the figures put out by them are lumped together, they come to about 0.7 percent of the GNP. The government has no integrated overseas cooperation plan. Hence there is no way for the United States or other nations to know Japan's plan. As a result, it cannot provide assistance to sectors on which countries such as the United States think Japan should place emphasis. Japan should talk with other countries and let them know that even though it cannot increase its military spending, it will do certain things in areas of

overseas aid. If that had been done adequately, the present fiction would not have occurred, I believe.

[Saito] There are so many things we could talk about in the area of international situations, including Gorbachev's perestroika. The allotted time, however, is only 20 minutes, and we have one or two minutes left. Now I would like to ask Mr. Fuwa. You said your party is supporting the CPSU stand. Does this mean that your party approves the perestroika pursued by Gorbachev—the policy of new structuring?

[Fuwa] Gorbachev, realizing errors committed by the Soviet socialism of the past, is doing what he can to bring democracy and openness to the nation. We support those actions. In fact, they should be done more thoroughly. On the other hand, he is pursuing a superpower-centered policy, envisaging superpowers to lead other nations and to contain movements of smaller nations. He is pushing for that policy, calling it a policy of new thinking. We object to such action.

[Saito] I am told it is time to end this part of the debate. I would like Mr. Mizukami to take over from here.

[Mizukami] Thank you so much, Mr. Saito. We will go into the next part of the debate dealing with questions filed by the second group. The questions from the second group have been sorted out and reorganized by Mr. Osamu Shima, chief editorial writer of YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Mr. Mitsunaga Tabata, deputy director of TBS Broadcasting Station, Mr. Sue Kawauchi, editorial member of TELEVISION ASASHI, and Mr. Kenzo Uchida, political commentator. On their behalf, the YOMIURI SHIMBUN chief editorial writer, Mr. Shima, will present the questions, acting as a moderator. Mr. Shima, please.

[Shima] Concerning the issue of political reform, I think right now, the worst case would be for us not to do anything at all, no matter how much we advocate idealist theories. A case in point concerns the amendment of the Political Funds Control Law, which came out in the earlier discussion. Although each party may have certain misgivings about the content of the amendments, do you not think that what is important is to make some progress, no matter how little? I would like to address this question to all the party leaders, and particularly to Mr. Fuwa and Mr. Ishida, who have said that both corporate donations and labor union donations should be opposed. Second, the question of redistribution of parliamentary seats. There is a Diet resolution about that. At the same time, in the midst of the chaos—excuse me for using the term—during the past attempt at redistribution, one seat was added to the original 512 seats. I thought that seat would be eliminated before the present election, but nothing has been done. How would you explain this to the people? Third, the election system. All parties, except for the LDP, boycotted the hearings of the Election System Research Council. Why do you refuse to participate in the hearings on the election system? You raise the distribution of seats as the

problem, but is it not the Diet's job to adopt a resolution on that? And is it not a problem that the Diet should tackle? Furthermore, if the Election System Research Council arrives at a fair conclusion, would you fully respect it? I would like to ask each party leader that. Let us first start with Mr. Ishida and Mr. Fuwa, followed by Mr. Kaifu and the others, in that order.

[Ishida] First, I would like to talk about the Political Funds Control Law. We have imposed strict rules about that. We prohibit donations from corporations and organizations. When it comes to an issue like this, I think there is no other way but to urge all parties to observe the rules.

On the redistribution of Diet seats, I think that at the stage of revising the election system, it will be very difficult to decide on the number of seats at the Diet level, because the ambitions of all parties come into conflict. In that sense, I suggest that as a new venue there should be legislation providing for a Diet seats committee. For instance, I think that we should follow the West German formula and work out favorable solutions to settle issues on both rezoning and redistribution.

It has been mentioned that the opposition seemed to have boycotted the Election System Research Council. However, regarding the appointment of members to the council, we think that the majority of the members appointed lean toward the LDP. That is the reason we boycotted the council.

[Fuwa] First of all, let me talk about the political funds issue. We have long advocated the prohibition of donations by enterprises and organizations. Despite different views on donations by organizations, the opposition reached an accord last summer that donations by corporations should be banned, and we made a proposal in that connection. We hope that the first possible step was taken by banning enterprise donations.

As for the second issue concerning the election system, it should be pointed out that the differential between the proper proportioning and the actual proportioning of lower house seating has now reached 3.15 times. The starting point of the differential was 1.66 times, and you will notice that the gap has widened quite a bit. As for the differential of the upper house seating, it was found out to be 6.29 times, and yet no correction has been made since the end of the war. Compared with the ratio of 2.62 times at the starting point, the differential has certainly widened by a large margin. Thus, urgent measures should be taken to correct the imbalance. I think that the majority party, which has neglected the issue, should seriously be held responsible.

As far as the Election System Research Council is concerned, it was decided at the last Diet session that the issues discussed at the council meetings should not have been taken up at the Election System Research Council, and that because those issues involve political parties, they should be taken up at the Diet sessions. Despite that

decision, the council meetings were held, and that is the reason that we did not attend the council meetings.

[Kaifu] It is said that in promoting political reforms, we take one step forward sometimes and two steps backward at other times, that we must carry out anything connected with reforms, and that the worst decision is not to act at all. I think that is quite true. The partially revised Public Office Election Law that was passed at the last Diet session was put into effect only yesterday. I think that strictly revised law, based on the British Anticorruption Law of 1883, is an initial step toward promoting reforms.

Moreover, during our discussions within our party, we have noted differing views on how to collect political funds in a more transparent and cleaner way. We will, however, have to overcome the difference in our views, and we are submitting a bill to the Diet to request deliberations by both the ruling and opposition parties. In addition, we will also submit a bill for the Asset Disclosure Law in which something very common is stipulated—that political funds should never be used for private purposes, but merely as political funds. Apart from that, we also plan to strengthen the functions of the Political Ethics Research Council in the Diet.

[Shima] Mrs. Doi, please.

[Doi] Yes, yes. I mentioned earlier the difference between donations made by corporations and by trade unions. But I would like to say that I did not mean to give the impression that I am merely emphasizing the difference. However, I will handle the issue by banning donations by both corporations and trade unions, and I feel that I must take that approach. After the election, we will work out a party resolution about banning donations and we will clarify our position on the legislation.

Next comes the issue of open information [joho kokai], which is certainly an important issue. It is said that every one of us will be asked to make public his assets. However, because open information is not yet sufficiently guaranteed in Japanese politics, I feel that it will be necessary to establish such an approach firmly, and, at the same time, such bills as the Open Information Law should be submitted.

And as mentioned earlier, the Diet adopted a resolution on the issue of [words indistinct] in 1986, and we feel that we should start by banning and abolishing two-member constituency and six-member constituency systems. Diet resolutions should be implemented first, and then come other reforms.

[Nagasue] Concerning the Political Fund Control Law, the Socialist Democratic Party [DSP] has so far made efforts to bring about some progress in promoting it. Concerning the issue of donations by corporations, let us take a look at the contributions made to various parties in 1988. It should be noted that individual contributions accounted merely for less than two percent. We are quite surprised that the percentage is so small.

Take my own case as an example. Former comrades have now become presidents of certain corporations and one of them brought me ¥30,000 as a party contribution, and that brought tears to my eyes. Then, I came to understand why individual contributions constitute only a small portion. Because I think that individual contributions should be the starting point, whenever the issue is brought up we state the need to consider seriously the introduction of a system of providing public subsidies to political parties.

It is true that in this mass society—or rather a huge society of mass media—it certainly takes money to participate in various political activities, and dues collected from party members alone cannot support such activities. We have to appeal frankly to the nation about these points, and also about the need for political parties to have funds collected in such a way that it is visible to the public. As for disclosing individuals' assets, the DSP has decided to disclose assets of its members of the Diet. Concerning the issue of redistribution of the lower house seats, Mr. Kaifu has just mentioned that arbitration by the speaker of the house was correct. But the LDP has done nothing for at least three years now. [Shima interrupts, indicating time is up] No action was taken. As for the election system

[Shima, interrupting again] Mr. Nagase, the time is up now. In listening to what has been mentioned, I regret that it seems that you are talking only about official stands; you have not indicated any intention to take any actual actions.

Those of you who believe that the current election system is all right and that the system need not be changed, please raise your hands.

[Fuwa] You mean, there is no need to change it?

[Doi] Do you mean for the time being? [Video shows all leaders except Mr. Kaifu raising their hands]

[Shima] Then, in that case, when the Election System Research Council submits its recommendations, the prospects for change would be very gloomy. Is that right?

[Nagasue, raising hand] That is what I wanted to point out. We wanted to follow the arbitration of the speaker of the house to settle the imbalance in seating distribution. We did our best, but no action was taken. On the contrary, when the Election System Research Council was formed, it immediately started studying the small constituency system. Various parties were asked to state their views. We asked them to stop for a while because the issue that should be settled first was the one on the disproportionate seating in the house....

[Shima, interrupting] My question was whether or not it is all right to continue with the existing election system.

[Doi] I am not saying that it will be a correct system forever. I think we must spend more time on this issue

and make efforts to revise the system. As for the measures to revise it, I think it will be necessary to have proportional representation as the core of the system.

[Shima, interrupting] Then, in your opinion, it will be necessary to change the system. Is that correct?

[Doi, nodding] We would like to make efforts to improve the system.

[Ishida] In principle, Komeito believes that it is all right to have a medium constituency system. If you look at the small constituency system adopted by the ROK, you will understand the situation. The malpractice of vote buying has prevailed there. The Amami-Oshima is another example. The one-member constituency system was introduced using that special constituency on that island. If you visit the island now, you will notice that deeply rooted conflicts persist among the voters even to this day. It certainly does not indicate that a money-free election can be conducted there. In this sense, Komeito feels that it would be all right to have the medium constituency system.

[Shima] I am afraid that we are half way through the allotted time, so we will drop this issue now.

[Doi, interrupting] The reason we do not agree to the small constituency system....

[Shima, continuing] Due to the time left, we will go on to other questions.

[Doi, interrupting] Well, I am opposed to the small constituency system.

[Shima] It has been said that in making preparations for internationalization and for the aging society, we must carry out various reforms. Naturally, in promoting some reforms, our people may be asked to share a greater burden or to suffer more. Of course, we have to resolve such problems. I feel that herein lies the politicians' responsibility.

However, when we take a look at your public pledges, none of you has explained the possible serious situation to the public. In our earlier discussions, we touched on the issue of revenue sources for welfare purposes in connection with the consumption tax issue. However, I am very disappointed, because Mr. Ishida and other leaders did not go further to the core of that issue in their responses. But we the people, who hold the voting right, are concerned about the situation. Is it really all right for politicians to take such an optimistic view of the situation?

Concerning these problems, I would like to ask all party leaders this question: How do you plan to appeal to the public about the possible serious situation? Please be specific. Mrs. Doi, will you start first? Let us start with the opposition parties.

[Doi] In dealing with the social welfare issue, we have to work out definite programs with practical contents. Our

society is aging each day, and we know what the state of the society will be when we greet the year 2020. First, we must work out concrete programs. As local governments will play major roles, various localities should first decide on a policy to establish a system, then work out definite programs, and finally think about the question of how the revenue sources can be ensured. I think that is the correct order for handling the issue.

In that connection, I think that precisely the reverse order was taken in recklessly introducing the consumption tax, and then calling it the tax for welfare purposes when criticized. I feel it is like doing a handstand. Regarding the welfare issue, first of all, planning should be carried out precisely. Then measures must be taken to deal with the revenue sources. I believe that is the correct order for dealing with the issue.

[Shima] Mr. Ishida, please answer in more concrete terms and not in abstract terms.

[Ishida] First, I think it is very important to make a projection of the future picture of social welfare, of the minimum to be guaranteed by the state. In that sense, when we make that projection, we will come to know how many financial resources are required. Another thing—I think we will have to consider the proportion of the people's share of the burden. Looking at the situation in Europe, the percentage is 56 in West Germany and 54 in Britain. In Sweden, it is 73 percent. Based on such a situation, we should study and compare the conditions of social welfare in those countries. We believe that the appropriate rate of the Japanese people's share in the future should be around 45 percent, and we are now working hard to draw up a comprehensive plan. [Chime is sounded] We are deliberating in this context.

[Shima] Mr. Fuwa, please.

[Fuwa] You have been talking about pain. In Japan at present, one of the sectors that is in a privileged position of not having to feel any pain in terms of fiscal and economic policies is big business. For instance, in terms of tax contributions, the share of companies capitalized at more than 10 billion yen is six percent lower than those capitalized at less than 100 million yen. They are in such a privileged position. When we look at the existing accounting systems in the world, it is only in Japan that latent assets do not appear in accounting sheets. The major manufacturers are allowed to hold 500 trillion yen worth of latent assets and banks 1,000 trillion yen in latent assets. They are allowed to hold enormous assets. I think something has to be done about that. One more privileged sector concerns the arms buildup. In 1980, Japan's military capability was eighth in the world by the NATO method of calculation. At present, it has surpassed Britain, West Germany, France, and China and has reached third place. When the people are feeling pain, it is of course necessary to control the privileged sectors. From there, various problems can be solved. I think that is the main point.

[Nagasue] We at the DSP have made computations up to the year 2010 based on the assumption that the aged would not work at all and would only receive their pension. Because the average age of the aged is gradually becoming higher, I think the issue of employing the aged should be given more consideration in welfare policy. Employment will reduce the payment of pension and that will have favorable effects on the government's finances. As to the question of how much the ultimate share of the tax burden should be, in connection with the Consumption Tax Abolition Bill, we intend to spend two years studying a tax reform law, in which process we will not totally negate indirect taxes. That will be the starting point. It will be impossible to cover all pension payments with the present premium. Because we will have to become a responsible ruling party, we will have to think about how much of which part of the revenue should be used to cover such payments. However, because we still have time before 2010, we propose to draw up the plans in two years.

[Shima] There is a saying that you have to start with rice gruel. With regard to political reform, a pessimistic mood has been observed in the LDP recently. In connection with reform under such a condition, how would you address your strong appeals to the people?

[Kaifu] As I said, the Kaifu cabinet started at the lowest point, when the LDP was experiencing its worst crisis since the founding of the party. I believe that the LDP has not forgotten how it felt at that time. Therefore, we intend to appeal the issue through the election. As I said earlier, the LDP will take the lead in working for passage of the legislation on ethics pending in the Diet in the next Diet session. Unless we implement reform through such measures... [changes thought] a while ago I talked about painful policy efforts. Take for instance, the Basic Land Law. After it has been passed, we have to work on new land policies based on the concept that land is public property, that it should not be an object of speculation, and that it should be fully used. During such a process, radical measures to promote political reform should also be taken simultaneously. That is a matter of course. Because we will be requesting that people make tax contributions and accept the new concept in the land issue [chime is sounded] we will also do our best in political reform.

[Shima] A while ago, Mr. Ishida, you said that even if the LDP retains the majority after the election, joining hands is out of the question. On the other hand, you also said that with regard to legislation relating to the budget, which is predicated on the consumption tax, there may be occasions for serious discussions from the standpoint of the people's interest. That was a very delicate expression. Please clarify Komeito's attitude toward the LDP after the general election. Tell us under what conditions there will be cooperation with the LDP.

[Ishida] We ourselves have not asked to cooperate. We are basically against the consumption tax, as I said

earlier, and we think that it should be abolished. Moreover, looking at the election situation, the support rate of the opposition parties may exceed 50 percent. In such a case, that means the majority is against the consumption tax. Considering the people's opinion, I believe that the consumption tax should be abolished. However, if under such circumstances, the LDP also opts to abolish the tax, I think that will call for major discussions. That was what I meant. In short, we are against the tax. With regard to related issues, we do not intend to change our basic position of opposition. However, as a practical problem, things may not turn out the way we want them. Then, of course, I think there will be discussions among the various parties. To say that there will be such discussions does not mean that I am for or against them.

[Shima] What I am asking is this: Is there any possibility that you alone will go over to the LDP, cutting off the former JSP-Komeito-DSP ties.

[Ishida] I am not sure to which sort of circumstances you are referring, but we have no intention of compromising on the current issues of the consumption tax and political reform.

[Shima] Last, let me ask Mr. Kaifu.

[Kaifu] Yes.

[Shima] There are dissonant voices inside the LDP concerning whether or not to continue with the Kaifu administration. I do believe that if the LDP gains a majority, the Kaifu administration will naturally continue until the end of your term of office in October next year. Please tell us your personal conviction.

[Kaifu] I am the first LDP president ever elected by vote. During my second term, there was a consensus, or I was supported unanimously. People encouraged me to carry on. I am determined to seek the people's support, help the LDP win a majority, and go to the Diet. If we implement our radical revision, I am absolutely sure that the consumption tax will become much better than what it is now. I intend to listen fully to the opposition parties' views on the issue, and we must continue our efforts at persuasion. That will be the basis. I am determined to make the LDP win. There is no change in that basic direction.

[Shima] Time is up. Mr. Mizukami, please.

[Mizukami] Mr. Shima, thank you for your efforts. Next, we will go on to the third group of questions centering on economic issues. The third group of questions was collated by Toyozo Tanaka, ASAHI SHIMBUN deputy chief commentator; Ichiro Hirose, TOKYO SHIMBUN editorial advisor; Soshichi Miyachi, Tokyo Television chief commentator; and Sakuya Fujiwara, JIJI PRESS commentator. We have come to the last runner of the ekiden-style relay. Representing the third group is Mr. Tanaka. Please.

[Tanaka] We have come to the last part. Here, we would like to have a more thorough discussion on the policy

issues which are very closely related to and very important for our livelihood. There are many issues, but I would like to start with the land issue. You were talking about that earlier. At present, the situation has somehow become such that no matter how hard a young person works, he will not be able to own a house. Not only that, but the gap is widening steadily between those who do and those who do not own land. We have come to a point where something really has to be done. I would like to ask Mr. Kaifu: In the LDP's policies, or in your election slogans, you call for safeguarding the free economic system. If you are calling for safeguarding the present system, what is needed now and what I think is indispensable is to effect a radical and fundamental U-turn to deal with the strains generated by the system in its development process, or in the free economic system's process of promoting all-important freedom and democracy. I think this has been most intensively manifested in the land issue. What are your views on that?

[Kaifu] I think you're right. For the past several years, we have been subject to the criticism that speculative investments in land, particularly in and around Tokyo, are depriving workers of their dream of owning houses someday. We are keenly aware of the problem, and we cannot leave the situation unattended. That is why we had the so-called Basic Land Law adopted, based on the concept that land is for use and should not be the object of speculative buying and selling. If we review why land prices have risen so high, we can see that it is because Tokyo has become an international financial center, and new demands for offices have arisen. We can also see that it is due to the unfavorable aftermath of the excessive concentration of people in Tokyo now showing itself. The problem is compounded by easing credit or loans extended in connection with land. We are coming to understand the causes of the problem. Taking them into account in implementing the Basic Land Law, we shall decide on a policy that ensures better use of unused or lightly-used land—by the end of this year. We will also review carefully the land tax.

[Tanaka] In the past, even among LDP members, there have been those who were in support of measures that were a little more drastic. For instance, there were once voices calling for drastic measures on land, including one that would limit private ownership. But somehow, those voices have disappeared, and the LDP and other parties in this election have different proposals. Consequently, the situation is such that many people are wondering if those proposals would really be adequate. Can't you come up with a proposal that is definitely one step ahead?

[Kaifu] A step ahead?

[Tanaka] I mean a more drastic policy including even the limitation of private ownership. The idea was once raised within the LDP.

[Kaifu] We shall go by the Basic Land Law. The law is based on the major concept of using unused or underused land effectively. Compared with past thinking, this concept is one that goes one step further. Ownership and public welfare are designed to converge. I am sure the concept is a consensus within the LDP. We will prepare plans or study tax system revision under that concept. We will finalize them this year, and submit a proposal to the Diet. This action, including taxation review, is a step forward by the LDP. I hope you will await future developments.

[Tanaka] Thank you. Now, Mr. Nagasue. You mentioned earlier that the public should be able to obtain a house costing about 4 times its annual income. I am directing this question to you, because you mentioned that. Where a major issue like land is concerned, I think, there should be a willingness to cooperate with all other opposition parties and, if necessary, even with the ruling party in coming up with a drastic policy. There are voices among the public that there can be no solution if parties continue to present only their own, different views every time there is an election. What is your comment on such a view?

[Nagasue] You are quite right. The basic problem is that, even though Japan pursues a free economy, land is something that cannot be produced as one pleases. Naturally, land has a public nature. As a result, the Basic Land Law has been adopted after some tribulations. In the law, the right to use land is recognized. The law is designed to define that right to use land from the public standpoint. The basic law on the land starts from defining certain things that must be controlled—with the consent of the majority of the people. Of course, it is not communism. For instance, as long as we agree to put a stop to the excessive concentration of people in Tokyo, we shall have to do things that are more effective than those of a dubious nature done in the past. Because the price of land is so high, regulations on heights of buildings, and green and residential space need to be set. Another thing is that we have to think about instituting an ownership tax on those owning land. Currently, there is a tax on real estate. Even the tax on real estate should be divided between that for residential use and that for commercial purposes. The government has to think that far.

[Tanaka] We shall go on to next question—that of rice or a staple food control system.

[Fuwa] When we compare Japan with Europe, there is one great difference. Residential areas play a major role in European cities. For example, it is an established practice that no business buildings are allowed in residential areas. Furthermore, in order to work out and carry out such programs ... [changes thought] For example, 60 percent of the land in Paris is owned by the city government. In West Germany, city governments own an average of 46 percent of the land in cities with a population of over a million. Based on such practices, urban development programs are mapped out.

No such practices exist in Japan. In the new law, isn't it also stated that land should be used to a high degree? In other words, it indicates that residential areas will be removed so that more and more high-rise buildings can be built. The administrative department will recommend that urban development should be promoted using that orientation. That is precisely the reverse orientation. I feel that we should learn a lot from European cities in that area. Japan should adopt urban development programs centered on residential areas and take necessary measures to carry them out. Otherwise, the situation will get more and more serious. Don't you think so?

[Tanaka] I see. We still have other questions to ask you. Therefore, if any of you wants to say a few words about this issue... Mrs. Doi, please.

[Doi] Well, there will be another increase in the fixed property tax next year. I believe no more burdens should be forced on people with residences, shops, their own houses, or self-run stores. On the other hand, I think it is quite necessary to impose adequate taxes on land speculation and unused land lots belonging to large corporations, which are sometimes termed blow-in assets [fukikomi shisan]. Such lots should be used for developing public housing projects.

[Tanaka] Yes. Mr. Ishida, please.

[Ishida] Well, I think stricter checkups should be made on applications for loans to be used in speculative land procurement. I think there is another question concerning the imposition of heavier taxes on unused land lots. However, I feel the point at issue is housing projects. If drastic measures are taken, I am sure housing for the weaker general public can be ensured.

[Tanaka] Yes. I understand now, and thank you very much. Well, now. Let's go on to the next question. You have already talked a lot about it. However, I think the issue concerning the Consumption Tax is of greatest concern to the voters. Which part of the tax should be revised? The LDP has already worked out a revised draft. It is said that the system is still undergoing a new revision. It certainly involves various questions. However, I would like opposition leaders to answer my question with a yes or no. No matter under what conditions it is revised, would you approve the revision after the general election? If possible, please answer this question with a yes or no. Please answer whether you will be able to cooperate with the possible revision. Mrs. Doi, will you start?

[Doi] Me? I don't know what the contents of the revision will be. However, I shall request that it be abolished.

[Tanaka] Do all of you have the same answer? Is that right?

[Ishida] We shall ask not for revision but for abolition.

[Fuwa] I am opposed to any large-scale indirect tax imposed on consumption or circulation, no matter under what name it might be imposed, and no matter what revision is made.

[Nagase] I would like to have the Consumption Tax abolished.

[Tanaka] Well, in that case, Mr. Kaifu, the LDP is now saying that the Consumption Tax will be revised. In reality, if the LDP wins the majority in the election, it would follow that the existing Consumption Tax system would be carried on without revision. To prevent misunderstanding among voters, I think it would be fair for the LDP to give an explanation. What do you say?

[Kaifu] The Consumption Tax is in effect now. As the public has criticized this system, we have made drastic revisions. Mrs. Doi has just mentioned that she doesn't understand the revision very well. However, as I explained during the first part of our discussions, we have reviewed the points that have to be revised, and then we worked out a revised plan. In this connection, when you are going to submit another bill, or if you are going to submit a bill calling for abolition, you might also submit plans for revenue sources and for reforms as you did last time. As your plans call for imposing taxes on commodities and services, such a tax is undoubtedly a consumption-type tax, even if it is not called that. If we deliberate, I am sure we will be able to find some similarities when proper comparisons are made. If, in the course of deliberations, you say that the Consumption Tax should not be denied, then we will be able to reach a consensus. If the Consumption Tax system should be admitted, it would be easier for those people concerned to have less of a burden and less concern. For example, in the processing of staple food....

[Tanaka, interrupting] Mr. Kaifu, we understand now. We shall go on to the next question. Concerning various agricultural issues, the minister of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry [MITI] stated, at the cabinet meeting the other day, that the logic of importing not even a grain of rice is unconvincing. Regarding that remark, Mr. Kaifu, did you ask him to put on the brakes?

Concerning that issue, the opposition parties seem to share the same views that the staple food control system should be maintained, that not even a grain of rice should be imported, and there is also the argument on a substitute method [daiten ho]. Are you convinced that it will do to carry on all these three ideas, including the first on not importing any rice, the second on maintaining the staple food control system, and the last on the substitute method? It will take too much time if we go into details, though.

[Kaifu] First, concerning the rice issue, we shall deal with it under the government's basic policy of supplying Japan's needs with domestically-produced rice. What comes next?

[Tanaka] Next comes the staple food control system.

[Kaifu] Yes. Concerning the issue of the staple food control system, the Agricultural Policy Research Council has already worked out clear guidelines. While maintaining the basic ideas of the system, the LDP has already put forward a reform plan to meet the need of the actual situation.

[Tanaka] Well, opposition party leaders, do you all agree that the status quo should be maintained? Am I right? If you do not agree to this idea, or if you think it may possibly change in future, or if you have any special views to state, please do so. Otherwise, we would like to go on to the next question.

[Doi] I think the time has yet to come for the staple food control system to be abolished. While strictly maintaining the system, we need to create conditions under which full-time farmers themselves can carry out self-management.

[Tanaka] I would like to point out that many of our club members who have submitted their views state that, taking the recent remarks on the liberalization of rice imports as a good opportunity, all those concerned should start seriously discussing issues on the long-term prospects for safeguarding Japan's rural areas, but that the farmers themselves are concerned because the remarks made so far are merely election campaigning. We shall now proceed to the next question.

Of late, the public has been talking about political instability—well, I don't think the term instability is correct. They point out the yen's depreciation and the drop in stock and bond prices, although a favorable economic situation has prevailed for a long time. It has been mentioned that it seems the economic climate is gradually slackening. We have less than two minutes left, will each of you please just say a few words on this?

[Kaifu] To have the foundation for carrying out all our policies, we must have energy, and we must have good systems, when we consider the issue from the economic, financial, and other viewpoints. In that connection, I feel we must carry out our efforts in promoting policies with foresight. That, of course, is our party's basic policy.

[Tanaka] Mrs. Doi, please.

[Doi] Yes.

[Tanaka] Concerning this issue, we have also heard people saying that, since there is a possibility that a coalition government may be formed among the opposition parties, the economic situation may slacken. Would you comment on that?

[Doi] When we enjoy a favorable economic situation, we should always be ready to meet with an unfavorable climate. It has been said that the conditions will be favorable this year, and such favorable conditions may continue for three to four years. However, when we take the future into account, we shall have to think about how work hours can be shortened or how we can let our people enjoy their leisure time. Isn't it important that, at

such a time, we should try harder to improve working conditions for our people so that their leisure life will be improved to meet international standards?

[Tanaka] Yes.

[Ishida] Currently, it is mentioned by such organs as the Economic Research Institute that the favorable economic situation may continue until 1992 or 1993. Moreover, as there is a possibility that the administration may change hands, it does not follow that the continuing favorable economic situation will also suddenly change. I do not think that is true. Take a look at West Germany. Conditions have been created so that there can be a change of government. However, West Germany continues to achieve great economic growth. I do not think there is any need to worry about it.

[Fuwa] Well, in talking about expansion of domestic needs, we all use common terms. However, in connection with politics, what is most important is that we have to consider whether we should give energy to big enterprises or to our people's livelihood. If we try to suppress the people's livelihood with the Consumption Tax, while making big enterprises prosperous by reducing corporate taxes, there will be no progress in economic development, which is closely connected to the people's livelihood. I think it is necessary to make a clear distinction on this point.

[Nagasue] It has been said that public concern about a possible change in the political situation may lead to gloomy prospects for Japan's economy. I don't think that is good. In that connection, we would like to state clearly our orientation to the public. It is very clear. We want to have workers' excessive working hours reduced; we want to reduce the burden on housewives in charge of spending money; and we would like to give people hope for settling various problems, including the housing problem. If we can state these objectives clearly, and if we can clearly state that this election is different, I don't think there will be any limitation to our economy. However, the fundamental point, I think, is clearly to indicate to the public, both at home and abroad, that what we will promote is not a strange, but a free, economy.

[Tanaka] Thank you very much. There are still many policy tasks we want to bring up. However, in a word, we can say that each of them is difficult to solve, and there are some issues for which severe demands will be imposed on voters. For example, there are such issues as the liberalization of rice imports, the staple food control method, and also the substitute method. It is also true with the land problem. While some people gain profits, others suffer loss. However, in publicizing those policies that impose severe demands on the public, we hope political parties will appeal to the voters with more persuasive arguments, including political reform itself.

Lastly, I would like to point out that it will not do merely to publicize policies just for the sake of election campaigning. With this, we would like to conclude today's discussions. Mr. Mizukami, please.

[Mizukami] Mr. Tanaka, thank you very much for your efforts today. We now conclude the second part of today's discussion. I would like to express our sincerest gratitude to all party leaders, as well as to all moderators of the discussion sessions. Thank you very much.

As you may know, this open discussion meeting will be extensively reported on television, over the radio, and also in newspapers by all our club members. We shall be happy if the contents of this discussion are of help to the public in making their judgment on this day when the election is just around the corner. In sponsoring this discussion meeting, we have received many ideas, as well as suggestions from our members. However, since we had only a short time to prepare, we ask for our audience's pardon if we have failed to completely live up to their expectations.

Now that the general election campaign is starting, party leaders, club members wish you to carry on a fair campaign. Furthermore, even though you may be dissatisfied with the arrangements made for today's discussion—maybe you were not given enough time to state your views—all club members hope you will ask our club to sponsor a future discussion.

We will now conclude our discussion meeting, attended by top leaders of the five political parties and sponsored by the Japan National Press Club today. Thank you very much for your cooperation. [Applause]

Kanemaru Hints at Post-Election Coalition

*OW0702145090 Tokyo KYODO in English 1338 GMT
7 Feb 90*

[Text] Hamamatsu, Shizuoka Pref., Feb. 7 KYODO—Veteran conservative politician Shin Kanemaru called Wednesday for efforts among the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and three noncommunist opposition parties to establish a coalition government after the February 18 general election. It was the first time Kanemaru, a leading power broker in the ruling conservative party, has referred to the possibility of a coalition government.

Kanemaru, who is former Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita's political mentor, said in a campaign speech that the LDP, the Japan socialist Party (JSP), Komeito, and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) should hammer out a new framework to restore political stability as soon as possible.

Kanemaru, who heads the LDP's largest faction founded by Takeshita, also said there is no difference between the ruling party and the three opposition parties, all of which he said are working for the sake of the Japanese people. He pointed to the need for the four parties to promote discussions on how to lead the country. Kanemaru was

in Hamamatsu to speak at a campaign meeting for an LDP candidate running in the general election for the House of Representatives.

Kanemaru said that should the LDP lose the election it should hand over power to the opposition camp and the cabinet of Prime minister Toshiki Kaifu should resign en masse. Kanemaru rejected an opposition proposal calling for abolition of the controversial 3 percent consumption tax and said consumption tax revenues should be used exclusively for social welfare.

Another TV Debate Likely Before Election

*OW0702134090 Tokyo KYODO in English 1239 GMT
7 Feb 90*

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 7 KYODO—There may be another round of TV debates among heads of major political parties before the February 18 general election for the House of Representatives, political sources said on Wednesday.

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] has no intention of declining an opposition call for another round, a top LDP official said. The official pointed to the need to arrange the date for the debate, saying that Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, president of the LDP, needs to modify his campaigning schedule.

The third and fourth largest opposition parties, the Democratic socialist Party (DSP) and Japan Communist Party (JCP), have proposed holding another round. The two largest opposition parties, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and Komeito, have so far not commented on the proposal.

Heads of the five parties discussed a wide range of domestic and international issues for over three hours on February 2, the eve of the start of a 10-day election campaign. The debate, the first of its kind in 30 years was televised live nationwide.

Japan's 90.57 million voters will go to the polls on February 18 in the general election for the 512-seat Lower Chamber, dissolved on January 24.

North Korea

Further Reportage on North-South Sports Talks

Summary of Talks

*SK0802053790 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean
2300 GMT 7 Feb 90*

[Text] The ninth North-South sports talks to discuss the formation of a single North-South team for the 11th Asian games was held yesterday in the South side's area of Panmunjom.

Kim Hyong-chin, head of our side's delegation, spoke first at the talks. After saying that the South side is fully responsible for the fact that the talks have faced a grave obstacle at

their final stage when the letter of agreement must be signed, he said: The full-dress talks have been deadlocked, and the formation of a single team, which was near success, suffered a heavy blow overnight. The fundamental reason for that is the unjust attitude and stand toward dialogue by the South side, which, determined from the beginning to hold talks but not to form a single team and to participate in the 11th Asian games, not as a single team, but as a separate team, has created an artificial obstacle to the talks and has complicated them.

Since the very beginning of the talks, the South has not strived to form a single team, but has successively put a brake on the talks to ensure that no progress would be made in the discussions on the formation of the single team. As for the discussion on how to select athletes, when we put forth a concrete proposal based upon the characteristics of each sports event in the first talks, the South side, criticizing the proposal as complicated, insisted that such practical matters be discussed and decided upon, not at the full-dress talks, but at the joint committee when it is formed in the future. Even though our proposal was just, out of a desire to solve at least one issue at the earliest possible date, we revised our proposal and agreed on the South side's proposal that these practical matters be discussed at the joint committee. Moreover, in the fifth talks, the South side put forth the issue of whether or not athletes will be openly selected, thus leading to unnecessary debates and adding another obstacle to the talks.

In fact, the South side committed that act to avoid forming a single team. Even at that time, we knew that the South side had no genuine will to give birth to a single team. However, then, we magnanimously fully accepted the South side's proposal.

Citing concrete facts, the head of our side said that the South side has continuously maneuvered to lead the talks to a rupture. The head of our side said that we have recently come to realize more clearly that it was no accident that the South side delayed the progress of the talks and led the talks to a catastrophe. Citing concrete data, he recalled the fact that on the South side, in order to break up the formation of the single team, the sports minister and other responsible persons recklessly make remarks that can be construed as a declaration that the talks for the formation of the single team have broken down and the fact that, moreover, using South Korean newspapers, the South side persistently aroused public opinion by saying that it would separately participate in the Asian games. After saying so, he urged the South side to assume the position of forming a single team, and put forth the following principled demands to the South side.

First, we demand that the two sides agree not to go to the 11th Asian games separately, but participate in it as a single team under any circumstances and declare this at home and abroad.

Second, we demand that the South side admit that it has delayed the formation of the single team by bringing

forward matters irrelevant to the talks or matters which had been decided to be discussed at the joint committee, and withdraw all its supplementary rules.

Third, we demand that sports officials of the South side withdraw their remarks that they would go to the 11th Asian games as a separate team.

After saying so, the head of our side's delegation said that what attitude the South side will assume to our three demands will be a touchstone with which one can judge whether it wants the formation of a single team or hinders it. However, the South side said that it cannot accept our three just demands and made absurd remarks that what the chairman of the South side's Olympic committee and sports minister said was their personal opinion and said: Is there any against such remarks?

Concluding the talks, the head of our side's delegation said that the South side's stand shows that it will participate not as a single team but as a separate team, continuously pursue the policy of mistrust and confrontation, not that of national reconciliation and unity, and pursue the perpetual division of the country, not her reunification. Also, he said that this stand is an unjust divisionist attitude in which, following the authorities' divisionist policy, the South side let political affairs exercise influence upon solemn sports talks and that it cannot avoid denunciation at home and abroad. After saying so, he warned that if a single team failed to be formed, the South side would be held wholly responsible for this and that this will leave an indelible blot on the nation and history. As to the date of the next round of talks, he made it clear that we will come to the talks tomorrow or at any other time if the South side notifies that it accepts our three demands.

After the talks, Kim Hyong-chin, head of our side's delegation, met with reporters.

North Chairman Meets Press

SK0802044190 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean
0700 GMT 7 Feb 90

[News conference by Kim Hyong-chin, head of the DPRK delegation to the North-South sports talks in Panmunjom on 7 Feb; recorded]

[Text] According to a news report filed by reporters Kim Myong-song and Han Kwang-tok from Panmunjom, the ninth round of North-South sports talks was held today in the area of the South side at Panmunjom to discuss the issue of forming a single team between the North and South for participating in the 11th Asian Games.

Following the talk, Kim Hyong-chin, head of our side's delegation, held a news conference and informed reporters of the status of the talks.

[Begin Kim Hyong-chin recording] We made it clear that the South side is fully responsible for the fact that a long time has passed without reaching an agreement since the (?seventh) round of talks. At that time, in fact, an

agreement on forming a single team should have been made public to the world. At the ninth round of the North-South sports talks, we raised three important issues proceeding from our desire to (?support) the talks and to give birth to a single team at an early date, on the basis of a serious summing up of the sports talks that have continued until now.

First, we demanded that the North and South agree to participate in the 11th Asian Games as a single team without fail and under no circumstances to participate in the games as (?separate teams), and then jointly make public the agreement to the world.

Second, we demanded that the South side admit that it has placed obstacles to the talks at the final stage of the talks, now of all times since the first round of talks, by raising issues other than the agenda items to be discussed in the talks and such unnecessary issues as the supplementary provisions. We demanded that they completely withdraw the obstacles.

Third, we demanded that the South side's minister of sports and the chairman of the South side's Olympic Committee recant their remarks. These are the three issues we raised at today's talks.

Speaking of these issues, they were basic and fundamental ones designed to (?make clear) the position of the South side which has created conditions capable of breaking up the talks at this juncture when the birth of a single team could happen at any minute.

Why did we raise these issues at today's talks? It is related to the maneuvers of the South side, which has deliberately delayed the talks for discussing the formation of a single team and to intentionally break up [kyollyol] the birth of a single team.

The whole course of talks continued until now show that the South side has schemed at all costs to keep a single team from being realized at an early date by deliberately delaying the talks, although it talks as if it had the will to translate the formation of a North-South single team into action while sitting in the talks.

I urge you, the reporters, to make an assessment of the course of talks from the first to the sixth based on your own coverage.

One thing I would like to mention, by citing an example, is how [word indistinct] have turned into a delaying and intentional breakup scheme is clearly evidenced in [word indistinct] since the sixth round of the talks.

As is known, at the sixth round of talks the North and South [word indistinct] reached a basic 10-point agreement on forming a single team. Also at the sixth round of talks the rules for operation concerning the establishment of a joint promotion institution were agreed on.

No sooner had these basic agreements been reached, thanks to our side's generosity and concessions, than the

South side denied the agreements with a concerned expression, not joy, on the faces of the delegates at the second round of talks.

At the sixth round of talks, the two sides also agreed and promised to declare the adoption of a written agreement at the seventh round of talks. In addition, they authorized working-level delegates to hold a contact to adopt it. The working-level contact was assigned the matter of drafting fundamental and separate written agreements.

This notwithstanding, the South side said in a far-fetched manner at the fourth round of the working-level contact that the matters agreed upon at the sixth round of talks were not assented to, but later they shamefully admitted that they were agreed upon and came out with an appendix, which had nothing to with the talks, and other unnecessary matters.

Our talks were aimed at forming a single North-South team. At the fourth round of working-level contact, the South side came out with such matters as the exchange of goodwill games, the inspection of sports facilities, a guarantee for transportation means, the routes of vehicles, ships, and airplanes, an overall North-South sports exchange, and the exchange of sports science which had nothing to with the talks. Can this be the attitude of the South side which paid lip service to forming a single team?

As clearly promised by the chairmen of the Olympic committees of the two sides, the North-South sports talks were designed to discuss the problem of participating in the 11th Asian games as a single team. This being the case, the South side should have come up with matters concerning the formation of a single team. However, the South side came out with the 37-point issue, which has nothing to do with the talks, at the final stage of forming a single team and what is more, a week before the day of [words indistinct]. Is this the stand of trying to form a single team?

Moreover, the South side, when it was faced by our just demands and calls for its explanation, withdrew such matters that had nothing to do with the talks as if they showed a sincere attitude. It withdrew the matter of exchanging goodwill games, inspecting sports facilities, and guaranteeing transportation means because the world's people ridiculed its act of coming out with preposterous matters.

Even at the stage of forming a single team, the South side openly raised the question of agreeing to participate in the Asian games as separate teams and of sending a letter to the Beijing Asian Games Organizational Committee and the Asian Olympic Council to inform them of this agreement. Is this the South side's stance of genuinely intending to form a single team?

In view of these facts, we can clearly state that the South side has premeditatedly and deliberately maneuvered to delay the talks and lead the matter of forming a single team to frustration.

Even at the ninth round of talks, the South side came out again with the matter of guarantee mechanism, whose unjustness had been laid bare to the world, and laid an obstacle in the way of the talks.

Let me talk about what has happened outside of the talks site. On 8 January, the chairman of the South side's Olympic committee openly said to reporters at the athletes' camp in Taenung that participating in the Asian games as a single team would be [words indistinct]. These remarks of the chairman of the Olympic committee of the South side, which dispatched its delegation to the talks, meant declaring that participating in the Asian games as a separate team rather than as a separate team is most proper. This is an outcome of a split perception. Also, this is an obvious declaration of the South side to frustrate a single team.

Think of the date of his remarks. It was 8 January. At the fourth round of working-level talks on 10 January, two days after that, the South side presented the matter concerning the 37-point appendix.

I indicated the unreasonableness of the supplementary rules. [Passage indistinct] This is a clear expression of the position of the South side which does not want national reconciliation and unity but wants only (?unnecessary) confrontation and [word indistinct]. Furthermore, on 31 January the minister of the Sports Ministry of the South side visited the athletes' village in Taenung, Seoul, to explain to the athletes on the Sports Ministry's plans for this year. There, far from emphasizing the need to form a single team between the North and South at any cost in response to the urgent desire of all of the nation, he declared that the goal of the South side's sports authorities this year is to participate in the 11th Asian games as a separate team and to do everything possible to win second place in the games.

This is tantamount to a declaration by the South Korean authorities that the South side will participate in the Asian games as a separate team, not as a single North-South team, although the South side's delegates have talked about the formation of a single team in the talks. In today's ninth full-dress sports talks the South side came up again with the so-called issue of guarantee mechanism. This constitutes a clear revelation of the South side's real intention. Therefore, as an effort to save the talks from a crisis of rupture due to the South side's unwarranted schemes and acts, our side urges the South side to immediately reply to the three-point demand that we presented. However, the South side failed to even utter a word in answering the demand while asserting to continue the discussion of the issue of guarantee mechanism.

It is natural that the South side delegates failed to answer our three-point demand. In other words, considering the deeds, words, and statements of the South side's delegates at the site of the talks we judged that they cannot answer our demand, because we have found not only the

South side's delegates, but also responsible sports officials of South Korea firmly following their authorities' policy of seeking division. Thus, in today's talks we clearly witnessed that the South side is attempting to participate in the Asian games as a separate team, which seeks not reconciliation and unity, but confrontation.

Therefore, concluding today's talks, as an effort to rectify such a wrong stand and attitude of the South side, we urged the South side's delegates to return to the intrinsic position of sportsman and to answer the three-point demand that we presented in order to respond to the nation's urgent desire for a single team. Then, we made it clear that if the South side fails to answer the three-point demand no progress will be made in the sports talks and the South side should be held responsible for this. We also told the South side that we will wait until it gives a clear answer to our three-point demand, a most basic and fundamental demand.

Such being the situation, what we can expect now is for the South side to completely liquidate its splittist stand, to return to sportsman's intrinsic position for the formation of a single team, and, thus, to give an affirmative answer to our three-point demand.

On the date of the next talks, we said that if the South side is ready to give an affirmative answer to the issue that we presented, we will agree to have the talks any time, that is to say, tomorrow, even this afternoon, or the day after tomorrow. We are ready to come to the talks any time. [end recording]

This has been the statement made by Kim Hyong-chin, chief delegate of our side to the North-South sports talks, concerning the result of the ninth North-South sports talks in a meeting with reporters.

Rally Welcoming South Korean Defector Held

*SK0702152490 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1511 GMT 7 Feb 90*

[Text] Pyongyang February 7 (KCNA)—So Chae-hui, 32, who came over to the North from South Korea some time ago, received warm welcome from working people of Pyongyang at a city mass meeting held today.

He had the chance to defect South Korea to the North while staying in the United States. He graduated from Social Science College of Seoul University and worked in the field of construction.

He received a DPRK order, a lot of money as a prize and souvenirs at the meeting.

Sim Song-kyong, vice-chairman of the Pyongyang Municipal Administration and Economic Guidance Committee, addressed the meeting.

In his speech, he appreciated So's defection to the Northern half of Korea as a righteous act which represents the will of the South Korean people who aspire after an ideal society for the popular masses and an

expression of his resolute resistance to the colonial fascist rule of the U.S. imperialists and their stooges.

In his reply, So Chae-hui said:

In the North, the state, being responsible for the life of the people, gives jobs to all people, enforces free education and medical treatment system, and, after abolishing taxation, bears the expenses for making holiday at rest homes and recuperation at sanatoria and health resorts, provides people with houses free of charge and supplies them with rice at a price next to nothing. Such a good society here can be found nowhere else in the world.

The greater my happiness today becomes, the more I think about the people in the South, he said, adding:

I will exert all my energy to bring earlier the day when all our fellow countrymen have come to live a happy life, holding respected President Kim Il-sung and the dear leader Mr. Kim Chong-il in high esteem in the reunified country.

Students Demand Release of Yim Su-kyong

SK0702002690 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
1514 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Pyongyang February 6 (KCNA)—Meetings were held today at different universities here to denounce the U.S. imperialists and the No Tae-u military fascist clique for the heavy penalties passed on Yim Su-kyong and her companion and strongly urge them to immediately withdraw the unreasonable penalties before facing stronger condemnation from people at home and abroad.

Speakers at a meeting of teachers and students of Pyongyang University of Dramaturgy and Cinematics angrily denounced the No Tae-u military fascist clique who held a verdict trial at the puppet Seoul District Criminal Court on February 5 and finally sentenced coed Yim Su-kyong to 10 years and Father Mun Kyu-hyon to 8 years in prison on various charges such as "special infiltration and escape" and "offer of military benefits" under the "National Security Law."

They said the South Korean fascist clique's reckless suppression of the envoys of reunification fully revealed the reactionary nature of those who do not want North-South dialogue, national unity, peace and peaceful reunification of the country.

Speakers at a meeting of teachers and students of Pyongyang University of foreign studies stressed that the brigandish act of the South Korean fascist clique is a foolish attempt to find a way out of their crisis in threatening the democratic forces which call for reunification and aggravating North-South confrontation under the unstable political situation of South Korea which is being brought to a grim phase by the merger of three parties.

However high the No group of traitors may build the wall of division and confrontation, running wild in their

fascist repression, cries for reunification will ring out louder and tens of thousands of Yim Su-kyong will grow up, the speakers said. They strongly demanded that the No group look squarely at the trend of the times, act with discretion and immediately withdraw the heavy penalties imposed upon Yim Su-kyong and her companion and unconditionally set them free at once.

Newspapers Denounce Yim Su-kyong's Sentence

SK0702052090 *Pyongyang KCNA in English* 0455 GMT
7 Feb 90

[Text] Pyongyang February 7 (KCNA)—The No Tae-u military fascist clique sentenced coed Yim Su-kyong to ten years and Father Mun Kyu-hyon to eight years in prison at the verdict trial held at the puppet Seoul District Criminal Court.

NODONG SINMUN, MINJU CHOSON and PYONGYANG SINMUN today brand this as an anti-reunification violence of the group of traitors.

A news analyst of NODONG SINMUN says:

Woman student Yim came to Pyongyang across the deathline, guided by her own faith, and loudly shouted to the world that our country is one and so is our nation, and Father Mun visited Pyongyang to give strength and courage to her who did a grand thing for national reunification. Their act was righteous and just in all respects and could never be a crime.

But the No Tae-u group inflicted heavy penalties on them. This is a vicious challenge to the entire fellow countrymen and the world peace-loving people who want the reunification of Korea and an anti-reunification, anti-national crime. This is a fascist outrage to trample underfoot in prison the bloom of youth of the woman student burning with the desire for reunification and the blood of patriotism.

The fascist clique demanded heavy penalties for them after they walked out and sentenced them to heavy penalties, not allowing even the pleading of the defence counsel. This means that the trial was an illegal and unlawful strong-arm trial staged by the fascist clique in contravention even of the court procedures laid down by themselves to impose false charges on coed Yim and her companion and kick up an anti-communist confrontation racket.

The acts of the No Tae-u group in arresting and punishing those who called for contact and dialogue with the north and for reunification clearly show that they are a band of thorough-paced national splittists and traitors who are utterly indifferent to national reconciliation and unity, peace and reunification.

A news analyst of MINJU CHOSON says that the No Tae-u fascist clique, by penalizing coed Yim Su-kyong and her companion, seek to throw a wet blanket over the

ardent desire of the South Korean people for reunification, threaten the patriotic forces of reunification and further increase North-South confrontation.

Those who must be tried and punished in South Korea are not coed Yim Su-kyong and her companion, the envoys of reunification, but the No Tae-u group itself which cries for "reunification" in the foreground and runs mad behind the scene to suppress and stifle forces for reunification, notes a PYONGYANG SINMUN news analyst.

The papers demand that the No Tae-u group withdraw the unwarrantable penalties imposed on coed Yim and her companion and set them free at once.

South's Chonnohyop Reunification 'Fight' Report

SK0702114390 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
1013 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] Pyongyang February 7 (KCNA)—The "National Council of Trade Unions" (Chonnohyop), which had been organized in the teeth of the harsh crackdown of the No Tae-u fascist group, published its inaugural declaration and platform, the South Korean newspaper HANGYORE SINMUN reported.

The declaration says "Chonnohyop" would fight in firm solidarity with all the democratic forces to improve the inhumane working conditions, achieve the basic rights of labour and promote the reforms of the economic and social structure which would fundamentally change the conditions of the workers on the basis of the development of organization and awakening, make South Korean society democratic and independent and accelerate the peaceful reunification of the country.

To this end, it vows to expand and strengthen the organized forces of the democratic labour movement and build up the central organization of independent trade unions, the declaration adds.

Chonnohyop defines it as its platform to fight for wages enough for livelihood, crush through the concerted struggle of workers the repression of the labour movement by capital and power, improve the system and policy on the enforcement of free compulsory education and medical service, reform of the inequitable tax system, stability of commodity prices and prevention of pollution and achieve the democratic rights of the workers and all other people such as freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association, demonstration and ideology.

U.S., Japan Monopolize South Korean Economy

SK0702151290 *Pyongyang KCNA in English* 1500 GMT
7 Feb 90

[Text] Pyongyang February 7 (KCNA)—The magazine of the World Federation of Trade Unions FLASH no. 3 dealt with the increasing investments of the U.S. and Japanese monopolies in the South Korean economy.

Noting that the intensified economic infiltration of the U.S. and Japanese monopolies into South Korea is an indication of the growing dependence of the South Korean economy on foreign monopoly capital, the magazine said:

The U.S. and Japanese companies which have made their way into South Korea number more than 2,800 and their capital exceeds 458 million dollars.

They have brought the key economic branches of South Korea under their complete control through increased investments in the manufacturing industries.

The transnational corporations ship into South Korea raw materials and spare parts from their home countries and take away finished goods assembled and manufactured by use of the cheap workforce of South Korea, thus raking in fabulous profits.

The infiltration of U.S. and Japanese transnational companies seriously affects not only the economic realms but also the living of South Korean people.

An increasing number of South Korean workers hired by them are subjected to backbreaking toil, inhumane exploitation and oppression.

Commentary Discusses U.S. Anti-China Moves

SK0802053690 *Pyongyang KCNA in English* 0519 GMT
8 Feb 90

[Text] Pyongyang February 8 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN in a commentary today hits out at the recent readoption by the U.S. Congress of "an amendment on sanctions against China."

The news analyst describes this as a manifestation of their attempts to create difficulties to the revolution and construction in China and obstruct its people from building socialism with Chinese characteristics by such a despicable method as putting economic and political pressure on it and, furthermore, to open a phase favorable to the execution of their anti-socialist strategy.

China strongly condemns this outrage of the U.S. imperialists as a violation of the basic norms governing international relations, as a crude interference in its internal affairs, the commentary says, adding: This stand of China is entirely just and natural as it is intended to defend its dignity and interests.

Recalling that the U.S. ruling quarters launched an anti-China campaign, terming the quelling of the counter-revolutionary rebellion in Beijing last summer "a repression of human rights," the commentary criticizes this as an encroachment on the sovereignty of China and an insult to its dignity.

The quelling of the counter-revolutionary rebellion in China last year was an internal affair of China, it notes, and goes on: It was a just step consistent with the

constitution and law of China and a revolutionary measure to safeguard the security of the republic and defend the gains of the revolution. Hence, nobody has the right to interfere in it.

The U.S. ruling quarters, however, continue to poke their nose into the domestic affairs of China and cry for "sanctions," as if they were a judge. This is because they do not want to see China make good headway with her work.

Although the U.S. reactionary ruling quarters revealed by themselves the intention to continue with anti-China campaign in the future, the Chinese are the last people to be frightened by U.S. "sanctions," the commentary remarks, and stresses:

The Korean people denounce the United States' anti-China clamor and fully support China's stand in this regard.

"Sanctions" against China will bring no good results to the United States. The United States must stop the anti-China moves.

Day of Solidarity With South Africa Observed

SK0702114790 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
1000 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] Pyongyang February 7 (KCNA)—Papers here today dedicate signed articles to the "Day of International Solidarity With South African People".

Recalling that the South African people are continuing their daring struggle for the final elimination of racism, not being taken in by the crafty moves of the racists, the paper says:

They are waging powerful political and armed struggles against the racists under the leadership of the African National Congress of South Africa. Their anti-racist struggle is a righteous struggle to shape their destiny by their own efforts and win the complete Liberation of Africa.

The Korean people are standing on the side of the South African people. The Korean anti-apartheid committee is active in our country.

The Korean people take this occasion to express support to and solidarity with the South African people in their struggle to liquidate apartheid and achieve freedom and liberation.

MINJU CHOSON in a signed article says that the struggle of the South African people against racism is one to overthrow the racist regime and win freedom and liberation and a part of the sacred struggle of the oppressed people of the world to wipe out imperialism, colonialism and racism and achieve national liberation.

South Korea

President No To Continue Trust-Building Effort

SK0802113590 *Seoul YONHAP in English* 1012 GMT
8 Feb 90

[Text] Seoul, Feb. 8 (YONHAP)—President No Tae-uv vowed Thursday to continue efforts to build trust with Pyongyang, saying he hoped the great change now sweeping other communist countries would occur in North Korea sooner or later. No, hosting a dinner for members of the diplomatic corps in Seoul, said Thursday, "We believe change will also occur in North Korea, sooner or later. With this belief, we will keep doing our best to build trust between the two parts of Korea by promoting dialogue, exchanges and cooperation."

No attributed the division of the Korean peninsula and the outbreak of the Korean war to the Cold War and said, "As the old international order that has tormented us so long is being replaced, we Koreans now greet the 1990s with fresh hope and expectations."

"The clock in the North remains stopped at that point in the 1950s when the guns of the Korean war ceased roaring. We do not believe, however, that north Korea will remain a frozen land forever, even while spring winds are sweeping the entire face of the world."

Seoul-based envoys from 65 nations, including Paraguayan Ambassador Anibal Raul Casal, dean of the diplomatic corps, attended the dinner with their wives.

Touching on his decision to create a new ruling party from a merger with two moderate opposition groups, No said, "A solid foundation has been laid for attaining full democracy and achieving economic progress at the same time in the 1990s."

Terming the merger "unprecedented in Korean history," No said the change in the political map marked the end of an "era of politics of confrontation and the habit of seeing everything in terms of black and white."

"Korean politics will now rise to a new, higher level of sophistication on a common base of trust and conviction that everyone should join hands to shape an era of democracy," he said.

On the two years since he took office, No said, "some negative side-effects have inevitably accompanied the transition from prolonged authoritarian rule to democracy. We are now overcoming those difficulties."

Sports Official Blames North for Talks Rupture

SK0802042290 *Seoul YONHAP in English* 0246 GMT
8 Feb 90

[Text] Seoul, Feb. 8 (YONHAP)—The head of South Korea's Amateur Sports Association (KASA) blasted North Korea Thursday for breaking off talks on forming a single Korean team for this year's Beijing Asian

Games. The blast followed Inter-Korean sports talks that ended in failure Wednesday with each side accusing the other of insincerity.

KASA president Kim Chong-yul issued a statement in which he accused North Korea of dashing hope of fielding a single team in Beijing by setting unreasonable pre-conditions. "The Northern side brought about the collapse of the inter-Korean sports talks by demanding three unreasonable pre-conditions such as that South Korea agree not to participate in the Asiad as a separate team," Kim said. "The demand for not competing in the games as a separate team hints at North Korea's real intention, which was to take advantage of the inter-Korean talks to block South Korea's participation in the Asiad.

"The North has stuck [to] its demand, refusing all discussion, that the South withdraw a call for a guarantee of implementation of the ten agreements between the two sides for the formation of a single team. The North, which used the talks as political propaganda, should assume the entire responsibility for the rupture of the inter-Korean sports talks," Kim said.

YONHAP Analyzes North-South Sports Talks

SK0802092990 Seoul YONHAP in English 0841 GMT
8 Feb 90

[By Kim Tae-sik]

[Text] Seoul, Feb. 8 (YONHAP)—The breakdown on Wednesday [7 February] of the South-North Korean sports talks on forming a joint Korean team for the Beijing Asiad once again revealed the limitation of the talks, which have included non-sports elements.

Since they first met at Panmunjom, the truce village in the demilitarized zone separating the two halves of Korea, to discuss fielding a joint team on March 9 last year, sports officials of the two sides had reached a broad agreement on all 10 major points and it seemed that a final agreement was in sight. The agreements included the team's flag, name, anthem and leadership and the establishment of a joint committee to oversee the procedures of the joint team.

Strains began to show with the sixth main meeting on Dec. 22. The North suddenly and unexpectedly accepted almost all the South Korean demands and proposed that the two sides exchange a memorandum and declare the agreement to the whole world.

South Korea, which has not fully recovered from decades of well-founded mistrust of its Northern neighbor, demanded a device to guarantee implementation of the agreements before it would accept the North's proposal. The North refused to discuss the proposal and the talks were stalemated. From the fourth working-level talks on Jan. 10, the two sides held five more meetings, including three main conferences, but were unable to move an inch ahead because of their stubbornness.

Chief Northern delegate Kim Hyong-chin finally declared the collapse in the ninth main meeting, laying down three conditions and saying there was no use in continuing the talks unless South Korea accepted them immediately.

The three new conditions, dismissed on the spot by the South as "unreasonable," were that South Korea agree not to participate in September's Asiad as a separate team under any circumstances, that it withdraw its call for an addendum on the implementation of agreements reached in previous talks and that South Korean sports officials withdraw remarks on South Korea's intention to compete in the Asiad separately.

Chang Chung-sik, the South's chief delegate, said the sports talks should not be used to block the other side's participation in international events. He urged the North to accept the South's call for a guarantee of implementation of the agreements on forming a single team and a guarantee of separate participation if a joint team cannot be fielded.

The reason for the South's insistence on a guarantee was previous experiences in which Pyongyang blocked Seoul's competition in a world event. In 1979, North Korea prevented a South Korean team from competing in the World Table Tennis Championships in Pyongyang on the grounds that it was not a joint team. Shortly before the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984, North Korea demanded that South Korea promise not to participate as a separate team while North Korea itself declared a boycott of the games with 11 other communist countries.

On South Korea's proposed guarantee of implementation, the North charged that it was a scheme to delay the talks and said the South would be fully responsible for a rupture of the talks if it did not withdraw the proposal.

South Korean delegates say they doubt North Korea really wanted to form a joint team. North Korea may never have intended to form a single team from the beginning, plotting instead to prevent South Korea from attending the Beijing Asiad, they say.

North Korea's decision to scrap the talks rather than agree to a guarantee device was expected as its real intention was for the talks to fail, observers say. Pyongyang's hidden agenda was first to publicize the agreement to form the team to the world so that South Korea would find it difficult to participate alone and then raise enough problems in the joint committee to ensure the South was unable to take part, they explained.

Although each side left room for a resumption of the talks if the other side backs down, observers see a resumption as unlikely.

Korean Senior UNC Delegate to MAC Possible

SK0802021790 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
8 Feb 90 p 1

[Text] Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun said yesterday that the ministry will consider the possibility of replacing the

senior delegate of the United Nations Command [UNC] to the Military Armistice Commission [MAC] meeting with a Korean general.

Following his New Year report on the ministry's major policy, Yi revealed that the United States had made a proposal that Korea represent the UNC at the MAC conference.

A U.S. general has been representing the U.N. Command at MAC meetings at the truce village of Panmunjom since the signing of the Korean War Armistice Agreement.

Yi also said that the ministry would set up a joint Korea-U.S. task force next month to plan the relocation of the American military installations in Yongsan through consultations with related U.S. military.

He added that Korea and the U.S. have yet to decide on an area eligible for relocation of the American military installations in Seoul, flatly denying that Taejon, Pyongtaek and Suwon were designated as the candidate sites for the projected relocation.

The ministry will continue to deliberate with the Economic Planning Board [EPB] on ways of dealing with burden-sharing of the defense cost, he said.

He said that the Defense Ministry sought to enact a special law to raise funds to bear the increased defense cost via consultations with the EPB and other related government authorities.

The defense chief added that he would talk with Secretary Richard Cheney on the basic directions of the reduction of U.S. troops in Korea and the sharing of the defense cost in the middle of this month when Cheney visits here.

Minister on Control of U.S. Military in Korea

SK0802030490 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English
8 Feb 90 p 1

[Text] Korea is seeking to produce submarines, fighters and missiles in the next 10 years to strengthen its security readiness, the Defense Ministry announced yesterday.

The government will "gradually" increase its share of the upkeep of U.S. forces posted in Korea, the announcement said.

Briefing President No Tae-u on the ministry's new year business, Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun said investment in military research and development of weapons will be increased sharply.

Such investment, currently at 1.5 percent of defense spending, will be raised to more than three percent in 1996 and seven percent in the early 2000s, Yi said.

By the early 2000s, he said, Korea will seek to produce all military aircraft, including fighters, and guided missiles, particularly those suitable for Korean terrain.

He expected the country will also be able to produce submarines and other battleships and all basic weapons in the next decade.

"We will try to secure high technologies in electronics and communication fields such as the C3I (Command, Control, Communication and Information) by the early 2000s," he said.

As for the much-talked-about burdensharing for maintaining U.S. forces in Korea, the minister said, "It is necessary to gradually increase the share as long as we can afford it."

He said the ministry will draft a bill which would make it easier for the government to increase the burden-sharing.

U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney will be here Feb. 14-17 to discuss more U.S. troop cuts and Korea's increased share of the upkeep of U.S. forces.

Some 5,000 noncombat U.S. military personnel are expected to be pulled out of Korea this year, according to authorities.

On other subjects, Yi said the ministry will be able to inaugurate the "Defense Force," a unified command of the Army, Air Force and Navy, by July this year.

He repeated that the planned military command is vital for modern warfare. A bill calling for setting up the combined command now awaits parliamentary action.

Analysts predicted that the bill will clear the National Assembly this month as a result of the merger of three political parties.

In an effort to cut defense expenditures, Yi said, the ministry will expand competitive bidding when it purchases defense industrial goods.

He said he will do his best to eliminate the "negative" image the public has of the military, which is caused by the military's political intervention.

To do so, Yi said he will stage a spiritual renewal campaign for the military.

On the matter of youths called up for nonmilitary duties, Yi said the ministry will have them serve in military camps along with regular soldiers, adding that such soldiers at police boxes and the headquarters of the Homeland Reserve Forces will be replaced by riot police and government officials.

Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun indicated that Korea could take over operational command the U.S. military now exercises over the Korean Armed Forces in peace time.

He told a news conference yesterday that Korea and the United States could "study ways of transferring operational authority to our side from the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) if the unified command of the Korean military is in operation by July."

The press conference came shortly after the minister gave a policy briefing to President No Tae-u.

Minister Yi said the U.S. side is asking Korea to represent it at the Military Armistice Meeting at Panmunjom, but "we have shelved our decision because doing so would entail demerits."

He said the Korea-U.S. military exercise, "Team Spirit," could be held every other year instead of every year and its scale could be reduced.

The decision depends on how north Korea acts, he said.

U.S. Envoy Comments on ROK Northern Policy

SK0802021190 Seoul Domestic Service in Korean
0900 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] Donald Gregg, U.S. ambassador to Korea, said today that the United States was satisfied with the northern policy Korea has been promoting and that he welcomed its expansion in the future.

Noting this at a national meeting of business managers arranged this afternoon by the Federation of Business Managers, Ambassador Gregg said that Korea and the United States should help the socialist countries in East Europe, which long for cooperation with Korea in the areas of politics and economy, to let them come into the global economic system with success. He also emphasized that in the long term aiding the socialist countries develop their economies is important for making them understand Korean and U.S. politics and economy.

Concerning relations between the North and South of Korea, Ambassador Gregg also noted the opening in East Europe has led North Korea to intensify its power inheritance system further and hoped that North Korea will adopt a more practical attitude in order to promote humanitarian and material exchanges with Korea.

* Future of U.S. Forces in Korea Discussed

902C0070A Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean
8 Nov 89 p 17

[Report of Roundtable Discussion on U.S. Forces in Korea by Yi Chae-ho and Yi Tong-kwan; Participants: Pak Yong-ok, Defense Ministry Deputy Director of External Policy; Ha Yong-son, Associate Professor of Political Science at the Seoul National University; Yi Sam-song, Political Science Instructor at Sungmyong Women's University]

[Text] [Moderator] The serial "The U.S. Forces in Korea" is now coming to an end after over 10 months of serialization. Our special coverage team has endeavored to delve into the real state of the U.S. forces in Korea and

the problems involved with them from a balanced point of view as much as possible and examine the demand for their withdrawal and the anti-American moves from an objective stance, but I feel the efforts of our team left much to be desired. In winding up this serial, we would like to focus our discussion on the "Future of the U.S. Forces in Korea." It is clear that the presence of U.S. forces in Korea cannot continue forever. Some day they will be withdrawn or reduced. What draws our attention in this connection is the question: Are the U.S. forces in Korea really a stumbling block to North-South talks and reunification?

[Pak Yong-ok] In my opinion, the presence of the U.S. forces is not a stumbling block to North-South talks and national reunification. I regard these as conditions for peaceful reunification: First, both North and South Korea are cognizant of the fact that they will gain nothing from a use of force (war) against each other; second, they build confidence in each other; and third, the powers surrounding Korea guarantee peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. In no way does the presence of U.S. troops in Korea hinder the fulfillment of these three requirements. First, the stationing of U.S. troops in Korea serves a deterrent to armed clashes between North and South Korea. Second, with regard to the question of building confidence, U.S. forces do not hamper confidence building. In Europe, while the NATO and the Warsaw Pact forces maintain their respective collective defense structures with U.S. and Soviet troops as their key elements, the East and West are pushing disarmament negotiations at a full scale based on mutual trust. Lastly, the U.S. forces in Korea are contributing to stabilizing the situation in the surrounding areas.

U.S. Forces Serve U.S. Interests

[Yi Sam-song] My idea is a little bit different. In my opinion, we should begin with recognizing that the U.S. forces in Korea are as a military power through and through. It is necessary to examine coolly whether the presence of an enormous force of arms can really be a means for perpetuating peace or poses an obstruction to peace. People often say that we need a "change in our way of thinking." It means that we need to shift our stance from a military-oriented view to pacifism. People often try to justify the presence of U.S. troops in Korea by pointing out that "U.S. troops are also stationed in Europe." But they should know that although Soviet nuclear weapons exist in Europe, there is no such weapon in North Korea. In addition, we should recognize the fact that North Korea has refused to turn itself into a Soviet military base. Some people claim that thanks to the presence of U.S. troops in Korea, military balance and peace are maintained between North and South. But it must be pointed out that to the contrary, the presence of U.S. forces is a factor causing a vicious cycle of military confrontation and turning North and South Korea into military barracks and inhumane societies.

[Ha Yong-son] There are several reasons for the U.S. forces having become a new issue, reasons such as the new international detente, the relative decline in the influence of the United States, and the progress in relations between North and South Korea. I think Deputy Director Pak has so far stressed the favorable political aspect of the functions of the U.S. forces in Korea whereas Professor Yi has stressed the adverse side of these functions. It is my stand that we should give our first thought to how North Korea's unification policy should be viewed. The present North Korean policy on reunification is different from what it used to be in the fifties and sixties, but I think that as long as North Korea refuses to abandon its policy of "reunification through revolution," we should recognize the deterrent effect of the U.S. forces in Korea against military clashes. However, the trouble is the adverse side of the functions. What is called a deterrence to military clashes on the Korean Peninsula is part of U.S. world strategy, and this deterrence does not necessarily reflect the interest of the Korean Peninsula itself. In some cases it could operate adversely. It should also be recognized that the presence of the U.S. forces in Korea cannot accord with our interest 100 percent in achieving the independent reunification and democratization of our country. In a word, this is to say that we should also recognize that U.S. troops are stationed here partly for the purpose of promoting the interests of the United States. Accordingly, I think it is necessary to expand the areas in which the interests of our country and the United States are identical and reduce the areas where there is a conflict of interests.

[Moderator] I think the majority of people are worried that if the U.S. troops are suddenly withdrawn, the balance between North and South will be broken, leading to the outbreak of a war. To put it a different way, I think many people are afraid of war and are apprehensive of the idea of reunification for the sake of reunification, the idea that "everything else will take care of itself if only reunification is achieved."

[Yi] In my opinion, the so-called conservative circles have distorted the demand of the dissidents for the withdrawal of U.S. troops. In other words, the conservatives have pictured the stand of the dissidents as an extremist view in order to make it an easy target of attack. It is the position of the dissidents that in anticipation of changes in the surrounding circumstances resulting from the withdrawal of U.S. troops, the Korean people themselves should contrive peace and security devices on their own initiative. They don't mean to say that after having all of the U.S. troops withdrawn, the Koreans themselves talk things over among themselves. In other words, we should positively respond to the call of the North for North-South military talks, including discussions on the issue of withdrawal of the U.S. forces.

[Ha] But I think what is equally important is the question of whether the North Korean demand for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the South signifies the abandonment of its revolutionary line or part of it.

[Yi] That question should be addressed not to North Korea, but to ourselves. Our party in power is trying to solve the question of North-South relations on the basis of an absolute negation of the communist society in the North. There is no difference between this attitude and the North's negation of the legitimacy of the South. Attention must be paid to the possibility that an announcement of a plan to withdraw U.S. forces will bring about an important change in the military strategy of the North.

[Ha] In my opinion, there must be something that performs a deterrent function before a shift takes place in the logic with regard to North-South relations, namely, a shift from a military to a political logic or the logic of peace. In other words, a means to back up a shift in the logic must precede the shift.

[Pak] It is quite natural that a shift should be made from a military to a political logic. I also agree with the opinion that the vicious cycle of military confrontation must be broken and that to this end, military talks should be actively promoted. However, military talks (disarmament talks) should proceed in the direction of maintaining the deterrent power. In the world history of disarmament negotiations, there has not been even a single instance of disarmament negotiation carried out in the direction of breaking existing deterrent powers. Yet, North Korea, while calling for military talks, demands the withdrawal of U.S. forces in an attempt to pull down one of the pillars in the joint ROK-U.S. defense structure, the backbone of our national defense.

[Yi] Probably, North Korea must have seen an imminent threat to its very survival in continuing ROK-U.S. joint military exercises and the growing of Japan as a military power.

[Pak] You just said North Korea's military may have stemmed from an imminent threat to its survival, but the by-law of the North Korean Workers Party and the North Korean constitution clearly provide that the communization of the Korean Peninsula is an ultimate goal of the state. In addition, North Korean troops are deployed in the front line areas.

[Ha] It is depressing to see that North Korea's disarmament proposal seems to indicate that it is not sure of itself whether it recognizes the other party to the talks (the ROK). In other words, it is obscure whether North Korea recognizes the legitimacy of the other party to the talks. In addition, the disarmament proposal advanced by North Korea in 1987 called for a simultaneous reduction of the U.S. forces in Korea and for the North and South Korean forces. But the so-called "comprehensive disarmament proposal" made in 1988 gives priority to the question of the U.S. forces and nuclear weapons in South Korea, thus it is a step backward from the earlier proposal. If North Korea really wants disarmament negotiations, I think the order of priority should be reserved. Part of the blame falls on our side. Our side

says it will actively deal with disarmament negotiations, but do you see any concrete plans?

Interest in Changing Military Structure

[Moderator] Let us now turn to the issue of withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Korea. The public seems to have the simple thought that inasmuch as there are great fears that withdrawing the U.S. forces from Korea will break the military balance between North and South, the withdrawal should be carried out only after a fool-proof device for security and peace has been contrived. In addition, fears are arising among some people that the discussion of the withdrawal issue currently underway among the dissident activist camp and on campuses may play into the strategic hands of North Korea.

[Yi] As in the 4 July joint statement issued in the early 1970's, North and South Korea has an experience in recognizing each other's systems on the basis of the principle of coexistence. Aside from the question of which side first broke this relationship of mutual recognition, it is true that this relationship was severed by the Yusin system. The very fact—the fact that there is a difference in character between North Korea's 1987 and 1988 military negotiation proposals in relation to the issue of U.S. troop withdrawal from Korea—conversely indicate the possibility that depending on the response of our side, North Korea will change its position. In the final analysis, depending on what kind of forward-leaning stance our side will take in military talks, the results will differ accordingly in dealing with the question of withdrawing U.S. troops and nuclear weapons. It is important to have an opportunity to confirm each other's true intention, and in this regard, our side should have self-reflection.

[Ha] In plain language, the difference in opinion between North and South Korea on the issue of U.S. troop withdrawal from Korea is the difference between "withdrawal first, peace afterward" and "peace first, withdrawal afterward." The position of North Korea is that "when the troops are withdrawn, confidence building will be achieved." But there is no such historical precedent. North Korea should have the flexibility of reversing the proposal, and the trouble with our side is that it has yet to clearly express its stance toward military talks.

[Moderator] Withdrawing or reducing the U.S. forces in South Korea is not only a matter of great concern for the North and the South but also has a close bearing on the interests of the four neighboring powers, namely, the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and China. Would you explain the opinion of each of these countries regarding the troop withdrawal issue and the question of achieving a stable peace on the Korean Peninsula?

[Pak] In my personal opinion, it seems that the four neighboring powers are concerned about the U.S. troop withdrawal issue because of the anticipated change in the structure of military forces in this region. I think that particularly China and the Soviet Union do not want a

radical change in the configuration of the U.S. forces in Korea for fear that the withdrawal of the U.S. troops may lead to upgrading the military power of Japan, which now ranks third in terms of military expenditures, and to an enhancement of Japan's political and military role in this region. For us, the question will remain: if the U.S. troops are pulled out under the circumstance in which we lack our own defense capability, will we be able to maintain national independence unaffected by the military and political influence of Japan?

Independent Peace Efforts Urgently Needed

Recently I had an opportunity to talk with Soviet scholars during their stay in Korea. In the conversation, they pointed out that "before 1985, the Soviet Union might have fully supported the North Korean demand for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, but since 1985, it has shifted to the stance that the interested countries should consult with one another to adjust their views on the timing and method of the withdrawal." Thus I could find in their stand something in common with our view.

I would say that the Soviet Union is in a dilemma because as far as its stand is concerned, it is interested in the question of whether withdrawing the U.S. forces from Korea will indeed increase Soviet influence, but the interests of the four powers cross one another over the question of reducing military forces in the Far East, including the withdrawing of the U.S. forces in Korea. At any rate, the Soviet Union, while tacitly supporting the principle of "peace first, withdrawal afterward," seems to take the flexible stand that North and South Korea should recognize each other. On the contrary, in the case of Japan, its stand seems to be somewhat delicate because when the U.S. forces are withdrawn from Korea, Japan expects to find itself in the dilemma of increasing its political and military influence and shouldering a greater burden.

[Pak] The U.S. Far Eastern defense strategy being a strategic concept centering around the navy and air force, even if the U.S. ground force in Korea is withdrawn, it is not expected to result in a weakening of the U.S. naval and air power in the Far East. This is to say that under no circumstance will there be any change in the system of military cooperation between the United States and Japan.

[Yi] As far as the Soviet Union and Japan are concerned, it seems that because of the need for disarmament aimed at reducing its defense outlays, the Soviet Union would rather prefer a change in the form of stationing of U.S. forces in Korea than a boost in Japan's military power as a consequence of a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. On the contrary, Japan seems to have on the one hand the desire to have U.S. forces stationed continuously in South Korea and on the other hand the desire to maintain its status as a military power in the context of a "triangular defense structure" embracing the ROK, the U.S., and Japan.

In the final analysis, I would say it is urgently needed that the North and South Korean authorities exert independent efforts to achieve a stable peace if they are not to leave the issue of "war or peace" on the Korean Peninsula in the hands of others.

[Moderator] Experience shows that at one time the United States unilaterally reduced or withdrew its troops from Korea by a unilateral decision on the basis of its own interests. In view of the possibility of a recurrence of a similar state of affairs, would you discuss what the state of our preparedness for such a contingency is like and what the preconditions for troop withdrawal are?

[Yi] In my opinion, the U.S. stand with regard to the troop withdrawal issue is that it "wants to station its troops as long as possible at minimum expense." The U.S. demand that the ROK share a greater defense burden is based on expected force reductions. But the United States will interfere in ROK security in another way, for instance, through the sale of weapons. In the final analysis, the controversy recently spearheaded by the U.S. Congress over the issue of reducing or withdrawing U.S. forces in Korea should be viewed as a means of pressuring the ROK to increase its defense outlays and open its markets wider. On our part, we should be on guard against the unilateral U.S. argument about withdrawing or reducing its troops, an argument which is far detached from the issue of relaxation of tension on the Korean Peninsula.

[Ha] As a means of justifying itself and promoting its own interests at the same time while avoiding an economic burden and refraining from impeding the process of a "new detente" between the United States and the Soviet Union, the United States will continue to station its forces in the ROK at an increasingly low stationing cost. This is to say that in proportion to the size of the defense burden borne by the ROK, the pace of troop reduction will slow down. However, even if the question of sharing of the defense cost is smoothly settled, it is expected that the so-called flab, such as noncombat personnel, will be gradually cut out. Nevertheless, even when ground forces continue to be reduced, the air force is expected to stay for a long time because of the Far Eastern defense requirement.

[Pak] As of this moment, the United States seems to have no intention whatsoever to abandon its defense commitment to the ROK or abrogate the ROK-U.S. joint defense arrangement. However, it seems to be giving an active thought to a partial force reduction. It is clear that the ROK-U.S. joint defense arrangement will undergo a change in the direction of increasing the role and responsibility of the ROK. The United States will gradually recede from its leading role in the defense of South Korea to a supportive role.

[Moderator] I understand that the United States has a plan to reorganize the overall U.S. overseas forces in the mid-1990's. This is expected to bring about a change in the configuration and features of the U.S. forces in

Korea in one form or another. Would you give your opinion as to when troop withdrawal will be possible and what preparatory posture we should take.

[Pak] Needless to say, as far as our stand is concerned, troop withdrawal should be carried out when we can cope with the military threat of North Korea on our own. Moreover, the U.S. commitment to intervene in the security of the ROK in case of war should be maintained as an institutional security device. As things stand now, we are expected to achieve a self-defense capability in the early 2000's. This presupposes an adequate economic growth and an adequate defense investment in the intervening period. However, it is an open question whether the situation in the areas surrounding the Korean Peninsula will remain "constant" until that time. True, the U.S. forces in Korea will have a low priority as a target of reduction in the reorganization of U.S. forces stationed overseas expected to be carried out in the mid-1990's. But I think a partial reduction will be carried out as a symbolic measure.

Shouldering of Adequate Defense Cost Necessary

[Ha] In my opinion, seen from the point of view of maintaining an overall balance of power in Northeast Asia, the U.S. forces should be withdrawn under the circumstances in which we can improve our self-defense capability rather than under the circumstances which may permit an increase in the political and military influence of Japan and the Soviet Union. Troop withdrawal should be carried out in accordance with the principle of "peace first, withdrawal afterward," and should come only after an institutional device for achieving a stable peace is in place.

[Pak] How to attain our own defense capability against North Korea while preventing excessive defense outlays is one of the problems confronting us. In the final analysis, as things stand now, the continued stationing of U.S. forces in Korea is inevitable in order to maintain a necessary deterrent power while avoiding domestic pressures for cuts in our military spending. Accordingly, we need to bear an appropriate level of the defense burden in order to gain time necessary to attain our own self-defense capability and maintain a deterrent power against North Korea.

[Yi] In conclusion, what we like to ask of the United States in connection with the troop withdrawal issue is that the United States should not take advantage of the withdrawal issue to pressure us to shoulder a greater share of the defense burden and open our markets wider. The powers that are in our country for their part should not take advantage of the troop withdrawal issue to maintain their power as their predecessors did in the 1970's. North Korea for its part should take visible measures to achieve a stable peace by, for instance, transferring their troops to the rear from the front line area, from the point of view that either side should first break the chain of military confrontation. The public for

its part should view the demand of students and dissidents as an expansion of mass peace movements for reunification instead of criticizing them from the standpoint of distorted anti-communism. I think dissidents and student activists should not resort to intermittent violence as in the past.

[Moderator] Thank you for the long time you have spend for this roundtable discussion.

Late Submission of GATT Beef Imports Report

SK0702024890 Seoul YONHAP in English 0222 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] Seoul, Feb. 7 (YONHAP)—South Korea has notified the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that it cannot submit a report on beef import liberalization by the Feb. 7 deadline, an Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Ministry official said Wednesday.

The official said his ministry was unable to reach agreement with the United States, Australia or New Zealand but will resume talks on beef imports Feb. 20-21 with Australia and Feb. 23 with New Zealand in Seoul.

Korea will explain the situation of the livestock industry and propose forming a joint investigation team to determine whether it is possible for Korea to comply with GATT's recommendation. GATT recommended Nov. 7 that Korea draw up a market opening timetable for beef and report the results within three months.

Korea failed to reach an agreement in talks on beef imports with Australia and New Zealand last year, and Korea-U.S. beef talks in Seoul on Jan. 11 broke down when the United States urged Korea to present a timetable for liberalizing imports but Korea insisted on retaining its import quota system.

Rumor of Cho Sun's Resignation Offer Denied

SK0802083090 Seoul YONHAP in English 0655 GMT 8 Feb 90

[By Hong Sang-pyo]

[Text] Seoul, Feb. 8 (YONHAP)—The Economic Planning Board (EPB) denied Thursday that Cho Sun, South Korea's top economic planner, has offered to resign as deputy premier.

"Deputy Prime Minister Cho has not tendered his resignation," EPB spokesman An Pyong-u said.

Despite the official denial, the former scholar is expected to step down soon because of disputes between government officials and party policy-makers over the direction of Korea's economic policy, an informed source said.

Published reports that Cho had tendered his resignation followed a meeting between Cho, who is also economic planning minister, and Prime Minister Kang Yong-hun on Wednesday.

The KOREA ECONOMIC DAILY reported that in offering to resign the deputy prime minister warned that any attempt weakening the economic stability might wipe out the economy's hard-earned growth potential and result in a "Latin American style" economy characterized by low-growth and hyperinflation.

An said the meeting was to brief Kang on the economic policy programs the EPB is to discuss with policy-makers from the new ruling party, to be created in mid-April by merging the old ruling and two former opposition parties.

If Cho resigns, President No Tae-u will probably replace most of the economic ministers in his cabinet in a reshuffle that is widely expected next month, the source said.

The discord is over whether Korea should return to its growth-oriented policies of the 1970s, shifting the policy accent away from well-being, stability and equitable distribution as has been vigorously demanded by Cho since he became top economic planner in December 1988.

Officials of the new ruling party, tentatively named the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), are openly pressing for the growth-first policy, claiming it would treble per capita income over the next 10 years from 5,000 U.S. Dollars to 15,000 dollars.

Technocrats within the government have responded coldly to the party's moves, branding them "attempts to restore popularity" in disregard of economic circumstances.

The DLP, however, has formed a special committee on economic policy, heralding major policy changes to bail out the sagging economy.

The six-member panel is led by Yi Sung-yun, a finance minister under ex-President Chon Tu-hwan, and comprises senior party members who held economic portfolios or were high-ranking officials under president Pak Chong-hui or Chon.

They include Kim Yong-hwan, Yi Hui-il, Hwang Pyong-tai and Kim Tong-kyu.

Yi Sung-yun, an ardent advocate of growth-oriented economic policies, has reportedly said Korea's most urgent economic problem is the unfair distribution of wealth and that the problem can be solved only in the course of high economic growth.

But Cho and other economic planners have made it plain that they are opposed to the growth-first school of thought being advanced by the new ruling party.

"The situation has changed a great deal since the 1960s and the 1970s, when growth and distribution were conflicting concepts. They (party officials) are causing only confusion by talking about growth-oriented policy," Cho said recently.

Another senior economic official has said that while radical pump-priming measures may generate a high rate of economic growth this year, they will later create a variety of woes and fuel inflation.

The Korean economy averaged an annual growth rate of about 10 percent since the early 1960s under President Pak's export- and growth-oriented policies.

The policy emphasis was shifted from growth to well-being, price stability and equitable distribution in the 1980s in response to growing demands among the public for a share of the nation's wealth.

Despite the policy shift, Korea's economic growth rate was still the envy of developing countries, averaging 9.97 percent from 1981 to 1988 with over 12 percent growth from 1986-1988.

Growth slowed in 1989 to 6.6 percent and is expected to further decline in 1990.

The discord between economic officials and the new ruling party may worry the people, who are already concerned by the uncertain prospects for exports, inflation and labor unrest.

Student Dissidents Protest Party Merger

SK0702032890 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
7 Feb 90 p 3

[Text] Tension continues to mount on the university campuses as student activists are determined to stage a series of rallies in their desperate attempt to dismantle the disputed merger of the three political parties.

The Federation of Seoul Student Councils (Sochongnyon), a key student activist group, has set up a range of measures to crush the recent incorporation of the governing Democratic Justice Party and the opposition Reunification Democratic Party and the New Democratic Republican Party into a giant party temporarily dubbed the Democratic Liberal Party.

Sochongnyon also designated the period from Monday through next Wednesday as the one for destruction of the newly-merged party.

Under the guidance of Sochongnyon, student militants held rallies on the campuses of five universities in the capital including Korea and Chungang Universities yesterday afternoon in a strong protest against the political party merger.

The radical student activist group ordered the universities and colleges in Seoul to stage at least one anti-merger rally during the first propaganda period.

Sochongnyon and other dissident groups such as the National Alliance for Democratic Movement (Chonminnyon) denounced the incorporation of the three parties in a vitriolic manner as the first anti-democratic step to consolidate despotic rule by one authoritarian party.

Sochongnyon has scheduled a large-scale rally at Korea University next Wednesday as part of its efforts to cultivate among citizens a strong sentiment against the merger by waging a maximum-degree propaganda war.

The law-enforcement authorities worried that street violence would be inevitable next week since the police have resolved to disrupt the rally at Korea University with every means available.

New Party's Economic Policy Conflicts Analyzed

SK0802020090 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
8 Feb 90 p 2

[By staff reporter Sin Hak-nim]

[Text] Internal conflicts over key economic policies appear inevitable in the ruling camp as the new ruling party to be founded through the merger of three conservative parties has shown signs of returning to a drive for growth instead of a policy of fair distribution.

Economic policymakers in the administration led by Deputy Premier Cho Sun are raising strong objections to the move of the new ruling party to put emphasis on growth.

Key architects of the merger plan regarded the economic policy change as a "fait accompli," saying that the political alignment was motivated by the need to help reinvigorate the sluggish national economy, among others.

Announcing close party-administration consultations on economic issues, ruling party spokesman Pak Hui-tae said, "Measures should be sought to clear away obstacles to sustaining economic growth in parallel with the merger of the three parties."

Following the announcement of the merger plan, even the rumor that it was the result of big businesses' lobbying for political stability became widespread through the political realignment which has been widely regarded to be a "grand conservative political alliance."

It was also manifested by an agreement between President No Tae-u and Kim Yong-sam and Kim Chong-pil in their meeting last Saturday that the new party will strive to realize a per capita income of \$15,000 by the year 2000, three times higher than this year's level.

There was no mention of continuing efforts to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor, in the four-point basic policies of the new party announced by the top leaders.

Besides this, a special six-member committee has been formed in the tentatively named Democratic Liberal Party to work out measures to cope with the current economic recess. They are ready to have full-dress consultations with key economic ministers soon to discuss the questions.

It is ironic and meaningful that all the six members, two each from the three parties, have served as senior economic policymakers in the past governments, which were preoccupied with economic growth.

Reps. Yi Sung-yun and Na Ung-pae from the Democratic Justice Party served as finance and economic planning ministers, respectively, during Chon Tu-hwan's Fifth Republic government. Reps. Kim Tong-kyu and Hwang Pyong-tae from Kim Yong-sam's Reunification Democratic Party served as assistant trade-industry and economic ministers under the Pak Chong-hui government. Reps. Kim Yong-hwan and Yi Hui-il were finance and agriculture ministers also during Pak's government.

Yi Sung-yun, current chief policymaker of the DJP [Democratic Justice Party], said, "The government cannot continue a welfare policy blindly unless it is backed by economic growth at a time when fiscal demands for the promotion of people's welfare are increasing explosively."

He then emphasized the need for the administration to work out measures to help businesses increase their investment and exports.

However, the nascent new party's attempts to give priority to economic growth will face violent reactions from economic ministers and Kim Yong-sam's party as well as people of low income brackets. It is one of the reasons why a considerable number of people suspect that the merger of the three parties is a return to old times.

Key economic policymakers in the administration assert that it is necessary to continue the welfare policy and to curb the economic concentration of big businesses in order to realize "genuine" economic stability.

They admit that the high economic growth in the last two decades has levelled off in recent years but that this cannot be taken as an excuse to switch the economic policy line. "Welfare policy under sustained growth should be continued for the time being," said one economic official. He then criticized those senior members of the new party arguing for the policy changeover for being seized by the way of thinking of the 1970's which marked almost double-digit economic growth.

He asserted that the people's mounting calls for "equal shares" of economic fruit stem from an unfair distribution of wealth and economic concentration during the past two decades.

He observed that the government's return to policies for rapid growth, and disregard of social justice will not be successful in the face of strong objections from poor people.

Ministry Reports on 1989 Labor Disputes

SK0702025290 Seoul YONHAP in English 0215 GMT
7 Feb 90

[Text] Seoul, Feb. 7 (YONHAP)—The number of labor disputes declined 13.7 percent last year while the number of individual participants rose 35 percent, a report by the labor affairs Ministry said Wednesday.

The report said there were 1,616 labor disputes last year, down 13.7 percent from 1,873 in 1988, and 56.7 percent lower than 3,749 in 1987.

Of the disputes last year, 1,107 (68.5 percent) were illegal, down 11.1 percent from 1,491 (79.6 percent) in 1988.

The number of people involved in disputes in 1989 rose 35 percent to 396,543 from 293,678 in 1988. Work hours lost due to disputes increased 17.6 percent to 50,811,547 from 43,206,684.

The report said 6,801 companies employing more than 100 workers averaged 17.8 percent pay raises last year, up from 13.5 percent pay raises at 6,093 companies.

Clerical workers' wages rose 15.2 percent last year, up from 11.7 percent raises the year before, while production line workers won 20.1 percent increases, up from 15.5 percent, the report said.

Ministry Unveils Technological Development Plan

SK0702074490 Seoul YONHAP in English 0642 GMT
7 Feb 90

[Text] Seoul, Feb. 7 (YONHAP)—The Trade and Industry Ministry unveiled a four-year 3.63 trillion won (5.26 billion U.S. dollars) plan Wednesday to spur technological progress in the electronic industry. The Ministry said it hopes to get 1.281 trillion won (1.856 billion dollars) from last year's huge national tax surplus.

The plan, to start this year, gives top priority to the development of the three major high-tech products: next generation semiconductor devices, high-definition televisions and time division exchanges.

The Ministry said items classified as urgent priority are medium-sized computers, G4 facsimiles, semiconductor microdevices and next generation display equipment.

Support will be provided to develop core components, micromechanics and trouble-shooting technologies to add value to items such as long-range cordless phones, liquid crystal display televisions and lap-top computers.

It said production technology research centers and universities, with government aid, will spearhead the development drive.

Some 40 new high-tech products were selected for development in 1990, including DAT (digital audiotape) recorders, videodisc players, ultra-large refrigerators, desk-top computers, high-speed laser printers, digital oscilloscopes and high-frequency electric tools as well as 20 core parts such as 13-layer printed circuit boards.

The 21 items picked for 1991 include portable televisions, lap-top computers, ultra-small portable transmitter-receivers and linear motors along with 23 core parts.

Target models for 1992 are notebook computers, optical disc drives, compact disc read-only memories, large-capacity transmission equipment and another 13 items as well as 19 core parts.

Projected for 1993 are digital videocassette recorders, optical testing apparatus, SF6 gas-insulation stations and another nine new models and 12 core parts.

Burma

ADSB's U Aung Appeals to Youths for Unity

BK0302134790 Delhi External Service in Burmese
1115 GMT 1 Feb 90

[From the "Current Burmese Affairs" program]

[Text] Listeners: We now present an appeal to the youths from U Aung, general secretary of the Alliance for Democratic Solidarity, Union of Burma [ADSB], dated 19 January 1990.

Dear patriotic youths: Out of the many sufferings in the world, suffering from a lack of freedom is a very serious one. As for us, the middle-aged, we have lost all our social freedoms since 1962. Some of you were born at the advent of the period of the military dictatorship which lasted for almost 30 years, or perhaps some of you were born during this era.

Since all of you have had no social freedoms since birth, there is nothing more to lose. You all know why you should be free from this suffering. Burma, as well as the whole world, knows that you all tried to gain social freedom at the cost of many lives in 1988. We all know just as the whole world knows of your courage. You all will persevere until you attain freedom, and that is why we congratulate you.

Thousands of youths, including Min Ko Naing, have been arrested. Some have given their lives; some are being tortured. Among the middle-aged group, thousands, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, have been arrested. Some have given their lives; some are being tortured. In the elderly group, thousands, including Prime Minister U Nu and General Tin U, have been arrested. Some have given their lives; some are being tortured. Why?

The whole country wants to be free from the suffering. You all want to be free from this suffering. We want to be free from this suffering. We all have the same objective. We shall stand up together to work for our country's benefit. We will all join hands and fight the military dictatorship. By this we do not mean that we are going to form a government.

We mean that we are going to pull out the feathers one by one from the dingy crows—the SLORC [State Law and Order Restoration Council]—who are pretending to be the king of peacocks. With the support of the people, including all of you, we must remove the dingy SLORC crows from our union. If we do not try to remove the SLORC military dictators, who will?

All kinds of dictators have been removed all over the world. We Burmese should be included in this trend of removing dictators from the world. The time has come for us to ask this question.

For the cause of democracy!

Signed: Maung Aung, secretary general, ADSB

Commission Deregisters Burma Reporters Party

BK0802100590 Rangoon Domestic Service in Burmese
1330 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] The Commission for Holding Multiparty Democratic General Elections of the Union of Myanmar [Burma] issued Announcement No. 372, dated 7 February 1990—the 13th day of the waxing moon of Tabodwe, 1351 Myanmar Era. The announcement reads:

1. The Commission for Holding Multiparty Democratic General Elections of the Union of Myanmar announced that the Burma Reporters Association, which has its headquarters at No. 11, Gandamar Street, Mahamyintmo Chan, Bahan Township, Yangon [Rangoon] Division, was permitted registration as a political party by the commission in accordance with Article 5A of the Political Parties Registration law on 7 November 1988. This was stated in Announcement No. 101 issued on that day.

2. However, since the commission is now in receipt of a request seeking an annulment of the registration of that party, it hereby announces the annulment of the registration of the Burma Reporters Association, with effect from 7 February 1990.

By the authority vested in me
Signed: Aye Maung, secretary

Arms, Ammunition Seized Near Kachin Camps

BK0502145590 Rangoon Domestic Service in Burmese
1330 GMT 5 Feb 90

[Text] Military units from the frontline 99th Light Infantry Division, under the supervision of that divisional headquarters and the Northeast Military Command, launched offensives against and occupied the headquarters of the KIA's [Kachin Independence Army] 4th Brigade and camps of the 2d and 9th KIA Battalions. A report on the arms and ammunition and the buildings captured was given at the 76th press conference held on 2 February.

Following this, our military units—the 113th Light Infantry Regiment and the 84th Infantry Regiment—went on a search and destroy campaign in areas around the KIA's 4th Brigade headquarters. As a result, they uncovered near the Hkahpaw camp, as of 1030 on 3 February, a total of 72 assorted weapons—three Browning machine guns, one 7.62mm submachine gun, two Browning automatic rifles with bipods, nine Bren guns, four M-79 launchers, three two-inch mortars, and 50 assorted small arms.

In addition, we captured 1,063 rounds of assorted ammunition—25 rounds of 57mm shells, 70 rounds of .5mm shells, 10 M-34 shells, 30 smoke bombs for the two-inch mortar, 928 rounds of small arms ammunition—as well as 55 assorted mines—one mine used in the destruction of buildings and 54 other types of mines. An additional 100 hand grenades were also seized.

Since the overrunning of the KIA 4th Brigade headquarters and its subordinate battalion camps on 31 January and until 3 February, our military columns have captured a total of 81 assorted weapons and 1,263 rounds of assorted ammunition.

Army 'Posing for Attacks' on Mon, Student Camps

BK0602022390 Bangkok *THE NATION* in English
 6 Feb 90 p 2

[By Yindi Loetcharoenchok]

[Text] Following its recent success in capturing a number of Karen outposts opposite Tak Province, the Burmese Army is posing for attacks on camps housing thousands of armed ethnic Mons and dissident Burmese students.

About 1,600 Burmese troops under Southeast Command (Karen State) Commander Brigadier-General Nyan Lin are moving in three groups towards the New Mon State Party's camps and headquarters opposite Thailand's Three Pagodas Pass in Kanchanaburi Province, according to Burmese student sources.

The sources said two Rangoon groups are coming from Ye and Keyudoo towns in the West while the other is from Kya-in Seikkyi town in the North. Keyudoo is about three-hours walking distance from Three Pagodas Pass.

The Burmese military has already arrived at Chaung Sonn, which is 29 miles from Three Pagodas Pass, said the sources.

Three students camps in the vicinity are under attack and about 350 students, who are preparing themselves for possible evacuation, are still providing medical care and educational training for villagers in the area, the sources added.

About 1,000 villagers in Kya-in Seikkyi and 700 from Ye have been rounded up by Rangoon forces to work as porters carrying ammunition and food, the sources said.

Thousands of Burmese students, who spearheaded the pro-democracy uprising in Burma in 1988, fled to jungle border areas under the control of armed ethnic forces after military rulers seized power through a bloody coup in September of that year.

The Burmese Army resumed military operations against the ethnic forces along the Thai-Burmese border after the start of the dry season last December. Since then it has managed to overrun Phalu, Maw Ker, Thay Baw Bo, and Wa Lay outposts belonging to the Karen National Union and located along the Moei River opposite Thailand's Tak Province.

Karen Rebels Vow To Continue Despite Losses

BK0602010590 Bangkok *BANGKOK POST* in English
 6 Feb 90 p 1

[Text] Mae Sot—Ethnic Karen guerrillas vowed to carry on their war against the Burmese government despite heavy casualties and the razing of their strongholds on the Thai border.

The Karen National Union (KNU), which has been fighting for autonomy from Rangoon, told REUTERS the government had destroyed 10 of their 11 major camps straddling the winding river border, a liaison officer said.

He said about 20,000 Karen refugees fled to Thailand during the latest government offensive which began two months ago.

The officer, who asked not to be named, said the KNU would change tactics to guerrilla warfare conducted out of small, mobile units.

"Our 40-year-old policy to fight for autonomy from Rangoon remains the same but our strategy will change from defensive to guerrilla warfare," he said.

Fighting in the last two years has increased as Burma's military government, cut off from foreign aid, [sentence as published]

Health Minister Leaves for Malaysian Study Tour

BK0202081790 Rangoon *Domestic Service* in Burmese
 1330 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] A Myanma [Burmese] delegation led by Colonel Pe Thein, minister of health and education and chief commander of the Universities Training Corps, left for Malaysia this morning by air to study and consult on health programs, regional development, and college and other educational programs in Malaysia at the invitation of Ng Cheng Kiat, the Malaysian minister of health.

Minister Col Pe Thein and his delegation were seen off at the airport by Brigadier General Aung Ye Kyaw, minister of construction and cooperatives; Brigadier General Tin U, secretary-2 of the State Law and Order Restoration Council [SLORC]; Colonel Than Nyunt, chief of staff of the Navy; Colonel Ket Sein, deputy commander of the Rangoon Command; U Kyaw Aye, director general of the Office of the SLORC; U Ko, director general of the Office of the Cabinet; the Malaysian ambassador to Myanma; Dr (Chaudury), resident representative of the World Health Organization; and departmental heads and officials from the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education.

Travelling with Minister Col Pe Thein are U Win Maung, director general of the Department of Higher Education; Dr Khin Maung Win, director general of the Department of Agricultural, Technical, and Vocational Education; Dr Aung Tun Thett, director general of the Department of Statistics and Planning of the Ministry of

Health; Dr Kan Tun, deputy director of the Department of Statistics and Planning; and the personal aide of the minister.

Brunei, Malaysia & Singapore

Singapore

Lee Returns Home From Switzerland 7 Feb

BK0702143090 Singapore Domestic Service in English 1400 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] The prime minister has returned to Singapore from Davos in Switzerland. He was there for a week to attend an annual meeting of the world economic forum. Some 70 government leaders and 700 chief executives were also present. A wide range of issues were discussed. They included reforms in Eastern Europe and the concerns of ASEAN.

Editorial on Lee Kuan Yew-Vo Van Kiet Meeting

BK0702143090 Singapore THE STRAITS TIMES in English 7 Feb 90 p 22

[Editorial: "Hanoi Has To Decide"]

[Text] For the past 11 years, Vietnam and Singapore have been at odds over Cambodia. They still are. Thus, when Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew agreed to meet the Vice-Chairman of Vietnam's Council of Ministers, Mr Vo Van Kiet, in Davos, Switzerland, last weekend, it was done not out of diplomatic politeness. Mr Lee went to Davos with one objective, which is to persuade the West Europeans not to give up their economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region even as their attention is drawn increasingly to the breathtaking upheavals in Eastern Europe. He used the opportunity to explain the Cambodian conflict to the 1,500 top European executives. In doing so, he tried to impress on them that after the Cambodian conflict is resolved, there would be greater economic opportunities for the West Europeans to explore.

It was imperative that he should explain clearly to them why Singapore and ASEAN had opposed Vietnam in the last 11 years. It was because the latter had violated an important principle. This is, in the Prime Minister's own words, that "national boundaries cannot be marched across at will". To small countries like Singapore, the principle is sacrosanct. Had such a violation been condoned, small countries could find themselves at the mercy of their larger neighbours. To underline that this was the only quarrel it had with Vietnam, Mr Lee stressed that relations between the two countries were good until Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in December 1978. But once the sanctity of this principle has been restored, government-to-government relations between the two countries could be stepped up. In this regard, the Prime Minister suggested how this could be achieved. To paraphrase Mr Lee, it is not enough that

Vietnam withdraw all its troops from Cambodia. The United Nations should be allowed to conduct free elections in which the Cambodian people are given the freedom to choose their own government. This will ensure that the non-communists would come back to power in Cambodia.

Mr Lee had also found it useful to make public his scheduled meeting with Mr Kiet. Perhaps it was to prevent the Vietnamese from making political capital out of it. Had the meeting been held in secrecy but later leaked to the press, a wrong signal might have been sent to the other Asean members and their supporters on Cambodia, which is that Singapore, while condemning Vietnam publicly, was secretly negotiating with it to improve bilateral economic ties. He also made it clear that it was Mr Kiet who requested the meeting. At this point in time, it is undesirable for regional countries to think in narrow bilateral terms. Indeed, this was not what Mr Lee had in mind when he agreed to meet Mr Kiet. By being open, he might have averted any possible misunderstanding.

To Vietnam, the message is quite clear. It should try and remove the albatross of Cambodia around its neck quickly. To draw Vietnam into the Asia-Pacific economic network might increase the dynamism of the region. But as Mr Lee made it clear, this should be done only after the Cambodian conflict has been resolved and if Vietnamese leaders turn their warrior culture into constructive use. Time is not on its side. No doubt since last September after it announced that its troops had all been withdrawn from Cambodia, a trickle of European economic aid has flowed into Vietnam. But with the West Europeans increasingly preoccupied in their own backyard, it is not certain that the trickle will turn into a flood. It might even stop altogether. Without any prompting from Asean, the West Europeans might just lose interest in the Indochinese countries. Vietnam knows what it has to do to enlist Asean's help in economic reconstruction.

Cambodia

AFP Interviews Hun Sen on Settlement Prospects

BK0802083890 Hong Kong AFP in English 0826 GMT 8 Feb 90

[By Jean-Claude Chapon]

[Text] Phnom Penh, Feb 8 (AFP)—Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen said here Thursday [8 February] that a settlement of the 11-year Cambodian conflict was nearing since all sides have largely agreed on a U.N. role in the country. But in an interview with AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, he rejected a Khmer Rouge condition that the five permanent U.N. Security Council members be included in informal talks on Cambodia set for February 26-28 in Jakarta.

The Cambodian situation is "ripe for a solution," he said, because all countries involved "have more or less agreed to a role for the United Nations in Cambodia." That role was put forward by Australia and calls for an interim U.N. administration in Cambodia until general elections are held and will be the focus of the Jakarta talks.

Mr. Hun Sen however objected to the participation of the Soviet Union, the United States, France, Britain and China at the Jakarta meeting. "I don't think that the participation of the five at the meeting in Jakarta is necessary in the current circumstances," he said, adding that the meeting is an informal one in line with an eventual international conference in Paris.

The Khmer Rouge, the most powerful faction in the Cambodian resistance, has made the presence of the five council members at the Jakarta talks a condition for its participation.

Mr. Hun Sen did say though that the attendance of France and Australia at Jakarta was necessary since "we are going to discuss their proposals." He also said that he was ready to accept an expansion of the talks to include the chairmen of the three commissions set up during August talks on Cambodia in Paris, which was co-chaired by France and Indonesia. The three commissions are led by Canada and India, in charge of a cease-fire and an international control mechanism, Laos and Malaysia, responsible for guaranteeing the sovereignty and neutrality of Cambodia, and Australia and Japan, charged with refugees and Cambodia's reconstruction.

"Our flexibility at Jakarta will rest mainly on the U.N. role and on its importance," Mr. Hun Sen said, adding that the talks will center on "the mandate and duties of the United Nations."

He said the United Nations would take part in supervising a cease-fire, a Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Cambodia and a halt of foreign aid to the warring factions as well as organizing and supervising general elections. But Mr. Hun Sen said he did not feel that U.N. peacekeeping forces were necessary in Cambodia.

"I think that the United Nations is coming to resolve a political problem, not war. Armed peacekeeping forces are not necessary." But Mr. Hun Sen added: "The United Nations can send men equipped with light weapons." Mr. Hun Sen said an accord on a cease-fire and a halt to foreign aid was not likely at Jakarta. "The other side is not disposed to that," he said, adding however that Phnom Penh wants a quick resolution of these questions "to avoid fighting."

Speaking on the military situation in Cambodia, Mr. Hun Sen said that it was not as "grave" as it was in late September following Vietnam's announced final troop withdrawal. He did not however rule out attacks by resistance guerrillas before the meeting in Jakarta. If such attacks occur, Mr. Hun Sen said, "we will retaliate."

The Cambodian premier, who was installed by Vietnam after their invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, also reiterated his opposition to the three-party resistance coalition's seat in the United Nations. "We do not recognize any legitimacy of the Khmer Rouge, but we recognize that there are two governments" and the composition of the resistance government concerns only the resistance, he said.

The Marxist Khmer Rouge is joined in the resistance by non-communist followers of former Cambodian monarch Prince Norodom Sihanouk and former Premier Son Sann. Together they form the U.N.-seated Cambodian Government.

The Khmer Rouge are blamed for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Cambodian civilians during their near four-year fanatical rule from 1975 to January 1979 when they were ousted by Vietnamese troops.

The premier also said that he had seen "no progress in the position of China," the principal backer of the Khmer Rouge, even if Beijing accepted a communique adopted by the permanent U.N. Security Council members during their meeting in Paris in January which called for an enhanced U.N. role in Cambodia. "Beijing continues to demand a four-party government," grouping the three resistance factions and the Phnom Penh administration, he said. Phnom Penh has termed a return to power of the Khmer Rouge unacceptable.

As for relations with the Soviet Union, a key ally of the Phnom Penh government, Mr. Hun Sen said there were no "signs of change, even if this country (the Soviet Union) is experiencing internal difficulties. I am sure that the Soviet Union will continue to support us and play an even more active role in a solution" in Cambodia, he said.

Heng Samrin Addresses Meeting on ICP

BK0402084790 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1300 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Speech by Heng Samrin, general secretary of the party Central Committee and chairman of the Council of State, on the occasion of the 60th founding anniversary of the Indochinese Communist Party—recorded]

[Text] Today, the entire party, Armed Forces, and our Cambodian people throughout the country together with the parties, governments, and fraternal peoples of Vietnam and Laos are joyfully marking the 60th founding anniversary of the ICP [Indochinese Communist Party]—the predecessor of the three parties, namely the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party, the Communist Party of Vietnam, and the Lao People's Revolutionary Party. Availing myself of this auspicious occasion, I would like to extend, on behalf of the party, government, front, and Cambodian people throughout the country, our best regards and commendation permeated with sincere feelings of love and respect to the male and female combatants and Cambodian people

throughout the country who, through genuine patriotism, have made vigorous contributions to the cause of the motherland and the happiness of our people.

Dear comrades and friends: While successfully defending and building our national achievements, we reminisce even more clearly on the militant traditions and harmonious solidarity of our three nations—Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos—which, under the constant training, guidance, and care of the ICP, have become the law of existence and development for each country.

The founding of the ICP stemmed from the requirements of the revolutionary struggle and the interests of the peoples in the three countries. It opened a new era in the national and popular cause of the three countries.

At the beginning of 1951, in compliance with the progress of the revolution in each country and the world situation prevailing at that time, the ICP's second congress decided to set up a separate party in each country to lead its own revolution.

On 28 June 1951, the Khmer People's Revolutionary Party, currently the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party [KPRP], was founded. The KPRP has constantly paid attention to consolidating the bond of militant solidarity between the Cambodian, Vietnamese, and Lao peoples who are their intimate brothers in the struggle for independence and freedom of each country and each people.

Dear comrades and friends, the historic victory won on 17 April 1975 brought incomparably great joy to the Cambodian people throughout the country. But, it turned out that they fell into a most miserable danger beyond expectation because the national liberation day had then become the beginning of the darkest span of time for the entire nation. Due to the traitorous acts committed by the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu Samphan clique, within a period of only three years, eight months, and 20 days, 3,314,768 people, including a total of 250,168 professors, doctors, engineers, writers, journalists, artists, and monks, were brutally massacred and died due to exhaustion, starvation, and illnesses. This constituted not only a great misery to our nation but also the loss of honor to progressive mankind.

To salvage our nation from the peril of genocide, all genuine patriots who opposed Pol Pot had joined as one and founded the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation. Under the leadership of the front and with the wholehearted support and assistance of the fraternal Vietnamese party, Army, and people, the Kampuchean People's Armed Forces grew up rapidly and could liberate many regions. On 7 January 1979, we liberated Phnom Penh capital, smashed the dictatorial, militarist, bloodthirsty regime of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu Samphan clique, and the new regime of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, currently the State of Cambodia, was established.

In the past 11 years, the enemies have stubbornly continued to launch all forms of activities to sabotage the Cambodian revolution, but thanks to the party leadership coupled with our efforts and the assistance given by fraternal countries and friends in the world—primarily the assistance of Vietnam, Laos, the Soviet Union, and other fraternal countries—our cadres, party members, Armed Forces, and people from all strata, have highly enhanced their patriotism, expanded their traditions of valiant struggle and perseverance, and strived to surmount all serious consequences left behind by the genocidal Pol Pot regime. We have successively frustrated the perfidious schemes of the enemies and have been able to totally defend our territorial integrity and our national society's achievements, thus restoring normal activities in the national society of our Land of Angkor.

Although the three enemy groups have tried to kindle the flames of war on the battlefield along the border, shedding the people's blood and causing more immense destruction than in the past, their activities cannot prevent the progress of our national society.

The change of the responsibility for the national defense and construction tasks of the two combined forces [Vietnamese and Cambodian armies] to just Cambodia's own forces has enhanced the State of Cambodia's role in the international arena. International public opinion, including peace- and justice-loving forces in the world, have seen even more clearly and agreed with us that the government forces of the State of Cambodia are the sole forces capable of preventing the return of the genocidal regime and that we are the sole force that really represents the vital interests of the Cambodian people.

Dear comrades and friends, entering the 1990's, we have not yet seen the enemies changing their attitude or making any concession in the search for a solution to the Cambodian problem. They have firmly adhered to their strategic maneuvers, continued kindling the flames of war, and caused grave misery and destruction to our people. This is a great pain to our people.

Currently, although our nation is in a state of peace and war and no matter how intense the struggle between us and the enemies has become, our people still desire to quickly end the conflict in Cambodia in order to bring genuine independence, peace, and happiness to our motherland and people.

Prompted by this desire, since the middle of 1987, the party and Government of the State of Cambodia have put forth a national reconciliation policy and made many concessions successively out of its desire to quickly end the conflict in Cambodia. But it is most regrettable that the tripartite groups have rejected this desire of the Cambodian people. These groups still want to end the conflict in Cambodia by carrying on the war to end war.

On 9 December 1989, in line with the initiative by Thai Prime Minister Chatchai Chhunhawan and the peace proposal by Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, we have made a new step which clearly attests to the

State of Cambodia's flexible and realistic stance by opening a broad prospect for the other Cambodian side and the countries concerned as well as the United Nations. The State of Cambodia and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council held a meeting in Paris from 15 to 16 January 1990 to help find a political solution to the Cambodian problem with encouraging results. But, the noteworthy point is that the 16-point statement of this meeting did not mention the prevention of the return of the genocidal regime which is the key to breaking the deadlock on the Cambodian problem.

Dear comrades and friends, on this occasion of the 60th founding anniversary of the ICP, we are very happy to see that the firm alliance of harmonious militant solidarity of the three parties, armies, and peoples of Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos, have developed and broadened even more rapidly than ever before on the basis of Marxism and Leninism. It constitutes the inexhaustible and invincible force consolidated and fostered by the ICP which set forth a correct line and policy, keenly blending independence with socialism, genuine patriotism with proletarian internationalism, and combined national forces with contemporary forces.

On this auspicious occasion, genuine patriots and Cambodians would like to express their deepest respect and gratitude to President Ho Chi Minh who had left a brilliant model for us and our children in the future generations to learn from - the noble spirit of patriotism, brilliant proletarian internationalism, and the excellent ethics of the patriots who are absolutely loyal to the party, motherland, and people, industry, thrift, honesty, good behaviour, humility, and sacrifice, thinking only of the interests of the collective.

The priceless great benefaction of the former combatants of the Vietnamese volunteer Army, who are the valiant and heroic combatants of President Ho Chi Minh, has caused the Cambodian revolution to be inscribed by the Cambodians in the golden pages of their national history. This benefaction will always remain in the heart of every Cambodian in this and the future generations to come.

On behalf of the Cambodian party, government, and people, I would like to express profound thanks to the parties, governments, and peoples of Vietnam, Laos, the Soviet Union, and other fraternal countries, and progressive friends and international organizations across the world which have given support and assistance to the cause of the just and correct struggle waged by our people in the past, at present, and in the future.

In conclusion, I would like to appeal to cadres, combatants, party members, male and female combatants, and people throughout the country emerging from the pain and disgrace that we experienced during the three years, eight months, and 20 days under the cruel and barbarous regime of the genocidal Pol Pot clique, that we must enhance our vigilance in party building work by not

allowing the opportunists and the narrow-minded chauvinists to infiltrate our party or to look down upon the leading role of our party. We must ensure that our party is pure and clean, [words indistinct] with high quality, and has the most loyal party cadres and members who are for the nation, people, proletarian internationalist solidarity, and the close bond of solidarity among the three Indochinese countries. We must regard this problem as the life-and-death factor for our nation.

I would like to call on the entire party, Armed Forces, and people to enhance their sense of responsibility toward the people and the destiny of the motherland and to clearly grasp the position of strength and advance of our revolution against the enemies' weak, deteriorating, rift-ridden, and disastrous situation; and to clearly realize that our own rights and interests are linked closely to the new regime. Mobilize all abilities to stimulate and enhance the will to fight, mobilize the spirit of independence and mastery, expand the sense of self-assistance in assuming the responsibility for national defense and construction, stimulate proper national pride in this new historic stage, and be highly resolute in order to fulfill the urgent tasks of implementing the final goals of the party and state. At the same time, it is imperative to continue building our ethics by sincerely being more self-critical with the good intention of building good friends. Lead a simple life-style, persevere, respect the rules and regulations and the opinion of the collective, consolidate unity and democracy within the party, and always link closely with the people and combatants.

Cadres at all levels and of all sectors must enhance revolutionary ethics and revolutionary zeal in order to set an example for the people and the masses. Our words must match with the deeds. Only by so doing will the people have confidence in and follow our party and state. Oppose all such inactive phenomena as greed, corruption, selfishness, and lack of care for the livelihood of the people, cadres, workers, personnel, and workers. At the same time, it is imperative to link closely with the localities, masses, and lower ranking cadres. Attentively listen to and promptly respond to the proper opinions and requirements of the people, cadres, personnel, workers, and combatants. Firmly strengthen internal unity. Oppose all forms of dictatorship, monopoly, favoritism, regionalism, and bureaucratism. More vigorously enhance the spirit of internationalist solidarity of the three countries of Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos.

In this immediate period, it is imperative to thoroughly and effectively implement the resolutions of the second national conference of party cadres, resolutions of the party Central Committee's 9th and 10th sessions, and the various resolutions of the Central Committee by firmly adhering to the slogan: Everything is for serving the battlefield; everything is for enhancing the people's trust in the new regime.

This 1990 is the year the struggle between us and the enemies has become intense, very fierce, and most

complicated militarily, politically, and diplomatically—particularly militarily. Therefore, it is necessary for us to strive to maintain and strengthen the existing advantage and strength of our revolution by preventing the enemies from seizing the advantage over us.

All levels, all sectors, each unit, each locality, and each person must enhance their role and strive valiantly to create more feats worthy of being revolutionary successors, and expand the glorious tradition of the ICP in order to seize more victories for the motherland and the people.

All cadres and party members must enhance their spirit as the vanguard by setting the model of being in the frontline of the masses' revolutionary movement.

Everything for the independence of the motherland and for the happiness of the people! [applause]

Weekly Marks ICP Founding Anniversary

*BK0302103790 Phnom Penh Domestic Service
in Cambodian 2300 GMT 2 Feb 90*

[PRACHEACHON editorial: "While Joyfully Welcoming the 60th Anniversary of the Indochinese Communist Party, All Should Participate Even More Actively in Building and Defending Our Party"; date not given]

[Text] This year, 1990, is the year which marks the historic important event of the 60th founding anniversary of the Indochinese Communist Party [ICP], the original source of the Communist Party of Vietnam [CPV], the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party [KPRP], and the Lao People's Revolutionary Party [LPRP]. The ICP was founded, advanced, and tempered by the esteemed and beloved President Ho Chi Minh.

Looking back at the past 60 years, we see that in response to the requirements of the revolution of the Vietnamese people and the three nations of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, President Ho Chi Minh—a Vietnamese communist and an outstanding combatant of the three nations of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos—introduced the beacon of Marxism and Leninism; blended it with the workers' movement, the patriotic movements of the Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Lao peoples, and the concrete situation in the Indochinese peninsula; and bravely founded the ICP on 3 February 1930.

Later, in conformity with the concrete situation and the growth of the revolutionary forces in each country, the ICP was divided into three parties—namely the CPV, founded on 3 February 1930; the KPRP, founded on 28 June 1951; and the LPRP, founded on 22 March 1955—which have succeeded and are now carrying on with the great cause of the ICP.

Clearly understanding the truth about the blending of genuine patriotism and lofty proletarian internationalism, the parties of the three countries have continued to expand the good traditions of solidarity, friendship, and mutual assistance among the parties, armies, and

peoples of the three countries. They have valiantly and resolutely led the revolutionary movement in each country, striving to surmount obstacles, passing through all stages of revolutionary struggle, overcoming all kinds of difficulties, conquering all enemies, and winning one victory after another over the French colonialists, Japanese militarists, and U.S. imperialists. They have opened up, for the first time in the history of each nation, an era of independence and freedom in which the people have become genuine masters of their own nation and destiny.

Under the clear-sighted and correct leadership of the CPV, the Vietnamese people scored a renowned victory in liberating the northern part of the motherland in 1945 and later, after winning victory over the U.S. imperialists in April 1975, unified the country, advanced the entire nation toward socialism, and carried out their proletarian internationalist duty in assisting the fraternal Cambodian and Lao people. At present, despite many obstacles and difficulties, the CPV has continued to uphold valiant revolutionary heroism, has dared to look at the truth, and has resolutely implemented a restructuring policy in line with the resolution put forth by the sixth party congress held in December 1986. Two years later, the implementation of the restructuring policy was marked by new factors and new potentials in the state administration's efficiency. The work on administrative and economic control has been enhanced and has contributed to arranging and improving the economic and social activities of the entire society, thus bringing about the people's hope and confidence in the party leadership.

In Laos, under the wise and correct leadership of the LPRP, the Lao people of all nationalities rose up to topple the monarchical regime—lackeys of the imperialists—won a brilliant victory on 2 December 1975, and restored the first worker-peasant state in the land of a million elephants.

At present, the LPRP is leading the people to implement the restructuring policy set forth by the fourth party congress, aimed at developing the country in a new stage suitable to the contemporary era.

In Cambodia, the Pol Pot clique, traitor to the nation, people, and Marxism-Leninism, seized the revolutionary achievements won by the people, plunged the people into a sea of blood and tears, and set the country back decades.

With their brilliant spirit of proletarian internationalism, the Vietnamese Army volunteers responded to the Cambodian people's appeal by sacrificing their flesh and blood in helping to topple the genocidal regime and liberating the Cambodian nation and people from an inhumane regime unprecedented in the history of mankind.

Eleven years under the leadership of the KPRP, our people have been actively carrying out all revolutionary tasks with a lofty sense of mastery and responsibility for the fate of the nation. Particularly, they have actively taken part in defending the motherland, have resolutely

strived to check all activities and maneuvers aimed at returning the genocidal regime to power in Cambodia, and have won successive victories. [Words indistinct] new advantage and strength politically, militarily, economically, socially, and diplomatically, thus ensuring the stability, security, social order, and livelihood of the people and enhancing the role and prestige of the State of Cambodia.

Each passing day, more countries have accepted that the State of Cambodia is the sole force capable of leading and controlling the country and people, and capable of preventing the return to power of the genocidal regime.

This year, our people mark the 60th founding anniversary of the ICP at a very significant time; a time of great tests and trials for Cambodia's own forces which are independently shouldering the tasks of national defense and construction. It is a time when the Armed Forces must courageously confront the danger of the return of the genocidal Pol Pot regime in order to successfully defend the people's livelihood, rights, and interests, as well as our beloved country.

This is a good time for cadres and party members to clearly understand that our state is the sole force leading the people in their revolution, guiding the state administration, and building the Cambodian society. Not only has our state restored society, but it has also brought a new, brilliant change to the entire society. It has become the decisive factor in ensuring victory for our revolution and for our people's cause in this new stage.

Prompted by this, all of us should enhance our efforts to contribute to building and defending our party. Particularly, party members should set examples for the masses in all fields. They must take a firm revolutionary stance and have a resolute will to fight. They must not be discouraged in times of difficulties nor complacent in times of happiness, and they must not be aloof from the masses. All party members must always try to grasp the people's feelings, view the masses as the base of the revolution, give their love and care to the people, and more vigorously stimulate the three revolutionary movements in society.

From now on, all of us must strive resolutely to create concrete changes in terms of ideology, views, and stances; firmly consolidate unity around the leadership of the KPRP; constantly strengthen and expand the bonds of solidarity, friendship, and cooperation among the three parties and peoples of Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos; and strive to successfully realize the historic, significant tasks in this new stage.

VONADK Sums Up January Battle Results

*BK0702025990 (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian
2315 GMT 6 Feb 90*

["Roundup of Activities To Eliminate Enemy Forces and Repeatedly Scatter and Dismantle the Village and

Commune Administrative Networks of the Vietnamese Enemy and Its Puppets in January 1990"]

[Text] 1. East Kompong Cham battlefield: 18 enemy soldiers killed and 19 wounded; total 37 casualties. Administrative networks in five villages and a commune dismantled and an administrator and six Cambodian soldiers freed.

2. Kratie battlefield: 15 killed and 13 wounded; total 28 casualties. Administrative networks in seven villages dismantled and 10 administrators freed.

3. Northwest Phnom Penh battlefield: 55 killed and 53 wounded; total 108 casualties. Administrative networks in 20 villages and two communes dismantled and four administrators freed.

4. Kompong Speu battlefield: 32 killed and 36 wounded; total 68 casualties. Administrative networks in 55 villages and two communes dismantled and 182 administrators and a Cambodian soldiers freed.

5. Kompong Chhnang battlefield: 22 killed and 22 wounded; total 44 casualties. Administrative networks in 30 villages and a commune dismantled and 80 administrators and 40 Cambodian soldiers freed.

6. Kompong Cham battlefield: 42 killed and 50 wounded; total 92 casualties. Administrative networks in 66 villages and five communes dismantled and 135 administrators and four Cambodian soldiers freed.

7. Stung Treng battlefield: five killed and five wounded; total 10 casualties. Administrative networks in nine villages dismantled and five administrators freed.

8. Mondolkiri battlefield: 12 killed and 23 wounded; total 35 casualties. Administrative networks in two villages and a commune dismantled.

9. Ratanakiri battlefield: five killed and six wounded; total 11 casualties.

10. Battlefields around Battambang Town: 220 killed and 212 wounded; total 432 casualties. Administrative networks in 37 villages, six communes, and five townships dismantled and 58 administrators and two Cambodian soldiers freed.

11. Kompong Som battlefield: 23 killed and 25 wounded; total 48 casualties. Administrative networks in 20 villages, a commune, and a township dismantled and 17 administrators freed.

12. Kompong Thom battlefield: 71 killed and 75 wounded; total 146 casualties. Administrative networks in 79 villages, 6 communes, and a township dismantled and 113 administrators and 5 Cambodian soldiers freed.

13. Siem Reap battlefield: 43 killed and 51 wounded; total 94 casualties. Administrative networks in 17 villages and 4 communes dismantled and 50 administrators and 2 Cambodian soldiers freed.

14. Moung-Pursat battlefield: 53 killed and 73 wounded; total 126 casualties. Administrative networks in 32 villages and three communes dismantled and five administrators freed.

15. Kampot-Takeo battlefield: 61 killed and 92 wounded; total 153 casualties. Administrative networks in 66 villages and two communes dismantled and 150 administrators and two Cambodian soldiers freed.

16. Southwest Phnom Penh battlefield: 33 killed and 58 wounded; total 91 casualties. Administrative networks in 121 villages and four communes dismantled and 350 administrators freed.

17. North Phnom Penh battlefield: 28 killed and 29 wounded; total 57 casualties. Administrative networks in 30 villages and a commune dismantled and 104 administrators freed.

18. Koh Kong Kraom battlefield: five killed and five wounded; total 10 casualties. Administrative networks in eight villages, two communes, and a township dismantled and 14 administrators and eight Cambodian soldiers freed.

19. Oddar Meanchey battlefield: 12 killed and 13 wounded; total 25 casualties.

20. Preah Vihear battlefield: 40 killed and 29 wounded; total 69 casualties. Administrative networks in eight villages and two communes dismantled.

21. North Sisophon battlefield: 38 killed and 47 wounded; total 85 casualties. Administrative networks in eight villages and two communes dismantled.

22. South Sisophon battlefield: 87 killed and 97 wounded; total 184 casualties.

23. Route 10 battlefield: 106 killed and 70 wounded; total 176 casualties.

24. Leach battlefield: 50 killed and 20 wounded; total 70 casualties. Administrative networks in five villages dismantled and 10 administrators freed.

In sum, we killed 1,076 Vietnamese enemies and wounded 1,123 others for a total of 2,199 casualties. We dismantled Vietnamese administrative networks in 625 villages, 43 communes, and eight townships and freed 1,293 administrators and 70 Cambodian soldiers.

Laos

Decree Issued on Use of Forests, Forest Land

BK0402150190 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao
1200 GMT 29 Jan 90

["Decree of the Council of Ministers on the Management of the Use of Forests and Forest Land"]

[Text] With reference to the resolutions of the 5th, 6th, and 7th plenary sessions of the fourth party Central

Committee, the resolutions adopted at the first nationwide forestry conference held in May 1989, Law No. 1/82 PSL dated 20 July 1982 on the Council of Ministers, and the recommendation of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the Council of Ministers issued the following decree:

Part I: The Management of Forests and Forest Land

Article 1. Forests and forest land within the territory of the Lao People's Democratic Republic is under the ownership of the national community represented by the state which is charged with the unified and centralized management duty within the entire territory throughout the country. The state grants the rights and responsibilities to all Lao citizens to safeguard, preserve, restore, reforest, and expand forests and to use forests and forest land in accordance with state laws and regulations to ensure that the number of trees in the forests will continue increasing every day.

Article 2. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry has the duties to outline strategies, plans, policies, laws, and regulations on forestry work, the logging industry, and the environment, which are to be submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval and implementation; to outline detailed guidelines, regulations, and recommendations for the implementation of these strategies, plans, policies, laws, and regulations; to organize, guide, and supervise the implementation of the strategies, plans, policies, laws, and regulations on forestry work, the logging industry, and environment throughout the country; to follow up and gather information on changes of forestry resources in each period; to set up and guide the nationwide forest and environment management network; to study and authorize the establishment of forestry enterprises, timber and forest products processing plants, and factories using raw timber products as energy sources at the center and in localities throughout the country; to appoint heads of forestry services of the provinces and municipalities and heads of state forestry industry enterprises attached to the ministry; to coordinate with provinces and municipalities in appointing heads of district forestry services and heads of state forestry enterprises attached to localities; to coordinate with localities and services concerned in carrying out propaganda campaigns to educate all Lao citizens to love nature and to develop a sense of responsibility in preserving, restoring, reforesting, expanding, and exploiting forestry resources in an efficient manner and in accordance with state laws and regulations; to coordinate and cooperate with foreign countries in the field of science and technology on forestry work, the logging industry, and the environment; and to train and upgrade personnel for managing forestry work, the logging industry, and the environment.

Part II: The Granting of Forests and Forest Land

Article 3. The state grants an area of between two and five hectares of forest and forest land to each farming family for use, and between 100 and 500 hectares in their

respective localities to each village and cooperative for preservation, restoration, rehabilitation, and reforestation.

Article 4. The number of trees in the forest and forest land which are granted to each village, cooperative, and farming family for management and exploitation must be increased. The receivers have the right to use, transfer, or give them as heritage to other persons in accordance with the principles and regulations set by the state.

Article 5. As for any collective individuals or individual persons wanting to utilize abandoned land or degraded forest land for restoration, rehabilitation, and reforestation into wooded forests or for carrying out cultivation, livestock-raising forestry enterprises with their own funds, the state will promote and acknowledge their ownership provided that they strictly and correctly comply with the laws and regulations on forestry work.

Part III: The Use Of Forests and Forest Land

Article 6. In the event that the receivers want to alter the use of forests and forest land to serve other purposes, such as for building transport routes, mining exploitation, the production of hydroelectricity, and irrigation projects, approval must be acquired from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

Article 7. Business enterprises that are permitted to exploit forests for timber must comply with the following regulations and principles: To exploit timber in forests which have been surveyed and listed under economic and technical plans approved by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry; to pay taxes to the state in full and on a timely basis; to reforest the forests according to the requirements set forth; and to strictly and correctly comply with the regulations on timber exploitation.

Article 8. As for people who need to exploit between one and 10 cubic meters of timber in forests granted to their village or their own family for building new living quarters and repairing old dwellings, their requests will be studied and verified by the village administration and forwarded to the district forestry service for inclusion in its annual plan to be submitted to the provincial or municipal forestry service for approval.

Article 9. The following practices are prohibited: Extraction of timber without a reforestation plan; extraction of the timber of protected species without permission from the Council of Ministers; extraction of timber for commercial purposes without permission from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry; indiscriminate extraction of timber without permission from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry; transportation of logs from the site of extraction or felling prior to obtaining a permit for transportation and stamping from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry—central enterprise units must obtain permits from the forestry services of provinces or municipalities and private enterprises from the local authority; destruction of forests in watershed areas,

riverbanks, steep mountains, plains, and densely forested areas; burning bush or starting a fire for cooking or for smoking out stick lac insects near or in the forest which can cause forest fires; raising animals such as elephants, horses, cows, buffalo, sheep, goats, and others in brakes, newly grown forests, and forest reserves; and buying or selling forestland.

Article 10. Entrepreneurs of forestry production businesses are obliged to pay a forestry resources preservation tax, special [word indistinct] fee, and export duties in accordance with the principles and regulations laid down by the state.

Article 11. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is assigned to collect forestry resources restoration taxes and fees and fines derived from the forestry business for contribution to the state budget. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry must use this tax money for safeguarding and restoring forests and for reafforestation. It is strictly prohibited to use the money for other purposes. If necessary, the state will provide additional funds from forestry resources restoration tax money for these objectives.

Part IV: Violation of the Decree

Article 12. Any collective community or individual who violates this decree will be reprimanded and fined, and any evidence seized will be confiscated. In the case of major offenses, the offenders will be charged in court.

Part V

Article 13. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is assigned to prepare introductory documents, guidelines, and detailed regulations for the implementation of this decree.

Article 14. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is assigned to coordinate and cooperate with ministries concerned and local administrations to conduct experiments on the utilization of forests and forestland in Vientiane Province, Vientiane municipality, and Luang Prabang, and to sum up lessons and organize seminars for expansion and implementation of the program nationwide.

Article 15. Ministers and heads of organizations at the ministry level and chairmen of administrative committees of provinces and municipalities are assigned to organize the faithful implementation of this decree.

Article 16. This decree comes into effect from the day it is signed. Past directives, regulations, and orders which contradict this decree are hereby nullified.

Vientiane, 5 October 1989

Signed and sealed: Kaysone Phomviharn

Chairman of the Council of Ministers

Workshop Held on Mekong Committee Cooperation

HK0702110590 Vientiane KPL in English 0940 GMT
7 Feb 90

[Text] Vientiane, Feb 7 (OANA-KPL)—A workshop on the cooperation between the Lao PDR [People's Democratic Republic] and the International Mekong Committee was opened here on Feb. 6, 1990.

It was cochaired by Mr. Kithong Vongsai, deputy minister of trade and foreign economic relations and also president of the National Mekong Committee, and Mr. C. Jan Kamp, secretary of the International Interim Mekong Committee. Also taking part in the workshop were Mr. Phao Bounnaphon, minister of trade and foreign economic relations, Mr. Souban Salitthilat, deputy minister of foreign affairs, and other officials concerned.

In his opening address, Mr. Phao Bounnaphon pointed to the main tasks of the committee, the interaction, the recommendation and the follow-up of the planning and study of the water resources development in the lower Mekong Basin covering 600,000 square kilometers, including 202,400 square kilometers in Laos, 180,240 square kilometers in Thailand, 154,000 square kilometers in the State of Cambodia and 65,200 square kilometers in the SRV.

The committee's role in the region, the Mekong Committee and Lao PDR's development, planning and the future of the development in the lower Mekong Basin area, and the water resource development in the Lao PDR were discussed at the workshop.

Philippines

Senators Decry U.S. Envoy's Remarks on Bases

HK0702121990 Manila Manila Broadcasting Company
DZRH in Tagalog 0800 GMT 7 Feb 90

[By Cesar Chavez from the Senate]

[Text] Several senators today criticized U.S. Ambassador Nicholas Platt for his statement claiming that the termination notice of the Philippines-U.S. military bases agreement should be presented only in 1991. According to Senators Neptali Gonzales, Wigberto Tanada, Aquilino Pimentel Jr., Tito Guingona, Sotero Laurel, Alberto Romulo, Rene Saguisag, Juan Ponce Enrile, Orlando Mercado, and Joseph Estrada, the Philippine Constitution should always prevail in any talks with the U.S. Government. Under the provisions of the Constitution, the bases agreement will expire on 16 September 1991, with notice of termination due a year before the date of expiration.

In a related development, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile proposed to the president that the Armed Forces of the Philippines be prepared to defend the government's

position in case the United States refuses to abide by the country's interpretation of the termination notice provision.

Here is the seemingly alarming declaration from Senator Enrile.

[Begin recording in English, in progress] [Enrile]...prepare her military organization in order to enforce her will and the will of the Filipino people as written in the Constitution of the Philippines.

[Reporter] What do you mean, sir?

[Enrile] If you are going to disagree with a foreign country about your interpretation of your contract, what is the law that will prevail? It is the law of the stronger.

[Reporter] Can you get that under the present circumstances of the military organization?

[Enrile] What military organization? [end recording]

Meanwhile, Senator Wigberto Tanada accused the U.S. Government of separating the U.S. military bases talks from Philippine law.

[Begin recording in progress] [Tanada]...Ambassador Platt. Which should prevail, our Constitution or the interpretation of an ambassador?

[Reporter] Why do you think this view is prevailing?

[Tanada] I think that is part of their plan to separate the forthcoming bases talks from our Constitution. [end recording]

Aquino Comments on U.S. Bases, Rebel Amnesty

HK0802095790 Manila Radio Veritas in Tagalog
0900 GMT 8 Feb 90

["Press Statement" by President Corazon C. Aquino, read by Press Secretary Tomas Gomez III, at Malacanang Palace; recorded, in English]

[Text] I am still verifying what Secretary Ramos said on this subject. Meanwhile, I have asked for an updated study and report of the status of the free amnesty program for rebel returnees. There can be no amnesty, however, without the concurrence of Congress. For this reason, I have instructed the secretary of Justice, Franklin Drilon, to consult with leaders of Congress regarding this matter.

The present bases agreement expires by its terms on September 16, 1991. This is the end of its 25-year period. By its terms, apart from the Constitution, the executive agreement on the bases could be extended expressly or impliedly: expressly, by another express agreement, impliedly by silence. In which case, after September 16, 1991, the period will be indefinite, but it can be terminated by a one-year notice. If, therefore, we advise the United States that we do not want the agreement

extended beyond September 16, 1991, then it will have to end on September 16, 1991.

The Constitution, on the other hand, said that after the expiration of the agreement in 1991, the U.S. facilities cannot stay in our territory except under a treaty duly ratified by our Senate. It is clear, therefore, that the present agreement cannot be extended beyond its expiry date of September 16, 1991. If we agree to allow the U.S. facilities to remain here beyond that date, there will have to be a treaty to that effect in place by that time. Hence, exploratory talks are expected next month about the prospects of negotiating such a treaty. During these talks, the shortfalls and certain arrangements can be taken up.

Another item: Senator Enrile's defense and evidence is a matter for the investigating fiscal [prosecutor] to take into account. As I said, due process is being followed and accorded.

Bases Termination Notice Required in 1991

*HK0702115990 Quezon City Sports Radio 738
in English 1100 GMT 7 Feb 90*

[Text] Presidential spokesman Adolf Azcuna today said that exploratory talks scheduled this month between the Philippines and the United States panels on the fate of the U.S. military bases in the country will definitely push through. This, even as President Aquino will issue a notice of termination to the American Government in September of 1991 [as heard]. This report from Tanny Rodriguez:

[Begin recording] Azcuna said whatever noncompliance of the U.S. Government to the 1988 Manglapus-Shultz agreement will be given priority concern and attention during the exploratory talks. Azcuna said the notice of termination will be done by the president because she has no choice but to follow this certain provision of the Constitution. [end recording]

Government Awaiting U.S. Move on Bases Talks

*HK0702105790 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE
in English 4 Feb 90 p 1*

[By staff member Marites S. Paez]

[Text] Government negotiators on the bases issue are awaiting word from the U.S. Government to start the exploratory talks as an initial step in deciding the fate of the American bases after the current lease agreement expires in 1991.

Health Secretary Alfredo Bengzon, who is the panel's vice chairman, said Friday his group is ready to begin the talks and is waiting for the US panel to "make the move."

Bengzon and Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus, who chairs the panel, said the Philippine negotiators during the talks would raise the issue of U.S. failure to deliver

on its military and economic commitments under the 1988 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).

The Government, through the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), expressed on Friday its "disappointment" over US Congress' move to slash \$96 million or 26.6% from the \$360 million in military and economic assistance the US government had pledged to extend to the Philippines under the MOA.

The talks, earlier set for last December, had been moved to early this year because of the perception among Philippine officials that the country had lost its leverage when Mrs Aquino sought U.S. air cover at the height of the December coup attempt.

Both sides have yet to agree on the date of the start of the bases talks, but Malacanang said the talks could begin in March or April.

Bengzon also told Malacanang reporters that U.S. failure to honor its commitments "raises in the people's mind the question of sincerity." Such a situation, he added, "does have an effect on whatever talks there will be."

Bengzon reiterated Manglapus' statements that the U.S. should not cut its aid to the Philippines because the country not only belongs to the league of new democracies but it has also hosted the bases here "for free for so long."

Bengzon said the huge aid cuts meant the "the U.S. may not regard its foreign-located bases to the same degree or importance" as before, adding that "new technologies may make it less necessary for them to have land-based facilities in other countries."

Bengzon also disclosed that the Executive-Legislative Base Council headed by UP [University of the Philippines] president Jose Abueva had been discussing proposal for the joint use by the Philippines and U.S. of Subic Bay Naval Base in Olongapo and Clark Air Base in Pampanga, particularly the "aviation facilities."

Bengzon clarified, however, that this was merely a "suggestion" and no position has been taken by the Government.

An American foreign policy expert, Larry Allen Niksch, earlier said President Bush might offer the Philippines the joint use of both Subic and Clark.

Further Reaction to U.S. Bases Issue Noted

Senator Links Abstention, Bases

*HK0702050190 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan
in Tagalog 0400 GMT 7 Feb 90*

[Text] Senator Alberto Romulo said the United States had a single message in its abstention from voting on the \$340-million loan which the Philippines is seeking from the World Bank. Romulo said this could be linked with the bases issue, the agreement on which will soon expire:

[Begin Romulo recording] That is the only issue in which they have genuine interest, because that is the current issue being discussed—the forthcoming termination, conclusion, or expiration of the U.S. Military Bases Agreement, which is scheduled for 1991. It is getting closer and closer. So, I think that their abstention, /which is not to vote yes and not to vote no,/ [preceding passage within slantlines in English] is construable as a message for us that if we still want their help, we should talk to them about the extension of the bases. [end recording]

U.S. Behavior Called 'Crass'

HK0802055390 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE
in English 8 Feb 90 p 5

[From the "Heart and Mind" column by Paulynn P. Sicam: "The U.S. Reveals Its True Agenda"]

[Text] Crass. That is the only word to describe the behaviour of the United States toward the Philippines these days.

It has been reneging on its aid commitments to the country in exchange for its use of our land for its military bases. It is \$40 million short of the \$200 million it pledged for the Philippine Assistance Program (PAP) which it initiated, we suspect, to ensure the extension of the U.S. military bases here.

And now, Finance Secretary Jess Estanislao tells us, it has abstained twice in the World Bank's deliberations for loan assistance to the country. The latest was the \$390 million energy sector loan given by the World Bank to the Philippines.

All these are happening only a year and a half before the present agreement on the U.S. military bases here expires in September 1991. In spite of its internal budgetary problems and the growing clamor among Filipino legislators for Government not to extend the bases agreement, the U.S. government has said that it wants its bases to remain on Philippine soil for at least another 20 years.

"I am sure they are sending certain signals," Estanislao told reporters last Tuesday. "I do not like it. Certainly that is not the appropriate way of delivering a message."

The U.S., however, has a ready response—dead pan, of course—from the singing butler, Nicholas Platt. In no way can the PAP be seen as a ploy to keep the bases in the Philippines, he told us this time last year. Last Tuesday, he was again on a denial binge. In no way can the U.S. abstention at the World Bank be read as related to the bases issue, he said. Eyebrow arched and looking incredulous that Estanislao would see such ulterior motives in his country's actions, Platt replied, "I understand that the vote was based on the concerns of the private sector's participation in the energy sector which was not given due emphasis in the way the loan was structured."

The importance of the role of the private sector, Platt continued, "is the basic tenet of our approach to economic matters and it's not a secret and there's nothing sinister about it."

As to the U.S. failure to deliver on the entire \$360 million in military and economic aid for 1990, Platt wanted to emphasize that "this does not represent a diminution of support for the Philippines."

What does it mean then? Why must the U.S. internal budgetary problems become our problem too, as if we didn't have enough problems ourselves. And if it is really so hard up, why doesn't America just pull out of here and leave us alone? Why must it make us suffer for its own deficiencies?

Besides the withholding of much needed funds from the Philippines, the U.S. has also gone on a Cory-bashing binge. All of a sudden, nothing good can come out of the Aquino Government. Congressional hearings, and State Department briefings routinely criticize the "weakness," "instability" and "corruption" of the Cory Government. There are a lot of American officials who are shaking their heads in studied dismay over the alleged failure of Mrs. Aquino to restore order and stability into the country.

We have, of course, seen such behaviour from the U.S. government before. But then, they were on our side, shaking their heads over the dictator's undemocratic, murderous and kleptocratic ways. They sought us out then to get a feel of the public's pulse, and encouraged us to mount protests against Marcos.

Now it seems they are again talking to the opposition. But today's opposition is not like it was before. Of course, some of the characters are the same—Doy, Bono, Kit, Espina—but these are the people we didn't trust, even then, when they said they were one with us in fighting the Marcos dictatorship.

Crass is the word Estanislao should have used to describe the U.S. behaviour towards a supposedly "special friend." But this kind of treatment is what we get for not insisting on calling a spade a spade. We should have insisted at the outset that the money they pay us for the use of the bases be called "rent" which they have to pay, and not "aid" which, technically, is up to them to give or not.

And the "special relations" we supposedly enjoy is nothing but a license on the part of the U.S. to interfere in our internal affairs and zap us when we don't comply with its wishes.

At this time, however, we have the upper hand. The bases agreement is up and it is up to us to renew it or not. Other things going for us are America's internal problems, and the recent geo-political realities. There is no more reason for us to be the underdogs.

This is perhaps the reason why the U.S. seems to have lost its bag of cool and suave tricks. And all we're getting

are crass and heavy-handed tactics that tell us finally and unequivocally, what its real agenda is.

Reward for Honasan Raised to Five Million Pesos

*HK0502044190 Baguio City Mountain Province
Broadcasting Company in English 0330 GMT 5 Feb 90*

[Text] The reward for the capture of coup leader Gregorio Honasan has been raised to five million pesos. It is the highest bounty ever put up by the Philippine Government for a wanted man.

PC-INP [Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police] Chief Brigadier General Ramon Montano said the original reward for Honasan was one million pesos, but some businessmen raised it to five million pesos.

According to Montano, several foreign and local business groups wanted to see Honasan captured to prevent further coup attempts that hurt business and turn away prospective investors. However, Montano did not identify the business group.

The five-million peso reward will be given to anyone who can give information which will lead to the capture of Honasan, the alleged leader of the December 1989 and August 1987 coup attempts.

House Expresses Concern

*HK0502101590 Manila Manila Broadcasting Company
DZRH in Tagalog 0800 GMT 5 Feb 90*

[Report by Dick Sinchongco—slantlines denote passages in English]

[Text] The House progressive bloc today expressed concern over a possible irregularity in raising the reward for the capture of leading rebel soldiers responsible for the bloodiest coup against the Aquino government. This was stated by Sorsogon Representative Bonifacio Gillego after the reward money for the capture of fugitive ex-Army Colonel Gregorio Honasan was raised up to five times the original figure.

[Begin Gillego recording] /It is a very seductive and enticing offer to civilian informants. But what usually happens, based on the track record, is sometimes these surrenders are faked./ Sometimes, the information really comes from intelligence agencies which, in turn, is passed to civilians, /and in the sharing or in the award, they share the loot. I hope that does not happen, that network. They can really capture the leaders of the coup without resorting to all these awards, or rewards, as the case may be./ This is alright for demoralizing coup leaders, but what I am looking at is the /moral degradation that will result because of the raising of the reward system, and it will induce members of the military to exert double efforts to capture the coup leaders at that price, and then share it among themselves, while making it appear/ that the information came from the civilian informant. [end recording]

Gillego, a former intelligence officer and Honasan's uncle, said it is possible that the military personnel themselves, who are on the government payroll to capture the enemies of the administration, will be the very people sharing the reward money. The price for the capture of the coup leader was increased, to five million pesos from one million, to expedite the capture of Honasan, former security officer of former defense secretary and martial law administrator and now senator, Juan Ponce Enrile.

Ramos Says Honasan, Others Entitled to Amnesty

*HK0802044990 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY
GLOBE in English 8 Feb 90 pp 1, 8*

[By Noemi Alcala with a report by R. Bundang]

[Excerpt] Rebel military men who participated in the failed December Coup, including Gregorio Honasan, are still covered by the amnesty program launched in 1986 for communist and Muslim separatist rebels and amended last year to include renegade AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] men.

Defense Secretary Fidel V. Ramos told a press conference at Camp Aguinaldo yesterday that rebel military men may avail of the amnesty provided they apply for it and "own responsibility for their crime."

The other day, Ramos said that the Department of National Defense (DND) will soon issue a new list of wanted December putschists with corresponding rewards for their capture. His disclosure came two days after the PC [Philippine Constabulary] announced that the reward for Honasan's capture had been raised to P5 million.

On Monday, the government issued a second wanted list containing 19 names with corresponding rewards ranging from P100,000 to P1 million, for a total of P7 million.

An earlier wanted list included 16 names, including Honasan's.

Ramos said that in 1986 the government launched the National Reconciliation Development Program (NRDP) for members of the New People's Army (NPA) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and its factions.

Early last year, Ramos and other members of Cabinet Cluster E. studying the NRDP proposed to President Aquino that amnesty be offered also to military rebels. The proposal was adopted.

Ramos said the government will grant amnesty to rebel soldiers if they "own responsibility for their crime and give manifestation of their desire to come back to the fold of the government."

Under the amnesty program, the rebel must file an application for amnesty with the commanding general of

the AFP Civil Relations Office. The application will be evaluated by the authorities concerned.

Also yesterday, Ramos said the DND is negotiating for the surrender of several MNLF, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and NPA rebels.

Rebel Leader Lucas on Military Discontent

HK0602044590 Manila PHILIPPINES NEWSDAY
in English 6 Feb 90 p 3

[By Merlinda Manalo]

[Text] "The seeds of discontent" are so ingrained in the minds of young and idealistic officers and men of the Armed Forces that even the capture of former Lt Col Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan will not prevent another coup, a leading figure in the nine-day military rebellion last December said yesterday.

He was reacting to reports that the military has raised the reward for the capture of Honasan from P1.5 million to P5 million, the highest ever put up by the government for a wanted man. Detained former Navy Lt Cmdr Jaime Lucas said the military rebels have a cadre of able men ready to inherit the mantle of leadership of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM). Soldiers of the Filipino People.

"Even if they eventually capture Honasan because of the increase in the reward, the seeds of discontent that we have planted in young military officers and enlisted men will be there, and it is now widespread. This will eventually reap another coup leader," Lucas said.

Lucas, one of the suspected leaders of the December 1 failed coup, was captured recently by military operatives. He was interviewed during a lull in the preliminary investigation hearing of the rebellion charges against him at the Department of Justice (DOJ) in Manila.

Lucas was charged along with former Lt Col Felix Turingan and former Air Force Capt Oscar Legaspi for their alleged takeover of Sangley Point in Cavite on December 1, the first day of the failed coup.

Lucas appeared before the panel in crutches and with his left foot in a cast. He was injured while trying to evade capture.

The 45-year-old Lucas also accused high ranking military officers of corruption. But he refused to elaborate.

He said the main goal of his organization, now called the Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabansa [Nationalist Revolutionary Alliance], is to get rid of graft and corruption. He said it is "widespread and tolerated" in the Aquino administration.

He said the December 1 coup attempt could have been prevented if the government implemented positive changes after the August 28, 1987 failed putsch.

"Between August 1987 and December 1, if there were positive changes made, then the December coup would not have been possible," he said.

Lucas, Turingan and Legaspi were dismissed from the military service but are facing charges in courts martial because of their alleged involvement in the August 28 putsch.

Coup Leader Arrested in Mindanao 3 Feb

HK0602011190 Manila Far East Broadcasting
Company
in Tagalog 2300 GMT 5 Feb 90

[Text] Another high-ranking military officer who joined the rebel soldiers headed by Brigadier General Jose Commendador in the Mactan Air Base seige, was arrested in Mindanao last 3 February. The officer was identified as Army Lieutenant Colonel Ericson Aurelio, the commanding officer of the Army battalion based in Misamis Oriental.

Rightists Said Recruiting Low-Ranking Officers

HK0502123990 Quezon City GMA 7 Radio-Television
Arts Network in Tagalog 1030 GMT 5 Feb 90

[From the "GMA News" program]

[Text] Philippine Constabulary chief Ramon Montano today revealed that low-ranking military officers are currently being recruited by right-wing forces. He made the disclosure after a meeting with a police-military organization, the Guardians.

Montano urged members of the organization to support the government against right-wing elements.

[Begin Montano recording in English, in progress] ...now a very concerted effort to again break this chain of command. We succeeded to crush this attempt before in December. But now, these forces are again trying to dismember the chain of command and subvert the organization. [end recording]

Guidelines Proposed for Media Coverage of Coups

HK0702105390 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY
INQUIRER in English 7 Feb 90 p 12

[By Roy S. de Guzman]

[Text] Government information agencies have urged Congress to draw up guidelines restricting media coverage of coups and other emergency situations.

Press Secretary Tomas Gomez III told the House committee on public information that Congress should "seriously consider" the enactment of a measure defining the boundaries of reporting in times of emergencies and crises.

However, Gomez said the government will not suppress members of the print and broadcast media from reporting the truth "regardless of its effects on national security."

Gomez and congressmen present at yesterday's hearings also endorsed a proposal from the University of the Philippines College of Mass Communication on the need to come up with a "national emergency broadcast system" in case of another coup.

The proposal calls for a nationwide hook-up of radio stations during a national crisis to ensure that information coming from "official channels" can reach even the people residing in remote places.

"This is better than threatening to close down stations," said associate professor Reynaldo Guioguo, who said the U.S. government and American media outlets have a similar arrangement.

Alice Villadolid of the Philippine Press Institute supported the idea, saying "Congress' focus should be on how to enable the state to practice its right to self-defense."

Gomez, Villadolid and representatives from various media institutions were invited by the committee to express their views regarding pending bills aimed at restricting media coverage—especially news aired by broadcast and television newsmen—during coups.

Andre Kahn, president of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas, [Association of Philippines Broadcasters] and some radio stations protested the proposed measures, which they said would infringe on the right of those in the broadcast industry to cover coups.

The bills—filed by Representatives Abdullah Dimaporo (KBL, [New Society Movement] Lanao del Sur) and Rodolfo del Rosario (LDP [Struggle of Philippine Democrats], Davao del Norte)—seek the establishment of guidelines on radio reporting during "abnormal" times.

The lawmakers proposed a certain kind of government regulation over radio and television broadcasts.

Toward the end of the hearing, Rep. Michael Mastura (LDP, North Cotabato) said the committee will look into the possibility of drafting a new bill to enable the government to cope with the scenario that some media outlets may be taken over by anti-government forces in case of another coup attempt.

Rep. Carlos Padilla (LDP, Nueva Vizcaya) said he believes "extra regulations" may have to be resorted to in future coups. He explained that coups are merely "a battle of propaganda" between two military factions and that whoever controls media may enjoy an undue advantage over the other.

Gomez said he sees no reason why the press should be suppressed from reporting the truth.

"Meda would be violating its very existence if it is not able to report the truth," Gomez said.

In a related development, the National Telecommunications Commission [NTC] asked members of the House committee on government reorganization to speed up the passage of a bill giving the NTC extra powers.

Rep. Enrico Dayanghirang (PDP [People's Democratic Party], Davao Oriental), who heads the committee, said they may be a need to remove some of the powers that the NTC asked for.

Dayanghirang said committee members noted that the proposed new NTC did not categorically state that the telephone monopoly enjoyed by the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company will be broken up.

"We will see to it that this (the provision of the monopoly break-up) is inserted," he said.

CAFGUs Defy Order To Surrender Guns

HK0502041590 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY GLOBE in English 5 Feb 90 pp 1, 8

[By correspondent Richie Salloman]

[Text] Bayugan, Agusan del Sur—Tension gripped this town when some 2,000 native-warriors-turned-militiamen under a disbanded task force headed by renegade Army Col Alexander Noble defied a military ultimatum for them to surrender their guns.

The tribal warriors, mostly members of the Manobo and Higaonon cultural communities, threatened to sow terror should the military revoke their license to carry firearms.

The warriors are members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit [CAFGU] under the disbanded Task Force Naybusayan no Noble.

Manobo tribal leaders Datu Kahikayan and Commander Eddie Ampo threatened to join the forces supporting Noble.

In a dialogue with officials led by Marciano B. Cerna Jr, director of the office for Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC) Region 10, Datu Kahikayan said the military trained the tribesmen to fight communist insurgents. To recall their firearms at the height of the anti-insurgency campaign is "very counterproductive." He said that the tribal warriors have already figured in several armed clashes with the insurgents and that the guns were their only defense against rebel atrocities.

The dialogue was the second to be arranged by the OSCC in the wake of reports that many tribesmen were sympathetic to Noble's plans to create what he called an Independent Mindanao.

During the dialogue held in Barangay Kalaitan in this town, the tribesmen also acknowledged the various livelihood projects extended by the national government to

the members of the cultural communities and reiterated their support for OSCC Secretary Jose Lopez and President Aquino.

They also condemned what they called an OSCC destabilization campaign mounted by a group of "disgruntled persons" issuing false information to the detriment of the cultural communities.

Noble is reportedly being guarded by a group of sympathetic tribal warriors and is believed holed up in a mountain barangay in Agusan del Sur.

Noble was made commander of Task Force Naybusayan when he was still part of the military and was allowed to organize the CAFGU. He claimed to have organized a 3,000-strong CAFGU, of which some 1,000 remained with him.

Death Toll Reaches 150 in Army-Communist Clashes

OW0802063390 Tokyo KYODO in English 0550 GMT 8 Feb 88

[Text] Manila, Feb. 8 KYODO—The death toll in clashes between government troops and communist rebels in the southern Philippine island of Mindanao since last week has reached at least 150, the military said Thursday. Brig. Gen. Rogelio Villanueva, Army commanding general in eastern Mindanao, said 62 communist rebels have been killed in the fighting with Army troops since last Friday in Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur Province, some 840 kilometers southeast of Manila.

Ten rebels, three Army soldiers, and an undetermined number of civilians were meanwhile slain in clashes which started February 1 in Balingasag Town, in the nearby province of Misamis Oriental, he said. Villanueva said two military planes and a helicopter were destroyed in the assaults, part of large-scale military operations to crush the rebels.

On January 31, military authorities also reported that 75 persons were killed in clashes between government and rebel troops in Mahayag, Zamboanga del Sur Province, about 770 kilometers southeast of Manila. Also in Zamboanga City, three bombings occurred within five minutes of each other Wednesday evening, injuring an unidentified boy who was passing by, military authorities said.

The explosions, which started at 8:10 p.m., occurred at the Edwin Andrews Air Force Base, in front of the house of the city administrator, and at the back of the provincial board building. In Cotabato City, 880 kilometers southeast of Manila, a bomb also exploded at a logging company at around 8:35 p.m. Wednesday. No one was hurt in the incident. Military authorities have not yet identified any suspects in the series of bombing incidents.

Military Launches Misamis Oriental Offensive

HK0602044790 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY GLOBE in English 6 Feb 90 p 7

[By Ritchie Salloman with a report from Noemi Alcalá]

[Excerpt] Government ground forces backed by three helicopter gunships launched an all-out offensive yesterday against communist rebels who had earlier surrounded a company of Army troopers after an encounter in Barangay Lantad, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental.

Sketchy reports reaching Camp Edilberto Evangelista in Cagayan de Oro City said the New People's Army [NPA] rebels, numbering about 200, encircled the Bravo Company of the 29th Infantry Battalion last Friday while the government troops were on combat patrol in the area.

An unconfirmed report said at least three soldiers had been killed since the gun battle started. Four other soldiers were believed wounded but could not be retrieved due to heavy fire from the rebels.

Col. Rodolfo Garcia, chief of staff of the 4th Infantry Division based in Cagayan de Oro, said reinforcement troops have managed to cordon off the rebels in their well-entrenched positions after helicopter gunships mounted heavy air strikes.

Garcia added that 40 Army soldiers had been holed up between two mountain slopes and surrounded by NPA rebels.

Meanwhile, reports reaching the provincial government of Misamis Oriental said at least 300 families have fled their homes for fear of being caught in the crossfire. The families reportedly sought refuge in school buildings while some have camped in public parks in Balingasag town. [passage omitted].

Ramos Orders Aid to Cotabato Clash Victims

HK0602013790 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan in Tagalog 0100 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos has ordered General Renato de Villa, Armed Forces chief of staff, to provide assistance to thousands of evacuees who have fled their homes because of an ongoing battle between the military and Muslim rebels in Central Mindanao. Ramos directed De Villa to liaise with Colonel Wilfredo Villanueva, commander of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police Regional Command 12, on how to evacuate people who were caught in the fight. A fierce battle between the government forces and the Muslim rebels, which is still raging in Pikit, Buluan, and Maguindanao, started on 31 January. It was reported that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front attacked the military in protest against the military's attack on the rebels' hideout in Mindanao.

Red Alert Reported Against Cebu Communists*HK0602071590 Manila Radio Veritas in Tagalog
0700 GMT 6 Feb 90*

[Text] The Armed Forces of the Philippines [AFP] forces have been placed on red alert to secure the capitol hall in Cebu, following threats of attacks by communist rebels. Cebu Governor Lito Osmena reportedly heads the hitlist of the rebels.

According to Daday Mercar Cabiling of DYRF Cebu City, CSU [expansion unknown] units have also been deployed to strengthen security measures around the capitol. Meanwhile, roads leading to the capitol have been closed to traffic. All visitors to the site are now being required to deposit their belongings at the gate.

Constabulary Reveals Names on NPA Hitlist*HK0502043990 Baguio City Mountain Province
Broadcasting Company in English 0330 GMT 5 Feb 90*

[Text] The Constabulary said the names of Cebu Governor Emilio Osmena and Cebu City Mayor (Tobacco) Osmena were among those found in a communist rebel hitlist confiscated by government troopers from victims in a raid in four rebel safehouses in Cebu City on Friday [2 February].

Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Lacson, Metrodiscom [Metropolitan District Command] commander, said the New People's Army hitlist also included the names of military and police officers, some judges, members of the Cebu provincial board, and some businessmen.

Among those in the hitlist, Lacson said, are Brigadier General Raul Imperial, Reconn [Regional Command] 7 chief; his deputy, Brigadier General Eleno Amores; Lieutenant Colonel Enrique Cuadra, Cebu City PC [Philippine Constabulary] commander; Police Captain Rogelio Yap, Lapu Lapu City police chief; Cebu provincial board member Regonacio Prozena; Judges Reynaldo Caniales and Fortunato Baylosis; and Darrel Calica of the Cebu Plaza; Mariano Zamora of Magellan Hotel; and the Zagitano brothers, owners of the Gayetano department stores. Lacson said his own name is in the death list.

De Villa on Promotion of Armed Forces Captains*HK0602043790 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY
GLOBE in English 6 Feb 90 pp 1, 7*

[By staff writer David C. Borje]

[Excerpt] Nine hundred-two captains will be promoted to major this year, a move that will pave the way for the promotion of about the same number of first lieutenants to captain.

The move is part of the efforts to unify the fractured Armed Forces, according to top military officers led by AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] chief of staff Gen Renato de Villa who appeared yesterday before the Senate committee on national defense and security.

Sen Ernesto M. Maceda, committee chairman, had invited the AFP officers to express their views on Senate Bill No. 769, introduced by him and two other senators, Leticia R. Shahani and Teofisto Guingona Jr. The bill seeks to institutionalize the fairness and quality of assignments, training and promotion in the military.

De Villa said that even with the promotion of 902 captains to major this year, there would still be 1,698 captains who would not be promoted because of the quota system.

Maceda said that until the problem of promotions is solved by legislation and by implementing regulations, "the present instability in the AFP officers corps, especially in the lower levels, will continue to exist." [passage omitted]

Aquino Dialogue With Labor Leaders Reported*HK0802054990 Manila BUSINESS WORLD
in English 8 Feb 90 pp 1, 6*

[By Rachel E. Khan]

[Excerpt] President Aquino, in a dialogue with the labor sector yesterday, promised to extend the price controls on basic commodities for as long as she had emergency powers, or until June this year.

At the same time, Mrs. Aquino called for the immediate activation of the National Wages and Productivity Commission [NWPC] and the Regional Wages and Productivity Boards [RWPB]. She was also open to the possibility of appointing labor representatives to the legislative bodies of local government units.

In the same venue, the President also encouraged the labor leaders to coordinate and cooperate with the Department of Labor and Employment in reporting violators of the minimum wage law.

Mrs Aquino also appealed to the labor representatives for industrial peace to induce the inflow of investments.

In a 90-minute dialogue yesterday afternoon at the Malacanang guesthouse, 16 representatives from the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines [TUCP] and the Labor Advisory Consultative Council [LACC] (8 representatives each) presented to the President a package of proposals calling for non-wage adjustments, ranging from housing and transportation subsidies to price control.

Press Undersecretary Horacio Paredes told reporters the President assured the labor representatives that she "would" maintain price controls for as long as she had her emergency powers. Mrs Aquino had promised this in response to the labor sector's request, who claimed that the rise has eroded the effects of the recent wage increase.

Mr Paredes said the labor sector delegates did not put emphasis on the wage hike proposals but TUCP president Democrito Mendoza indicated that the P25 wage increase last year would last the worker only until the middle of this year.

The labor sector submitted to the President a complete lineup of their nominees for the NWFC and the NWPBs. Mrs Aquino said, as quoted by Mr Paredes, that delays in the activation of the said bodies were caused, in turn, by delays in the submission of nominees, especially by the employers sector.

The President said that once the bodies have been activated, she will direct them to conduct studies so as to be able to set the appropriate wage rate for each region.

LACC president Vladimir Tupaz said that Mrs Aquino called for a meeting between the labor sector and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra and Local Governments Secretary Luis Santos to discuss the possibilities of placing sectoral representatives in Congress and the local government units, respectively. "Not just the labor sector but other sectors as well," he said.

Housing

The President also called for a meeting between the "housing people" and the labor sector to discuss their housing benefit proposals, i.e., condoning interests on workers' housing loans.

As to their proposal on income tax exemptions, Mrs Aquino said the Department of Finance was currently having a difficult time because of the many exemptions already being granted to vital industries. [passage omitted]

Paper Cites Reaction to IMF Measures

HK0602043990 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE in English 6 Feb 90 pp 1, 6

[By staff member Lito Zulueta with additional reports from Johanna Son, Patrick Paez, Booma Cruz, Claro Fernandez, and Arleen Chipongian]

[Text] President Aquino yesterday indicated that the austerity measures spelled out in the addendum to the Letter of Intent [LOI] prepared by the Government and the International Monetary Fund, including reduction of government spending and new taxes, were already being put in place.

She cited the bills she had been asking Congress to approve that would impose taxes on liquor and tobacco, which is one of the measures adopted in the supplement to the Memorandum on Economic Policy (MEP) for 1989-1992 that was submitted in March last year to the IMF.

The President added that she intended to have a more efficient bureaucracy without hirings to the civil service,

an echo of the addendum's proposal for a limit to the expansion of the civil service to only 1%.

Mrs. Aquino made the remarks at her regular weekly press conference, wherein she was asked whether or not she had approved the final version of the supplement to the MEP.

The President, however, ruled out deregulation of oil prices in the near future, thus countering claims made by some of her Cabinet members that the Government was already moving toward letting market forces determine the prices of petroleum products.

She said that public perception about the Government's impending deregulation policy resulted from statements by proponents within the Cabinet such as Budget Secretary Guillermo Carague and Finance Secretary Jesus Estandis.

Mrs. Aquino stressed that there is no Cabinet consensus on the matter. "In my opinion, we cannot deregulate oil prices and the industry at this time," the President declared.

The supplementary MEP is supposed to shore up government financial operations by cutting back on public spending and raising more money through taxes.

It also outlines the Government's economic goals and plans, which will form part of the new "bible" of Mrs. Aquino's new economic team.

But addendum to the Letter of Intent drew mixed reaction from lawmakers, labor, bankers and economists.

At the Senate, Sen. John Osmena warned the Government of "increasing discontent" from Filipinos who would have to suffer "harder life" if the country pursues an economic austerity program agreed upon with the IMF for this year.

He said the austerity program contained in the addendum to the LOI meant possible increases in the prices of basic items such as fuel, electricity as well as food, even as the people are barred from getting wage increases.

"So in effect it's going to be a harder life and increasing discontent (to grapple with)," Osmena said.

For his part, Finance Committee Chairman Neptali Gonzales said he understood Government's desire to adhere to previously set targets and cut back on inflationary overspending, but he reminded the Government to "study and be very careful about the social implications of these proposals."

Despite the executive department's constant reminders for Congress to pass measures imposing taxes on cigarettes, liquor and soft drinks, legislators have remained opposed to the unpopular proposal.

On the labor front, the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU [I May Movement]) accused the Government of "systematically cheating the people, including the workers, to achieve the so-called economic recovery program of the Government."

KMU chairman Crispin Beltran said the addendum to the LOI, by imposing austerity measures and raising new taxes, "asks the poor to subsidize the rich, as what IMF conditionalities are putting the effect."

The addendum's trading off of slower economic growth for reduced inflation would force taxpayers to absorb the effects of austerity measures, he said.

"Workers will now have to shell out more from their meager incomes due to higher value added taxes on basic goods and services, vis-a-vis a wage freeze policy," Beltran said.

The militant labor federation reiterated its demand for a new round of wage increase, despite the policy of no wage increase adopted in the supplementary MEP.

Bankers, however, are optimistic about the plans of the Government to trade slower moving economy for a reduction in inflation rate this year, saying it will result in a "better performing" economy beginning next year.

However, they are taking a wait and see attitude toward how the program would work for the business and financial communities.

Bankers interviewed by the CHRONICLE said most of the policies and targets of the Government would prepare the economy for faster and sustainable growth in the 1990s.

A foreign banking source said "the Government's commitment to correct inflation rates this year makes sense...a slower moving economy with a low inflation rate is far better than a quick expanding one which loses most of the gains to inflation."

Local bankers said that an item in the addendum that deals with the foreign exchange rate policy will not have any dramatic changes in the next two years.

Thailand

Praphat Again Forced To Postpone Saudi Visit
BK0802014990 Bangkok THE NATION in English
8 Feb 90 p 1

[Text] Deputy Foreign Minister Praphat Limpaphan was yesterday forced to postpone for the second time his scheduled goodwill visit to Saudi Arabia, a Foreign Ministry official said.

Kopsak Chutikun, ambassador attached to the ministry, said yesterday the ministry was informed by the Saudi

government that it would not be convenient for the Thai delegation to start its four-day visit to the Middle Eastern kingdom yesterday.

The Saudi government said that all government departments in the Islamic country were closed on Thursdays and Fridays in line with Muslim practices.

Under the new schedule, Praphat's team will leave Bangkok for Riyadh on Saturday [10 February] and return on Tuesday, he said.

However, a three-member delegation, including Deputy Central Investigation Bureau Commissioner Chalo Koetthet, was to leave for Saudi Arabia last night to brief Saudi authorities on the investigation into the murders of three of their diplomats here as well as to lay the ground work for the deputy foreign minister's delegation, Kopsak said.

The Praphat delegation has been entrusted with the task to bring about a normalization in relations between Saudi Arabia and Thailand, which have been strained following the assassinations of three Saudi Arabian Embassy officials in Bangkok last Thursday.

In addition, the Thai delegation will also seek to expand bilateral trade ties, cooperation on labour issues and discuss the purchase of petroleum products from Saudi Arabia, the ambassador said.

Meanwhile, a 20-member delegation of the House committee on labour led by committee chairman Suphasit Thechatanon was scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia between Feb 14 and 16 to study the Thai labour situation there, he said.

Last Thursday, Second Secretary Abdallah 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Basri, and embassy officials Fahd 'Abdallah al-Bahli and Ahmad 'Abdallah al-Saif, were killed in two simultaneous attacks near their homes in Yannawa area.

Eyewitnesses have told police that one of the gunmen looked like a Middle Eastern while the other was believed to be a Thai national.

Sihanouk Arrives; To Meet With Various Leaders

To Meet Khmer Rouge Leaders

BK0702125590 Hong Kong AFP in English 1228 GMT
7 Feb 90

[Text] Bangkok, Feb 7 (AFP)—Cambodian resistance leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk arrived here from China Wednesday [7 February] and left immediately for the seaside resort of Phatthaya, where he is to meet leaders of the Khmer Rouge, his office said. He was scheduled to meet Wednesday evening in Phatthaya, southeast of here, with Khmer Rouge Chief Khieu Samphan and the communist resistance faction's army commander Son Sen, the prince's office here said.

The question of whether the Khmer Rouge, accused of genocide in ruling Cambodia from April 1975 to January 1979, should play a role in a future Cambodian government is a main obstacle in the peace process. The Khmer Rouge, the most powerful of the three guerrilla factions fighting the Vietnam-backed government in Phnom Penh, have refused to attend peace talks scheduled for Jakarta later this month, reliable sources here said.

They added that in a letter dated Sunday, Mr. Khieu Samphan had said the Khmer Rouge insisted that talks include the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, decide on matters by unanimity rather than majority vote and be in the framework of international talks which broke down in Paris in 1991. The Jakarta talks are slated to be an informal meeting not including the five permanent U.N. Security Council members—France, Britain, the United States, Soviet Union and China—although France would be represented since the meetings would be in the Paris framework.

Prince Sihanouk, Cambodia's former monarch, has said he will return to his country after years in exile but only after meetings in Phatthaya. The prince, who was not staying in Bangkok as his visit is a private one, was also to meet the other coalition partner Son Sann, a former conservative prime minister in Cambodia, in Phatthaya on Thursday, his office said.

Prince Sihanouk resigned in January as head of the coalition after international criticism of his continuing links with the Khmer Rouge. But the prince is expected to return here on Friday to meet with Thai Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan, his office said.

Prince Sihanouk is scheduled to leave Thailand for Singapore on February 17 and return here on February 20. He is then to meet Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila before traveling to areas of Cambodia controlled by his army.

Leaders of the three guerrilla groups are scheduled to meet here Thursday to discuss the Jakarta meeting set for February 26-28, diplomats and Cambodian guerrilla officials said. Prince Sihanouk is not expected to take part in Thursday's discussions.

To Meet With Chatchai

*BK0802014690 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
8 Feb 90 p 8*

[Text] Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan said last night that he is expected to meet Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who arrived in Bangkok from Beijing yesterday, at his Soi Ratchakhru residence tomorrow.

General Chatchai said that the Prince is expected to be in Thailand "for about two weeks", adding that he will host a dinner for him tomorrow night.

After arriving yesterday, the Prince left immediately for Phatthaya where he is expected to rest before going to Singapore.

The Prince, accompanied by his wife Princess Monique and a 10-man delegation, arrived at Don Muang's Military Wing yesterday, but did not speak to reporters.

Prince Sihanouk and his entourage were driven to the Royal Cliff Beach Hotel's Royal Wing.

Some 39 Sihanoukist resistance officials and 10 Foreign Ministry officials were on hand at the hotel to welcome them.

A Sihanoukist source said the Prince was expected to leave for Singapore on February 16 and was expected to stay there about one week.

He will then return to Thailand where he is expected to cross into one of the so-called liberated zones.

Soldiers Take Koh Kong, Thai MP Missing

*BK0802094790 Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai
8 Feb 90 pp 1, 26*

[Text] Our correspondent reported from Trat Province yesterday [7 February] that the situation in Koh Kong Province of Cambodia, near Thailand's eastern border, is now in a crisis after a group of about 200 Heng Samrin soldiers, dispatched there to fight the three-party Khmer resistance forces, left their strongholds and with weapons took control of Koh Kong. The troops declared that they were launching "a campaign against the rich."

The soldiers, whose commander was still unidentified, has taken over all trading points in Koh Kong which have access to other countries, namely Phum Moat Prek Veal Krabei and Phum Dang Tong. They looted food and valuables from the Khmer traders. Shops were raided and destroyed.

The report said that the governor of Koh Kong, Rung Phlamkesan, who is also secretary of Koh Kong's Party Committee, in a disguise fled Koh Kong accompanied by a group of senior officials. Before leaving, they ordered local soldiers not to take up arms in retaliation against the crazy soldiers to avoid killings among the Khmer people. The incident which occurred on 6 February is still going on at press time.

Thai traders from Khlong Yai District, Trat Province of Thailand, who went to Koh Kong have quickly returned. According to them, authorities and wealthy businessmen in Koh Kong have left for Singapore. Many of them said that Thanit Traiwut, an MP [Member of Parliament] of Trat Province, who went to Cambodia to open a friendship market, was abducted by a group of unidentified Khmer soldiers at Phum Sre Ambel, Koh Kong Province. His fate is still unknown.

Thai MP Reported Safe

*BK0802144490 Bangkok Army Television Channel 5
in Thai 1300 GMT 8 Feb 90*

[Text] With reference to the report by a mass media source that Thanit Traiwut, Chat Thai party's MP [member of parliament] from Trat Province, was detained in Koh Kong Province of Cambodia while he was on a business trip there, the MP is reported safe now.

In checking with his home in Trat Province at 1000 today, there was confirmation that Mr. Thanit asked for speedboat fuel to be delivered for him in Ban Khlong Son, Khlong Yai District, where he took shelter during the fighting in Koh Kong. Mr. Thanit has already returned to Trat Province.

According to a latest report, Mr. Thanit has again gone to Koh Kong to resume his business dealings.

Kraisak Chunhawan Gives Interview on Cambodia

*BK0402124590 Bangkok KHAO PHISET in Thai
22-28 Jan 90 pg 28-37*

[Interview with Kraisak Chunhawan, son of Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan and a member of the prime minister-appointed team of policy advisers, given to Samran Rotphet and Wuthiphong Lakkham of KHAO PHISET "last week"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The prime minister's adviser admitted that the Cambodian problem remains a big issue. International attention is being given to the formula for a political settlement by Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. There is also an agreement from the Hun Sen government in Phnom Penh for a U.N. role in the settlement, and the international consensus against the return to power by the Khmer Rouge. Amid diplomatic activities going on at the moment, Dr. Kraisak is full of hope for success.

"I believe that, by the end of this year, we should see a certain achievement concerning the Cambodian problem," the adviser to the prime minister said.

[KHAO PHISET] Will Thailand have to adjust itself in keeping with the efforts to push ahead for the progress of this formula?

[Kraisak] I think that it is up to both the Foreign Ministry and the military. They will have to discuss with each other the direction to take. It is the military which is the closest to Cambodia. I believe that the army is trying to get the three Khmer factions to understand that the role of the United Nations is important. This is a sensitive issue. I do not know in detail how much progress has been made on this.

[KHAO PHISET] Did China ever state clearly whether it supports the move through the United Nations?

[Kraisak] China did not say this in public, but deep down it has shown growing interest in the various proposals

made. China wishes to have good relations with the countries in this region. It is not prone to making war only. Take the change in Romania as an example. China used to have close relations with Ceausescu, and Ceausescu admired China's policy at a time when China had conflicts with the Soviet Union. Yet, after the government change in Romania, China was among the first countries to recognize the new leadership after the downfall of Ceausescu. This means that China is also following the global trend, and is not just standing still.

[KHAO PHISET] Will China have to sacrifice the Khmer Rouge finally?

[Kraisak] China must naturally wish to see the Khmer Rouge be part of the Cambodian administration, but to what extent will that be acceptable to the Cambodian people? At least, Hun Sen once said that he would accept the Khmer Rouge if two members of the Pol Pot clique were not in it and if the new faction of the Khmer Rouge admitted that it's policy was responsible for the mass killings of millions of people in Cambodia. In other words, this kind of self-criticism of its policy in the past by the Khmer Rouge would make the group accepted as part of the administration of Cambodia, according to Hun Sen. Anyway, if you go through articles or statements of the Khmer Rouge, you will never come across anything which says that the Khmer Rouge admitted that its policy was a mistake and what it did was catastrophic to the Khmer society. They believe what they did was the right thing.

[KHAO PHISET] This should be the key issue in the settlement of the problem at present then?

[Kraisak] Yes, when we visited the United States, we met leading senators, such as Alan Cranston, or congressmen, such as Chester Atkins. Regardless of whether they come from the Democrat or the Republican parties, those people adopted a common stand on the issue of the Khmer Rouge. They all said that we must positively prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning to power in Cambodia. Meanwhile, the policy of President Bush is to compromise with China, and this is the explanation of the effort to have Hun Sen accept the Khmer Rouge on the assumption that the war should prolong if they are left out, and the lack of effort to pressure Sihanouk to hold separate talks with Hun Sen despite the fact that both Sihanouk and Son Sann enjoy massive support from the United States.

[KHAO PHISET] It seems that there is a difference of views between the Foreign Ministry and the team of advisers at Ban Phitsanulok over the recognition of the coalition government of Prince Sihanouk. While the Foreign Ministry recognizes it as three factions, the advisers think that the coalition should be held a single body. Will this lead to ...?

[Kraisak] No, we do not have such fixed thinking, but we only wish to see various options. We have to study various options so that we can present them to the prime minister. Besides, there have been so many proposals put

forth, especially the one concerning the administrative role of the United Nations. We think that it is well justified and has received sufficient support, enough for the four Khmer factions to sit and talk about it now. We think that the time is right.

[KHAO PHISET] We realize that the Foreign Ministry must adopt a position in line with the resolutions adopted each year by countries of the United Nations. We therefore don't know how we could be flexible on this.

[Kraisak] But what we see is that they are not much related. Next year, there will be a change in the UN resolution, as it would be difficult to get more than a hundred countries to vote for it with the present trend in Europe. Please do not forget that Sweden, Canada, and England have sent high-level officials, at the level of ministry permanent secretary, to Phnom Penh. Japan did the same. Japan even sent a deputy minister. The world is changing now.

[KHAO PHISET] There is a comment that, here in Thailand, there are three factions with different views on the settlement of the Cambodian problem. How are things developing now?

[Kraisak] I think we can expect something positive now. I think the prime minister's proposal for a step-by-step settlement of the Cambodian problem is very sensible. The first step is to have the three Khmer factions meet and discuss a ceasefire and freezing of their respective forces. Second, a UN international control mechanism must be dispatched into Cambodia to verify whether the Vietnamese troop withdrawal really took place. After the troop withdrawal has been verified, the international control mechanism will be there as a guarantee that all factions, or the three factions, no longer get external support.

[KHAO PHISET] Do you mean that there will be a peace keeping force?

[Kraisak] Yes, and later on the international control mechanism will assume the role of setting up a new administrative structure based on the principle of democracy. This is what we first proposed to Hun Sen, and Hun Sen accepted it. At first, when we proposed this to him, he was very reluctant to accept the role of the UN international control mechanism. But later on, about two weeks ago, he agreed not only to accept the role of the UN international control mechanism, he even agreed that there should be a UN role in the administration of the country. He has changed that much. We were surprised by him, and we did not even know what to say to him. It was a concession on his part. Then we asked Sihanouk. Sihanouk wanted everything to begin with the comprehensive settlement, and the Khmer Rouge must be included in the new administration as part of the coalition. That means he did not agree. I think this is the principal stand of the Khmer Rouge; the Khmer Rouge is in charge of administration for Prince Sihanouk. In Beijing, at the United Nations, or anywhere else, Khmer

Rouge officials have almost completely taken over control from Prince Sihanouk's staff, especially when it concerns international relations.

[KHAO PHISET] Did our army ever discuss the problem in order to find a clear-cut position?

[Kraisak] The army always listened to the government. The military would follow the direction given by the government. What made the people think that we have given a new course to our relations with Cambodia was the meeting between Hun Sen and the Thai prime minister. It would not have been possible for us to arrange the meeting of the two leaders if there was no backing from the army. In fact, it was not an achievement of the advisers at Ban Phitsanulok. It was a success of the military and the prime minister.

[KHAO PHISET] Hun Sen agreed to have UN trusteeship establish to supervise elections in Cambodia, but he has a condition—that the UN seat must be left vacant and the status of the two opposing sides remain as it is now.

[Kraisak] The CGDK [Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea] meanwhile made two demands. First, it wants the UN seat to be retained. Second, on local administration, it wants its personnel as part of the new administration along with those of Hun Sen. This is tantamount to a coalition government. Without any agreement reached, how could you be able to allocate the power? This would create more complications. For example, how would the assignment in Battambang or Siem Reap be shared? This is complicated. They also demanded an abolition of the Hun Sen government.

There are two proposals. The two options the Soviet deputy foreign minister, Igor Rogachev, told us at Ban Phitsanulok are: first, all parties remain at the places they are and leave it to the United Nations to play a central role in arranging for the sharing of power. The second option is for all parties, including the CGDK and Hun Sen, to be dismantled, and to let the United Nations arrange for the power sharing. Now concerning the second option, Sihanouk said that, after the dissolution, he must be part of the new administration along with Hun Sen.

[KHAO PHISET] That means the two options are open for discussion now?

[Kraisak] Yes, and at least I would like to be rather optimistic. I think that the various proposals should receive opinion from other countries as this could be a pressure on Sihanouk. He should make some compromise instead of remaining stiff and always thinking that negotiations can get started only after battlefield victory. I personally think that the Khmer people have gone through such a long war, longer than in other country. It is also not good for us in the long run to have a neighbor whose psychology is that of making war. It is not good for the Khmer society. The war culture would make it difficult for the Cambodian people to have smooth

relations with Thailand, especially as we are agricultural countries. Waging war for too long would affect the psychology of the people.

[KHAO PHISET] In short, do you have hopes for the coming meeting in Jakarta in February?

[Kraisak] I still hope for it. It would be too bad if we could look forward to this meeting at all. [laughter]

General Suchinda Views Political Situation

BK0402030490 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
4 Feb 90 p 6

[From the "Inprint" column]

[Text] Deputy Army Chief General Suchinda Khrapayun—the heir-apparent of Army Chief Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyut—told KHAO PHISET that the present political instability arose from shortcomings of the political system and the fact that the Government is a coalition of six political parties.

It is hard for a coalition government to be stable and last the four-year term, Gen Suchinda said. There will be changes. The present Government does have problems which resulted in the recent swap of Cabinet posts.

More importantly, Gen Suchinda added, the imperfection of the present political system must be taken into account. MPs [members of parliament] want to be Cabinet ministers, and the method of selecting them is inappropriate. Some political parties select their ministers from those who control 20-30 votes, and only rich people can control such votes. This means that only the rich can be ministers, the general said.

Some other parties select ministers from those who have been MPs for three to five terms, regardless of their qualifications. Problems frequently follow such appointments, Gen Suchinda said. The question is how to get those who are both talented and acceptable to become Cabinet ministers.

The Constitution, Gen Suchinda said, does not forbid those who are not elected MPs to become Cabinet ministers or prime minister. This means that if necessary, those who are not members of parliament can hold these powerful positions.

Asked whether the current Government will last two years, Gen Suchinda said it was difficult to predict, but there was a truism that "good deeds bear good results, bad deeds bring about misfortunes." If the Government performs well, no one will be able to overthrow it—it may last not just one, but two or three terms.

He would not comment on the Government's performance, but joked that the Prime Minister always said "no problem."

Asked to comment on the possibility of Gen Chawalit resigning from the military service and setting up a political party of his own, the deputy Army chief said he could only

point out that those who retired from the military to set up a political party seldom succeed. Gen Kriangsak Chamanan had prepared his grounds well, but did not succeed. Gen Athit Kamlang-ek and Gen Thianchai Sirisamphan also set up their own political party, but met with little success. They can found only small parties. He added that Thai politics is difficult. The question is how to get good persons into the democratic system.

"The problem is that no matter how good you are, if you have no money you will never get elected," Gen Suchinda said. He recalled an incident 20 years ago when his father-in-law, who had retired as Provincial Police commissioner, applied to be a candidate of a major political party to contest an election in Ratchaburi. He had a good record and was honest, but the party did not accept him. Instead the party selected someone else who was less good and Gen Suchinda's father-in-law had to stand as an independent candidate.

Two or three days before election day, Gen Suchinda visited his father-in-law and they both went to a temple. The abbot asked Gen Suchinda how much he would pay since the other candidate had already built a wall for the temple. "We could do nothing," Gen Suchinda said, "when even monks behaved like this." And this is still true today. "Gen Chatchai himself told me that no matter how much good he had done, good deeds do not count in an election; it is money that does the job," he said.

"Achan Khukrit Pramot himself used to tell me that when he was prime minister, he had to take money from the Internal Security Operations Command fund to pay these people. He said after he left the post he was still unable to repay all the debt," Gen Suchinda revealed. "He admitted he had to carry a bagful of money to pay people whenever there was a crucial vote in Parliament."

Gen Suchinda said that everyone dreams of a democratic system, and many people think that if someone has gone through an election, this is democracy. In fact, this is not so. Nowadays they will always claim that they represent democracy, that they had been elected representatives of the people, and so forth—using the election to define democracy. This matter, if not rectified, can turn our country into a Marcos-style democracy.

Gen Suchinda threw a question back at the interviewers, asking them to compare the Prem Tinsulanon and the Chatchai governments. "Which government contributed more?" he asked.

And he was not surprised to get the answer that the better one was the government of Gen Prem, who has never been an elected MP.

Sitthi Comments on Dalai Lama's Upcoming Visit

BK0602141990 Bangkok ZHONG HUA RIBAO in Chinese
6 Feb 90 p 4

[Text] Foreign Minister Air Chief Marshal Sitthi Sawetsila yesterday briefed reporters on the upcoming visit to Thailand by Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama. He said he

hoped the Dalai Lama, in his capacity as a Nobel Peace Prize winner, would not engage in any political activities during the visit. The foreign minister also said that the Foreign Ministry had discussed this issue with other agencies concerned and that they were satisfied.

Asked how the Chinese side has reacted to this, Air Chief Marshal Sitthi said that the Foreign Ministry has already informed China of the visit. It seems that this time we [Thailand] have to let him (the Dalai Lama) come to visit.

Meanwhile, a Chinese Embassy official yesterday told our correspondent that Pracha Khunakasem, director general of the Foreign Ministry's Political Department, had invited Chinese Ambassador Li Shichun for a meeting last Friday to inform him of the Dalai Lama's visit. Ambassador Li had already reported this to the Beijing government. The official said that the Chinese Government had not changed its attitude on the Dalai Lama's visit to Thailand.

When the Dalai Lama planned to visit Thailand last year, the Chinese Government expressed its objections, saying that he had been carrying out activities advocating secession from China.

The Dalai Lama, invited by the Sathiankoset-Nakhapraphit Foundation under the coordination of well-known writer Sulak Siwarak, will visit Thailand in May to carry out a series of religious activities.

The Chinese Embassy official said that the Chinese Government will soon issue a statement on the issue.

Vietnam

Greetings Mark Party, Relations Foundings

CPV Receives Messages

BK0302154490 Hanoi VNA in English 1452 GMT
3 Feb 90

[Text] Hanoi VNA February 3—The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam [CPV] has received messages of greetings on its 60th founding anniversary (Feb. 3) from the Central Committees of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the Lao People's Revolutionary Party [LPRP], and the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea [PRPK].

The CPSU message reads:

"All friends of Vietnam know very well the considerable significance of Comrade Ho Chi Minh's revolutionary life with regard to the development of the country, and this year will celebrate his birth centenary. The Communist Party of Vietnam founded and educated by him rallied the people in a struggle for national independence. Vietnam's freedom and reunification are the historic merits of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

"At present, the CPV is again proving itself the leading force of society. The process of broad renovation based

on the modern conceptions of socialism has met the interests of the masses, and the initial successes you have recorded on the path of renovation have eloquently testified to this truth.

"The CPSU supports Vietnam's constructive foreign policy, Vietnam's persistent struggle for the victory of the principles of peace, security, good-neighbourliness and cooperation in Southeast Asia, and Vietnam's contribution to the settlement of the Cambodia issue.

"We believe that the Vietnamese people, under the leadership of the communist party—their experienced vanguard—will successfully carry out the programme of building a socialist and prosperous Vietnam.

"The unbreakable solidarity and unity between the CPSU and the CPV, and the fraternal friendship between the Soviet and Vietnamese peoples will last forever."

The Lao message says:

"The great success and valuable experiences of the Vietnamese revolution have greatly contributed to the struggle for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world, thus constantly raising the Communist Party of Vietnam's role and prestige in the international arena.

"The Lao People's Revolutionary Party like the Communist Party of Vietnam is a successor to the cause of the Indochinese Communist Party. The Lao people greatly rejoice at the constant development of the special relationship, the friendship, solidarity and all-round cooperation between the fraternal Lao-Vietnamese peoples on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. The LPRP and the Lao people have always been grateful to the party and people of Vietnam for their valuable assistance to the Lao people in their national liberation in the past and their present national defence and construction."

The message from the Kampuchean party says:

"The great victories which have been recorded by the CPV and the Vietnamese people in each stage of development have consolidated the position and power of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and constituted important contributions to the cause of revolution of the three Indochinese countries, as well as to peace, stability and cooperation in Southeast Asia.

"On the occasion of this historic day, we once again express our deepest and most sincere gratitude toward the CPV and the Vietnamese people for their valuable support and assistance to the PRPK and the Cambodian people in the past as well as in their present struggle for national defence and construction."

Party Receives More Greetings*BK0402103090 Hanoi VNA in English 0609 GMT
4 Feb 90*

[Text] Hanoi VNA February 4—The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and its General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh have received more messages of greetings from party leaders of Cuba, the GDR, Mongolia, Czechoslovakia and the DPRK on the occasion of the CPV's 60th founding anniversary (February 3).

In a message addressed to Nguyen Van Linh, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba Central Committee Fidel Castro Ruz said: "Now that mankind is living through hard times, President Ho Chi Minh's extraordinary cause, his teachings, his thoughts, his spirit of struggle against colonialism and imperialism for national liberation, his modesty and his revolutionary enthusiasm constitute a driving force to all communists and serve as an inspiring example for all nations...."

"The Cuban communists and the entire heroic Cuban people will forever uphold the banner of revolution, socialism and internationalism, considering it the best way to commemorate President Ho Chi Minh and the ideologies that led to the founding of the glorious Communist Party of Vietnam."

Gregor Gysi, chairman of the Party for Democratic Socialism, said in his message: "With deep sympathy, we are following your current efforts aimed at renovating your party's policies and, through building a socialist-oriented sectoral economy and democratizing social life, at pushing up the socioeconomic development for human interests."

"Please be confident that our party members as well as many citizens of our country are always aware of their obligation with regard to their traditional friendship and solidarity with the CPV and the entire Vietnamese people. Now and in the future, our party will continue regarding the trustful exchange of views and the coordination of action on the basis of solidarity with the CPV as an important task in our international activities for peace and social progress, and for humanity and justice in the world."

The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee's message to the CPV Central Committee said: "On this memorable occasion, we would like to wish the fraternal Vietnamese people many major achievements in the cause of renovation for their country's development and the rest of the world."

The message from Ladislav Adamec, president of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, wrote: "With sympathy and attention, we are following the efforts of the Vietnamese communists and the entire Vietnamese people in seeking new forms for their socioeconomic policy and for social democratization. We highly value your endeavours for establishing peace, stability, cooperation and mutual trust in Southeast Asia."

For its part, the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea said in its message: "The Vietnamese people, closely united around the CPV Central Committee headed by Comrade Nguyen Van Linh, have made considerable progress in their struggle for successfully building socialism."

Exchange Made With East Europe*BK0302160390 Hanoi VNA in English 1502 GMT
3 Feb 90*

[Text] Hanoi VNA Feb. 3—Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach has exchanged congratulatory messages with his counterparts in East European countries on the 40th anniversary of Vietnam's diplomatic relations with them.

In his messages, sent to the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia, Nguyen Co Thach expressed his satisfaction over the fruitful development of Vietnam's multifaceted cooperative relations with East European countries and wished for further promotion of those relations for mutual benefit for the sake of peace, social progress and socialism in the world.

In their messages addressed to the Vietnamese foreign minister, Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer of the G.D.R. expressed his confidence in the further development of the friendship and multifaceted cooperation between the two countries in the interests of world peace and the benefit of the two peoples; Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn said that in the future, Hungary will do her best to push up the multiform cooperation between the two countries in the benefit of the two peoples and world peace; and Romanian Foreign Minister Sergiu Celac wished the friendship and cooperation between Vietnam and Romania constant development.

Bulgaria, Japan Send Messages*BK0502155990 Hanoi VNA in English 1525 GMT
5 Feb 90*

[Text] Hanoi VNA February 5—The Central Committee of the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) on the 60th anniversary of the party (Feb. 3). [sentence as received]

The message from Bulgaria says:

"The Bulgarian Communist Party and the People's Republic of Bulgaria support the consistent and constructive initiatives of the Communist Party and the Government of Vietnam aimed at consolidating world peace and security, making Southeast Asia a zone of peace, good neighbourliness, cooperation and mutual understanding and solving complicated problems in Indochina, first of all the Cambodia issue, by peaceful means."

"Over the past years, implementing the testaments of Georgi Dimitrov and Ho Chi Minh, our two parties and countries have been bound by ties of mutual respect and profound fraternal friendship. That is a firm foundation for the development of the all-round cooperation between Bulgaria and Vietnam in the interests of our two nations and of peace and socialism."

The JCP message says:

"We hope that the Communist Party, the organizations and people of Vietnam will uphold their tradition of indomitable struggle and determined actions for national independence, building and defence, overcome the immediate difficulties and gain new and big achievements in the building of socialism, including the struggle to abolish nuclear weapons, achieve the nations' rights to self-determination, improve the people's livelihood and realize socialist democracy."

Greetings Traded With Poland

BK0402093790 Hanoi VNA in English 0618 GMT
4 Feb 90

[Text] Hanoi VNA February 4—Nguyen Co Thach and Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Vietnamese and Polish foreign ministers, have exchanged greetings on the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries.

In his message, Nguyen Co Thach said: "Over the past 40 years, the friendship and multi-faceted cooperation between our two countries have constantly been consolidated and developed, making an important contribution to the national construction of each country and to the cause of peace and friendship among nations.

"May these relations be further consolidated and developed in the interests of the two peoples, and of peace and social progress."

In his message, Krzysztof Skubiszewski said: "Over the past four decades, the Poland-Vietnam cooperation has expanded to many new domains in service of the two nations' interests and of peace in the world. The relations between Poland and Vietnam have been developing on the principles of equality, friendship and mutual benefit.

"On this occasion, I would like to express our belief that the time-honoured Poland-Vietnam relationship will continue to consolidate and develop in more diversified forms."

Nguyen Co Thach Attends North Korean Reception

BK0402152390 Hanoi VNA in English 1441 GMT
4 Feb 90

[Text] Hanoi VNA Feb. 4—DPRK ambassador to Vietnam Yi Hong gave a reception here last night on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the establishment of

diplomatic relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Vietnam (Jan. 31).

His Vietnamese guests included Nguyen Co Thach, Politburo member of the Communist Party of Vietnam [CPV] Central Committee, vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers and foreign minister; Hoang Bich Son, member of the CPV Central Committee and head of its Commission for External Relations; Dinh Nho Liem, member of the CPV Central Committee and first vice foreign minister; and Le Van Di, president of the Vietnam-Korea Friendship Association.

DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Cha Pong-chu who is currently visiting Vietnam was also on hand.

Yi Hong and Nguyen Co Thach jointly proposed a toast to the further consolidation and development of the friendship and cooperation between the two countries.

Party Anniversary Celebrated in Localities

BK0402153990 Hanoi VNA in English 1444 GMT
4 Feb 90

[Text] Hanoi VNA Feb. 4—Some one thousand veteran revolutionaries in the people's army, who are now living in Ho Chi Minh City, held a meeting in the city yesterday morning to mark the 60th anniversary of the Communist Party of Vietnam [CPV] (Feb. 3).

The meeting was attended by Nguyen Huu Tho, vice-president of the State Council and president of the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee.

Addressing the meeting, Tran Van Tra, former senior lieutenant-general and commander of the South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces during the anti-U.S. war, brought out the great services rendered by the CPV to the nation in the victorious struggle for national independence and in taking the country to socialism.

On this occasion, an exhibition on the "founding and development of the Communist Party of Vietnam" was opened in the city on Feb. 2. The city's cultural houses, clubs, and traditional houses organized diversified art performances and talks on the history of the party and the Vietnamese revolution.

Soviet Consul-General Rudolf F. Mowkhin also gave a reception and a film show in the city on Feb. 2 to mark the anniversary.

Mass meetings were also held in Lam Dong and Quang Ninh provinces on this occasion.

Radio Gives Review of Nguyen Van Linh's Book

BK0702150990 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese
2330 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Text] On the occasion of the CPV's [Communist Party of Vietnam's] 60th founding anniversary, President Ho Chi Minh's birth centenary, and major anniversaries in 1990, the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Publishing House

has released a book entitled "Some Military and National Defense Problems in the Renovation Undertaking" by Comrade Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the CPV.

The book summarizes a number of speeches and articles by the comrade general secretary since 1984. These speeches and articles concretize and shed more light on our party's correct, creative military lines, thus providing our armed forces and people with concrete guidance so they can successfully carry out socialist construction and firmly defend the socialist Vietnamese fatherland.

Over the past several decades, in order to liberate and defend the fatherland, our party has led our entire people in its struggle to defeat the war of aggression waged by our enemies who possess greater numerical strength and who are superior to us in terms of modern weapons, war means, and technology.

As pointed out by the comrade general secretary, our people have acquired an extremely valuable tradition after thousands of years of national construction and defense. Our people's war is of a unique nature. It takes very rich and creative forms and is patterned after the characteristics of the Vietnamese people. Under the feudal system, our people use to adhere to the tradition of all people joining the armed forces and setting out to fight the enemy for national defense. During the wars of resistance against France and the United States, under the party's leadership, the Vietnam people's war reached a new development stage. Particularly, during the anti-U.S. national liberation struggle, we fought the enemy on the military and political fronts, applying the three-pronged tactic—military attacks, political activities, and enemy troop proselyting—in all three strategic areas—the mountain regions, the countryside, and the lowland and urban areas—and using three categories of troops—main forces, regional forces, and militia and guerrilla forces.

During the general offensives and uprisings in the early spring of 1975, by combining the attacks of our main forces with the combat activities of our regional forces and the masses' uprising movement, we completely liberated the south.

A new development has taken place in our country after our people successfully defeated the two wars of aggression in the southernmost and northernmost parts of our country and after the Vietnam volunteer army outstandingly fulfilled its duty toward the Cambodian people. A relatively peaceful situation has prevailed in the entire nation. Nevertheless, because there still exist many burning points and because the enemy continues to resort to dark schemes and sabotage acts, this peaceful situation is yet to be complete and durable.

Therefore, while taking steps to firmly shift the entire people's activities to large-scale peaceful national construction and devoting the overall national strength to promoting economic development, which is our key

objective, we should see through the enemies' short-term and long-term perfidious schemes, constantly heighten vigilance, and stand ready to cope with all circumstances.

The new situations and tasks facing our revolution and the world revolution make it necessary for us to form new concepts about the responsibility toward the defense of the fatherland and national defense and security. We can neither analyze all issues from a point of view based on the development of wars, especially the war for national liberation, nor can we completely turn a blind eye to valuable past experiences. The contents of the new political thinking and new military thinking lie in a correct solution to this important problem.

The resolution of the sixth party congress has pointed out: Renovation is an urgent requirement for our country and a common trend of development of the era. We must renovate our thinking, workstyle, organization, cadre-related work, and all aspects of social life. Only by so doing can there exist conditions for our country to resolve current difficult problems and surge forward.

Along with the country's common process of renovation, we must carry out renovation in the military and national defense domains. According to the comrade general secretary, we must have an accurate conception of renovation in the military domain. This is because renovation in the military domain is not the same as in the economic domain. In the military domain, our people and army have acquired many valuable experiences and traditions that should be revived, maintained, and developed in such a way as to suit the new conditions in our country. This also means renovation.

Our party's military line during the period of building and defending the socialist fatherland has been delineated to establish the all-people national defense system, build up the people's armed forces, and carry out people's war for the defense of the country. This military line is also the continuation and development of that adopted by the party during the national democratic revolution and liberation war.

Objectively and scientifically analyzing the new situation and conditions in the country and needs arising from the current task of defending the socialist fatherland, the comrade general secretary pointed out the orientations and tasks for the development of national defense and people's armed forces at present as follows:

—Regarding national defense, we advocate the establishment of a solid and sufficiently strong all-people national defense system in close combination with economic development by relying on the strength and direct participation of the entire people. This is aimed at creating an array for people's warfare on a national scale.

We must adopt an organizational system and design a mechanism to ensure that when a war arises, all socioeconomic life activities can readily be shifted to wartime

footing and the latent power of the all-people national defense can be turned into the real strength of the people's war for national defense.

Applying the motto that the entire people participate in national construction and defense, we must pare down national defense expenditures step by step but, at the same time, must ensure that we still can increase our national defense capacity and remain active under all circumstances.

—As for the development of the armed forces, we must build up the people's armed forces, which comprise the three categories of troops. Among these forces, there should be a standing army of high quality and efficiency and with sufficient or relatively small numerical strength and a powerful, judiciously managed, and well-trained reserve force with a suitable mechanism of mobilization to rapidly expand itself in case of war.

Meanwhile, attention must be paid to rationally developing the local armed forces comprising local army and militia and self-defense units, especially on the defense front line and in key areas.

Apart from its practical guiding value, the book "Some Military and National Defense Problems in the Renovation Undertaking" renders highly effective help to us in studying and recapitulating the resistance against the French and recent war against the Americans, as well as in continuing to seek a thorough understanding of the party's military line during the present period of building socialism and defending the socialist fatherland.

Malaysian Foreign Ministry Official Pays Visit

BK0302161890 Hanoi VNA in English 1508 GMT
3 Feb

[Text] Hanoi VNA Feb. 3—Ahmal Kamil Jaafar, secretary general of the Malaysian Foreign Ministry, concluded a four-day visit to Vietnam, today.

The Malaysian diplomat and his party, including senior officials from the Foreign Ministry, the Internal Ministry and the National Security Council of Malaysia, paid tribute to President Ho Chi Minh at his mausoleum, and visited his home and office. The guests were received by Nguyen Co Thach, vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers and foreign minister. They had working sessions with Phan Van Khai, chairman of the State Planning Commission, and Dinh Phu Dinh, vice-minister of external economic relations, and held talks with a delegation of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry led by Vu Khoan, assistant to the foreign minister.

The Malaysian side highly valued the achievements gained by the Vietnamese people in the renovation process, and expressed their desire to broaden the cooperation between the two countries, particularly in rubber production, coal and tin mining, aviation, tourism and banking.

The Vietnamese side welcomed the Malaysian proposals and expressed its readiness to negotiate these issues in order to promote the cooperation between the two countries.

The two sides welcomed regional developments after Vietnam's total troop withdrawal from Cambodia and expressed their wish to contribute to an equitable and reasonable solution to the Cambodia issue, thus building Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, stability and cooperation. They also exchanged views on the issue of illegal Vietnamese migrants to Malaysia, in the spirit of the programme of actions adopted at the international conference on refugees in Geneva in June, 1989.

Memo Signed With Visiting Australian Delegation

BK0602155190 Hanoi VNA in English 1503 GMT
6 Feb 90

[Text] Hanoi VNA February 6—A delegation of the Australian Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade led by Deputy Foreign Minister Michael Lightowler visited Vietnam from January 31 to February 4 to prepare for the signing of an agreement of trade and economic cooperation.

The delegation was received by Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach. It had working sessions with the Ministry for External Economic Relations, the Foreign Ministry and other concerned ministries and general departments.

A memorandum on the discussions was signed between Mr. M. Lightowler and Dinh Phuc, deputy minister for external economic relations.

Vietnam Favors 'Peaceful Reunification' of Korea

BK0302101090 Hong Kong AFP in English 0958 GMT
3 Feb 90

[Excerpts] Hanoi, Feb 3 (AFP)—Vietnam has called for the "peaceful reunification" of the divided Korean peninsula in talks here with North Korea's visiting deputy foreign minister, an official said Saturday [3 February].

Na Pyong-chu is the most senior North Korean official to visit Vietnam in recent years, analysts said. [passage omitted]

An official here said Vietnamese leaders had told the visiting dignitary they favored "a peaceful and independent reunification of the Korean people." [passage omitted]

CSSR To Reduce Number of Vietnamese Workers

AU0602132890 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
31 Jan 90 p 13

[CTK correspondent Milan Smutny Hanoi dispatch: "The SRV Is Limiting its 'Export of People'"]